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POPULIST PROSECUTORIAL
NULLIFICATION
W. KERREL MURRAY*
No one doubts that prosecutors may sometimes decline prosecution notwithstanding factual guilt. Everyone expects prosecutors to prioritize enforcement based
on resource limitation and, occasionally, to decline prosecution on a case-by-case
basis when they deem justice requires it. Recently, however, some state prosecutors
have gone further, asserting the right to refuse categorically to enforce certain state
laws. Examples include refusals to seek the death penalty and refusals to prosecute
prostitution or recreational drug use. When may a single actor render inert her
state’s democratically enacted law in this way? If the answer is anything other than
“never,” the vast reach of American state criminal law demands a pertinent framework for ascertaining legitimacy.
In offering one, this Article provides the first extended analysis of the normative
import of the locally elected status of the state prosecutors who make such pledges.
If legitimacy is the problem, local elections can be the solution. That is, there may
well be something suspect about unilateral prosecutorial negation of democratically
enacted law. Yet that same negation can be justified as distinctly democratic when
the elected prosecutor can wrap it in popular sanction.
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This Article first unspools a once-robust American tradition of localized, populist
nonenforcement of criminal law, best seen in jury nullification. It then draws upon
democratic theory to construct a normative basis for reviving that tradition in the
context of state prosecutors’ categorical nonenforcement. These moves uncover a
before-now unappreciated connection: At least where the prosecutor ties her categorical nullification to the polity’s electorally expressed will, she accomplishes
wholesale what nullifying juries could once do retail. I thus dub that wholesale
action “populist prosecutorial nullification.” Building upon that analogy and my
normative analysis, I set out a novel framework for evaluating state prosecutors’
categorical nonenforcement that is keyed to the concept of localized popular will,
while accounting for populism’s well-known downsides.
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INTRODUCTION
A district attorney candidate promises, if elected, not to enforce
prostitution laws.1 A district attorney refuses to enforce gun laws he
deems constitutionally suspect.2 Others pledge never to prosecute any
recreational drug use, or never to seek the death penalty against eligible defendants.3 No one thinks that prosecutors can or should
enforce the law to the hilt. But does their discretionary power really
authorize unilateral negation of democratically enacted law?
The question is timely. Real state prosecutors proposed—
recently—those just-described nonenforcement policies. It is not hard
to hypothesize more. Though attention often skews federal, the 94
presidentially appointed United States Attorneys are vastly outnumbered by over 2,300 chief state-level prosecutors,4 most of whom are
elected locally to serve in districts keyed to counties and multi-county
areas.5 All possess substantial, rarely questioned discretion over
whether to charge an offense when probable cause gives them

43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 90 Side A
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1 See Otillia Steadman, Sex Work Could Soon Be Allowed in a Huge Part of New York
City, BUZZFEED NEWS (June 14, 2019), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
otilliasteadman/tiffany-caban-sex-work-queens-decriminalization-new-york; Matt
Charnock, Boudin Will Not Prosecute Prostitution, Public Camping, and Other ‘Quality-ofLife Crimes’ Once Sworn In, SFIST (Nov. 16, 2019), https://sfist.com/2019/11/16/boudinwill-not-prosecute-prostitution-public-camping-and-other-quality-of-life-crimes-oncesworn-in.
2 Press Release, Ronald C. Dozier, McLean Cnty. State’s Att’y, Second Amendment
and Illinois Gun Laws (Aug. 21, 2012), https://www.mcleancountyil.gov/DocumentCenter/
View/940/SAOPressRelease090612?bidId= (invoking Second Amendment as grounds for
announcing that the McLean County State’s Attorney’s Office will no longer enforce
certain Illinois statutes relating to firearms).
3 E.g., Wesley Bell, End the Death Penalty, FRIENDS OF WESLEY BELL, https://
www.votewesleybell.com/end-the-death-penalty (last visited Feb. 20, 2020); Krasner for
District Attorney, Krasner on the Issues, https://krasnerforda.com/platform (last visited
Feb. 20, 2020) (“Exercising his discretion as District Attorney, Larry will never seek the
death sentence.”); Monivette Cordeiro & Jeff Weiner, Aramis Ayala Won’t Seek ReElection as Orange-Osceola State Attorney; Belvin Perry May Enter Race, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (May 28, 2019), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-nearamis-ayala-no-re-election-run-orange-osceola-state-attorney-20190528z65rv7rmqjdqfoyxsd6rp6junu-story.html (noting that Orange-Osceola State Attorney
Aramis Ayala revealed, “[s]oon after taking office” that she would never seek the death
penalty); John Wagner, Queens District Attorney Candidate Backed by Sanders, Warren,
Ocasio-Cortez Claims Primary Win, WASH. POST (June 26, 2019, 10:49 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/queens-district-attorney-candidate-backed-by-leadingliberals-claims-primary-win/2019/06/26/438f03b8-9802-11e9-830a-21b9b36b64ad_story.html
(“During her Democratic primary campaign, Cabán made clear that if she prevailed . . .
recreational drug users [would not be prosecuted] . . . .”).
4 See Steven W. Perry & Duren Banks, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 2007 NATIONAL CENSUS
OF STATE COURT PROSECUTORS 1 (2011).
5 See CARISSA B. HESSICK, UNIV. N.C. SCH. L., THE PROSECUTORS AND POLITICS
PROJECT, NATIONAL STUDY OF PROSECUTOR ELECTIONS 4, 10 (2020) [hereinafter
HESSICK, NATIONAL STUDY].

43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 90 Side B

04/16/2021 13:23:52

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-1\NYU103.txt

176

unknown

Seq: 4

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7-APR-21

17:25

[Vol. 96:173

authority to charge, which means they can block the enforcement of
criminal law against the factually guilty by simply refusing to prosecute.6 At least on the retail level, most agree that such declinations are
not only inevitable but optimal. They facilitate deserved mercy and oil
the gears of criminal justice.7 Not only are resources limited, but some
cases of factual guilt would simply be wrong to pursue.8 Either way,
no one doubts that prosecutors sometimes may thwart the law’s application where, by its letter, it would govern.
The question is how far “sometimes” goes. As the opening examples show, prosecutors are beginning to stretch their power beyond
mine-run resource-driven nonenforcement and one-off ex post declinations in “anomalous cases” of factual guilt.9 Instead, some propose

43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 90 Side B
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6 See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“[T]he decision whether
or not to prosecute . . . generally rests entirely in [the prosecutor’s] discretion.” (quoting
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978))); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,
364–65 (1978) (same); Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power,
and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 408–10, 448 (2001). The United States has
never adopted the European principle of “mandatory prosecution,” which theoretically
renders prosecution nondiscretionary. See Shawn Boyne, German Prosecutors and the
Rechtsstaat, in PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY 138, 147
(Máximo Langer & David A. Sklansky, eds., 2017) (describing how in Germany, unlike the
United States, criminal law relies on mandatory prosecution which “attempts to regulate
prosecutorial decision-making and mandate prosecutors’ fidelity to the law”).
7 See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607–08 (cautioning that a judicial review of prosecution
“delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement . . . and may undermine
prosecutorial effectiveness”); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311–12 (1987) (“[A]
capital punishment system that did not allow for discretionary acts of leniency ‘would be
totally alien to our notions of criminal justice.’” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
200 n.50 (1976))); Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the
Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1352–54 (2008) (challenging the notion that
prosecutorial discretion should be treated differently than other tools of mercy like
nullification and clemency); Albert W. Alschuler, A Teetering Palladium?, 79 JUDICATURE
200, 201 (1996) (“[T]he discretion of prosecutors . . . not to enforce the law is not only
tolerated but applauded . . . .”); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power,
94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1551 (1981) (“[S]ome nonenforcement of the law will occur
anyway [i.e., always].”).
8 See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243,
1252–54, 1256–57 (2011) (listing examples of where it may be wrong to pursue a case, such
as where punishment is too harsh, enforcement of a law is detrimental to the community,
there are moral justifications for violating the law, or in exchange for a defendant’s
cooperation).
9 Vorenberg, supra note 7, at 1551–52 (justifying prosecutorial nonenforcement in
such “anomalous” cases but expressing doubt about its potential transformation into “a
general power to control conviction and punishment”); see also William H. Simon, Should
Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 217, 226 (1996) (“Prosecutorial
nullification is widely considered legitimate in circumstances where the application of a
statute produces an especially harsh or anomalous result or where an entire statute . . .
seems out of tune with contemporary sentiment . . . .”). I use “not enforce” or variants to
refer both to absolute nonenforcement policies and policies of systematic
underenforcement. The latter includes strongly presumptive nonenforcement.
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to de facto decriminalize10 in full or in part, through programmatic
prosecutorial nullification: categorical prospective negation of law
based on per se or as applied opposition to that law.11 Complicating
matters, these prosecutors may be locally elected, but the laws they’re
nullifying are statewide laws.12
Qualms? Join the former Attorney General of the United States,
William Barr, who while in office condemned “social justice” prosecutors who “undercut[] the police, let[] criminals off the hook, and
refus[e] to enforce the law.”13 This is no throwaway line: In 2020, he
established a federal commission to, among other things, study
“[r]efusals by State and local prosecutors to enforce laws or prosecute
categories of crimes.”14
He is not alone. A Pennsylvania-based Federal Chief Prosecutor,
William M. McSwain, slammed Larry Krasner, his Philadelphia-based
state counterpart, for “ignor[ing]” “entire sections of the criminal
code.”15 After Rachael Rollins won in Massachusetts on a nonenforcement platform, police officers claimed they would “continue to
arrest” lawbreakers, neighboring chief prosecutors condemned her,
and the National Police Association filed an ethics complaint.16 And a

43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 91 Side A
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10 By “decriminalization” I mean prosecutors’ “de facto power of decriminalization by
. . . selective enforcement or nonenforcement.” Stanislaw Pomorski, On Multiculturalism,
Concepts of Crime, and the “De Minimis” Defense, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 51, 99 (1997); see
also Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 785,
796–97 (2012) (describing how prosecutors engage in decriminalization).
11 See, e.g., Charnock, supra note 1 (quoting newly elected San Francisco district
attorney’s pledge that certain crimes “should not and will not be prosecuted”).
12 See Kay Levine, The State’s Role in Prosecutorial Politics, in THE CHANGING ROLE
OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 31, 31–32 (John L. Worrall & M. Elaine NugentBorakove eds., 2008) (“[T]he state is the source of formal penal legislation, but
enforcement is determined exclusively by local prosecutors guided by community priorities
and resources.”).
13 William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at the Grand Lodge
Fraternal Order of Police’s 64th National Biennial Conference (Aug. 12, 2019), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarks-grandlodge-fraternal-order-polices-64th.
14 Press Release, William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Attorney General
William P. Barr Announces the Establishment of the Presidential Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/attorney-general-william-p-barr-announces-establishment-presidential-commission-law.
15 Press Release, William M. McSwain, U.S. Att’y, E. Dist. of Pa., Statement by United
States Attorney William M. McSwain on the Shooting of Six Philadelphia Police Officers
(Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/statement-united-states-attorneywilliam-m-mcswain-shooting-six-philadelphia-police.
16 Andrea Estes & Shelley Murphy, Stopping Injustice or Putting the Public at Risk?
Suffolk DA Rachael Rollins’s Tactics Spur Pushback, BOS. GLOBE (July 6, 2019), https://
www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/07/06/stopping-injustice-putting-public-risk-suffolkrachael-rollins-tactics-spur-pushback/IFC6Rp4tVHiVhOf2t97bFI/story.html; Carissa
Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, The National Police Association Is Throwing a Fit
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Florida prosecutor’s announcement that she would refuse to ever seek
the death penalty engendered the Florida governor’s reassignment of
all her death-eligible cases.17
Others are unperturbed. For example, focusing on nullification by
“progressive prosecutors,” some say blanket nonenforcement offers
“underrepresented and disenfranchised” communities “more power
to choose how to police themselves.”18 In that vein, some “current and
former elected prosecutors” directly challenged the Attorney General
to support nonenforcement that “move[s] conduct better addressed
with public health responses out of the justice system.”19
Blossoming, it seems, is a reimagining of prosecutorial discretion
that goes beyond nipping and tucking to embrace substantive
reworking of the law within a district attorney’s jurisdiction. And
repurposing old power for new ends uncovers scholarly gaps. Writing
in 2014, one scholar of programmatic prosecutorial nonenforcement
observed it had received “only a few relatively brief and impressionistic treatments.”20 Since then, sparked by prominent federal nonenforcement policies, scholars have begun spinning out normative
frameworks.21 They have trained deserved attention on the distinction
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over Prosecutorial Discretion, SLATE (Jan. 4, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/
2019/01/national-police-association-throwing-fit.html.
17 Ayala v. Scott, 224 So. 3d 755, 756–57 (Fla. 2017).
18 John Pfaff, Boston’s New D.A. Pushes Back Against Prosecutors’ ‘PunishmentCentric’ Point of View, THE APPEAL (Nov. 14, 2018), https://theappeal.org/bostons-new-dapushes-back-against-the-punishment-centric-point-of-view-of-prosecutors; see also Carissa
Byrne Hessick, Elected Prosecutors and Non-Prosecution Policies, PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept. 8,
2018, 9:37 AM), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/09/elected-prosecutorsand-non-prosecution-policies.html (defending decriminalization through discretion); Sam
Reisman, The Rise of the Progressive Prosecutor, LAW360 (Apr. 7, 2019), https://
www.law360.com/articles/1145615/the-rise-of-the-progressive-prosecutor (highlighting four
progressive prosecutors: Wesley Bell, Rachael Rollins, Larry Krasner, and Kim Foxx).
19 Press Release, Fair & Just Prosecution, Statement in Response to Attorney General
Barr’s Remarks to the Fraternal Order of Police (Aug. 19, 2019), https://
fairandjustprosecution.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Barr-Remarks-Sign-OnStatement.pdf.
20 Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV.
671, 678 (2014).
21 Compare id. at 673–76 (discussing the Obama Administration’s federal
nonenforcement policies keyed to “certain federal marijuana offenses” and the “removal
of certain sympathetic undocumented immigrants,” ultimately concluding that
“categorical” nonenforcement policies are presumptively invalid without congressional
authority), and Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take
Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 (2013) (“[T]here is simply no general presidential
nonenforcement power.”), and Sam Kamin, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Context of
Immigration and Marijuana Law Reform: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 14 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 183, 185–86 (2016) (arguing that the Obama Administration “turned to the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion rather than legislative change to achieve its [marijuana
law enforcement and immigration] policy outcomes”), with Leigh Osofsky, The Case for
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between anodyne, individualized case-specific nonenforcement and
programmatic nonenforcement that de facto nullifies democratically
enacted law. Likely because of their federal inspiration, however,
scholars debating these issues have focused on the federal context.22
Necessarily minimized in the scholarship, then, is the degree to
which the United States’s globally unusual institutional choice to
enforce most criminal law with locally elected prosecutors23 might
matter for programmatic nonenforcement. This Article fills that gap
with the first full-length normative assessment of state prosecutors’
programmatic nullification that centers that institutional choice.24
That analysis draws on, and richens, multiple scholarly debates.
First, I place novel emphasis on these prosecutors’ elected status to
situate this phenomenon within a broader, longstanding debate on the
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Categorical Nonenforcement, 69 TAX L. REV. 73, 75–76, 131–32 (2015) (supporting
categorical nonenforcement in some circumstances).
22 See, e.g., Price, supra note 20, at 673–74 (focusing on “enforcement discretion” in the
federal criminal and administrative contexts and employing “close examination of the
[federal] Constitution’s text, structure, and normative underpinnings”); Delahunty & Yoo,
supra note 21, at 785 (critiquing policy-based nonenforcement of federal immigration law
on federal constitutional grounds); Osofsky, supra note 21, at 131–32 (analyzing the
categorical nonenforcement of federal tax law); Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg,
Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1201 (2014).
23 See David Alan Sklansky, Unpacking the Relationship Between Prosecutors and
Democracy in the United States, in PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL
STUDY, supra note 6, at 276, 277.
24 Some recent, shorter scholarship has begun to address this issue. See, e.g., Hessick,
supra note 18 (arguing that decriminalization decisions are not solely reserved for the
legislature); Hessick & Hessick, supra note 16 (criticizing Rachael Rollins’s opponents and
observing that “[t]he law has long recognized that prosecutors have discretion not to
charge”); Pfaff, supra note 18 (objecting to the ideas that a blanket policy of
decriminalization would lead to increased crime or violate the separation of powers). The
most on-point recent piece highlights the relevance of state prosecutors’ elected status en
route to defending their programmatic nonenforcement as valuable under a “functional”
view of the separation of powers, though its normative conclusions stay within the
separation-of-powers milieu. See Logan Sawyer, Reform Prosecutors and Separation of
Powers, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 603, 609–11, 621, 625 (2020). One recent note touched briefly on
the unique issues of democratic control posed by state prosecutors’ programmatic
nonenforcement policies. See, e.g., John E. Foster, Note, Charges to Be Declined: Legal
Challenges and Policy Debates Surrounding Non-Prosecution Initiatives in Massachusetts,
60 B.C. L. REV. 2511, 2534–35 (2019). Otherwise, scholars engaging this state-level trend
have not focused on developing a normative framework. See, e.g., Thea Johnson, Fictional
Pleas, 94 IND. L.J. 855, 870–76 (2019); Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution,”
132 HARV. L. REV. 748, 751–54 (2018); David Alan Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s
Handbook, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 25, 25–26 (2017). Broader treatments of
underenforcement’s relationship to democracy have not grappled with the phenomenon
examined here, although the leading article raises important considerations for any
normative framework rooted in democratic ideals. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff,
Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1740, 1752 (2006).
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proper role of the democratic public inside and outside criminal law.25
Drawing on democratic theory, I advocate analyzing the trend
through a popular sovereignty lens, thus advancing still-budding scholarship on the proper democratic role of the prosecutor.26 Second, I
couple that approach with a once-robust American tradition of localized, populist control of criminal law—best seen in jury nullification—
to uncover an unappreciated similarity. When fettered to localized
popular will, programmatic prosecutorial nullification acts as a
hydraulic descendant of jury nullification: It facilitates wholesale the
species of democratic local control that jury nullification permits
retail. Thus, far from lawless novelty, this populist prosecutorial nulli-
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25 See, e.g., Daniel S. McConkie, Jr., Criminal Justice Citizenship, 72 FLA. L. REV. 1023,
1025–26 (2020); see K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 89–91,
97–98 (2016) (discussing “popular sovereignty—the political agency of citizens to control
and direct action of the state” and the ways in which democratic agency should be
structured); David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699,
1705–06 (2005) (tracking the rise of “democratic pluralism” in postwar America, its
influence in criminal procedure, and the beginning of “participatory democracy” in the
1960s); Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a
Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2749–51 (2014)
(“[D]emosprudence represents a philosophical commitment to the lawmaking force of
meaningful participatory democracy.”); infra Part II. Compare John Rappaport, Some
Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 716 (2020)
(“[W]e follow this path of ‘democratization’ at considerable peril.”), and RACHEL E.
BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS INCARCERATION
105–24 (2019) (indicting the influence of “the masses” as a major cause of criminal justice
dysfunction), with Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U.
L. REV. 1367, 1397 (2017) (“[T]he movement to democratize criminal justice refers to a
form of criminal law and procedure that is responsive to the laity rather than solely to
officials and experts . . . .”), and ALBERT W. DZUR, PUNISHMENT, PARTICIPATORY
DEMOCRACY, AND THE JURY 17, 94–95, 106–21 (2012) (“Being bored with government . . .
[is] a symptom of both institutional and cultural failure . . . failure to trust the contributions
of the nonexpert . . . a failure of democratic self-respect.”), and Stephanos Bibas,
Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 912–14
(2006) (discussing the tension between the “insiders—namely, judges, police, and
especially prosecutors” and the “outsiders—namely, victims and the general public”), and
Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV.
249, 300–02 (2019) (advocating more popular inclusion in criminal law).
26 See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 25, at 781 (“A curious omission from the [criminallaw] democratization agenda is any discussion of . . . prosecutorial elections.”); see also
Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1203, 1207 (2020) (noting an
“absence of a normative theory of prosecutorial behavior”); Jessica A. Roth, Prosecutorial
Declination Statements, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 477, 486 (2020) (observing that
“little attention has been paid to how prosecutors should communicate with the public”
about declinations); Máximo Langer & David Alan Sklansky, Introduction, in
PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 6, at 1, 1 (“The
relationship between prosecutors and democracy is particularly unclear.”); John L.
Worrall, Prosecution in America: A Historical and Comparative Account, in THE
CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR, supra note 12, at 3, 4–9; Michael
Tonry, Prosecutors and Politics in Comparative Perspective, 41 CRIME & JUST. 1, 26–27
(2012).
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fication grows from longstanding democratic thought. Third and
finally, aided by my distillation of populist prosecutorial nullification,
I offer a concrete framework for scrutinizing these policies. In short,
legitimate policies reflect a localized popular will and do not invidiously trench on the self-determination of those whose will they do not
implement. This framework, I argue, can provide normative
grounding for evaluating prosecutorial categorical nonenforcement
for a variety of actors, including state-level entities with the power to
overrule local behavior.27
Three points of order before beginning. First, for analogical purposes, I focus on the petit (trial) jury in this Article, and references to
the jury are to that jury unless otherwise noted.28 Second, I focus on
categorical prosecutorial nullification as a subset of prosecutorial nonenforcement.29 These are cases where prosecutors act analogously to
the nullifying jury—i.e., refusing to apply inarguably applicable law
because of moral or ideological opposition to that law in all or a
subset of cases.30 While this is not true of all prosecutorial nonenforcement,31 this subset poses the thorniest questions, as it at first blush
seems to represent willful rejection of a democratic will expressed
through elected representatives. Finally, although I focus on prosecutors, I recognize that other actors possess similar discretionary nonenforcement power.32 Police officers may “nullify” through nonarrest,33
27

See infra Section IV.D.2.
Some aspects of the indicting grand jury (such as the possibility of seeing it as a
populist mechanism to thwart the enforcement of the law) might be amenable to the
treatment I give the petit jury. See generally Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion
and Constitutional Design, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 703 (2008). But differences, including
perhaps most notably the greater state freedom not to use the grand jury, see SARA SUN
BEALE, WILLIAM C. BRYSON, TAYLOR H. CRABTREE, JAMES E. FELMAN, MICHAEL J.
ELSTON & KATHERINE EARLE YANES, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:5 (2d ed.
database updated Nov. 2019), Westlaw GRJURLAW, lead me to focus on the petit jury in
this Article.
29 Cf. Fairfax, supra note 8, at 1245 (drawing distinction).
30 Compare Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 877,
888, 892 (1999) (arguing that juries nullify because of disagreement with a particular law
itself or disagreement with law as applied in particular circumstances), with Fairfax, supra
note 8, at 1252–53 (defining prosecutorial nullification). The analogy is not perfect, see id.
at 1248–49 n.23, but it is on all fours for present purposes: in both settings, applicable,
otherwise legitimate law is rejected for ideological or value-driven reasons.
31 See Fairfax, supra note 8, at 1254–58 (outlining non-nullification nonenforcement
cases).
32 Id. at 1247 (noting that “enforcement officers, petit and grand juries, and judges” all
have the ability to forego prosecution).
33 Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 198 (2019). Note
that prosecutorial discretion is looked upon more favorably than police nonenforcement.
See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 15.1(c) (4th ed. 2020), Westlaw CRIMPROC (“[I]n the eyes of the law,
discretion by the prosecutor is considered proper while discretion by the police is with rare
28
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and judges might wield discretion to impede conviction.34 But as even
a recent critic of overstated prosecutorial power concedes, “virtually
every criminal justice outcome can be traced to a prosecutor’s decision.”35 Prosecutors’ unquestioned importance makes them worthy of
targeted inquiry, notwithstanding other actors’ relevance.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I unspools the power of
two institutions that can excuse the factually guilty: the jury and the
prosecutor. Part II draws on democratic theory to elaborate—and justify employing—a democratic vision focused on autonomy and catalyzed by the subsidiarity of district attorney elections. Part III employs
that vision to construct a framework for evaluating programmatic
prosecutorial nullification. That framework reveals key democracyreinforcing benefits at the phenomenon’s most legitimate core—populist prosecutorial nullification. Part IV engages potential criticisms.
Part V applies the framework to real-world cases and considers its
implications for future study of jury nullification and conventional
prosecutorial behavior.
I
DISCRETION: THE JURY

AND THE

PROSECUTOR

Exceptions in criminal law are nothing new; de minimis non curat
lex is Latin for a reason.36 But exceptions are not limited to trifles.
Long before “progressive prosecutors,” American juries and prosecutors have had generally unchecked discretionary power to excuse ille-
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exception viewed with disfavor.” (citation omitted)). Moreover, if officers care about
converting their arrests to prosecutions and convictions, “arrest rates [should] respond
endogenously to changes in district attorney behavior.” Sam Krumholz, The Effect of
District Attorneys on Local Criminal Justice Outcomes 10–11 (Jan. 3, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the New York University Law Review). Prosecutorial nullification
thus warrants examination irrespective of the police’s role.
34 See Bellin, supra note 33, at 194–98 (“A particularly crafty judge could undermine a
prosecution simply by declining to call a case in a predictable fashion.”). Some of this
Article’s analysis may bear on state court judge behavior, at least those elected at a local
level. It might be, however, that the differences in the judicial role might require different
treatment of electorally sanctioned “judicial nullification.” Cf. David E. Pozen, Judicial
Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2084, 2086 (2010)
(considering whether judicial elections imply “that sensitivity to public opinion is part of
the job description,” but observing role-based opposition to such sensitivity among some
supporters of judicial elections (citation omitted)); id. at 2126–27 (flagging the possibility
that even those generally committed to populist collective self-rule might yet want to
preserve one branch of government as expressly “backward looking” and
“nonmajoritarian”). I do not attempt to resolve these differences in this piece.
35 Bellin, supra note 33, at 212.
36 See United States v. Lehman, 468 F.2d 93, 103 (7th Cir. 1972) (applying this common
law principle, which means “the law does not concern itself with trifles”); Anna Roberts,
Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327, 334–36 (2017) (discussing state-law
incorporation of the Model Penal Code’s de minimis provision).
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gality.37 Understanding that power, and its justification, is key to
understanding populist prosecutorial nullification.
A. Jury Nullification and Democracy
For better or worse, the diminished role38 of today’s criminal jury
would likely have been unimaginable to the Founding generation.
They knew a robust jury with substantial discretionary power to control outcomes in service of the jurors’ view of justice. They had read
William Blackstone’s praise for the grand and petit juries as the
“sacred bulwark of the nation,” which “preserve[d] in the hands of the
people that share which they ought to have in the administration of
public justice.”39 They thus saw nothing untoward in juries deciding
the contours of applicable law as well as the case-specific facts.40 For
the same reasons, they supported the jury’s ability to acquit despite a
proven case, i.e., jury nullification.41 Then, as now, nullifying jurors
might have (1) thought the law in question morally illegitimate, or (2)
thought the law generally acceptable but wrong to apply in cases of a
certain sort, or to a specific defendant.42 Such exercises of power were
fresh in Founding-era cultural memory. Most would have been
familiar with the English jury that ignored judicial harangues to reject
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37 See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and
Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 455 (1998) (“The jury’s check on
punishment is . . . similar to the power of the executive to refuse to prosecute: both are
assumed to be beyond the reach of judicial order or legislative mandate.”).
38 See, e.g., Aliza Plener Cover, Supermajoritarian Criminal Justice, 87 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 875, 905–06 (2019) (describing scholarly agreement on the jury’s “atroph[y]” and
collecting sources); see also DZUR, supra note 25, at 5–6 (observing the long “decline” of
the American jury, as measured through the decline of trials and the rise of pleas); see also
infra text accompanying notes 72–81.
39 4 W ILLIAM B LACKSTONE , C OMMENTARIES 350; 3 W ILLIAM B LACKSTONE ,
COMMENTARIES 380.
40 See, e.g., Jenny E. Carroll, Nullification as Law, 102 GEO. L. J. 579, 587–88 (2014)
(“[J]uries conferred a meaning in the law previously absent by driving the law beyond its
prescriptive limitations towards a descriptive construct.”); see also JEFFREY ABRAMSON,
WE, THE JURY 30–32 (2000).
41 See Carroll, supra note 40, at 588 (“[T]he Founders understood th[e] right [to
criminal jury trials] to include a citizen’s right to interpret law and to nullify it.” (emphasis
added)); Barkow, supra note 7, at 1340 (defining jury nullification and explaining why a
jury may opt to nullify). These are distinct concepts. One can imagine a jury acquitting
after adjudicating the law (e.g., resolving an ambiguity in a defendant’s favor) without
believing that it was acquitting “despite proof of the case,” i.e., without acquitting
“against” the law.
42 See, e.g., Marder, supra note 30, at 892. Some argue that a hung jury’s refusal to
convict—if based on some jurors’ wish to nullify—constitutes nullification. See, e.g., id. at
881. Because nothing here turns on the difference, this Article assumes that nullification
requires acquittal.
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unlawful assembly charges against William Penn.43 Even more would
have known, and approved, of the colonial jury that acquitted John
Zenger of “seditious libel” against the Crown despite little doubt that
conviction was warranted under the law announced by the court.44
There was, in short, a general understanding of the jury as representing “a procedural system and a legal culture whose every feature
tended to underscore and reinforce the centrality of lay control.”45
Take it from John Adams: jurors had the “right” and “Duty” to “find
the verdict according to” their conscience and judgment, “tho [sic] in
Direct opposition to the Direction of the Court.”46 The authorities
and the law as they enunciated it could be wrong, or at least contrary
to the people’s “best Understanding, Judgment, and Conscience.”47
For Federalists and Anti-Federalists, this was a consensus position.48 It
is thus unsurprising that the jury’s importance was uncontroverted at
the Constitutional Convention.49
The Convention, however, precipitated a debate about the importance of the local jury. Anti-Federalists deemed it indispensable to
preserve popular control over criminal law.50 They recounted the
many cases in which local juries had thwarted perceived English
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43 See ABRAMSON, supra note 40, at 68–73 (“[The] jurors [of Penn’s trial] had made
their own assessment of the law, or at least had rejected that put forth by the court.”)
(quoting historian Thomas Andrew Green); see also Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury
“Nullification”: When May and Should a Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice, 30 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 239, 241 (1993).
44 See Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role
in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 52 (2003) (recounting defense’s
argument that the jurors had “the right . . . to determine both the law and the fact”);
ABRAMSON, supra note 40, at 73–74 (calling Zenger’s trial “the defining moment . . . for
the English jury”). Notably, the Crown brought those charges via information after three
grand juries refused to indict. Barkow, supra, at 52.
45 LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 157 (2004); see also Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000, Term
Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 31 (2001) (describing juries as “render[ing]
verdicts based on their own interpretation and understanding of the constitution”);
ABRAMSON, supra note 40, at 30–32.
46 Kramer, supra note 45, at 31.
47 Id.
48 E.g., Donald M. Middlebrooks, Reviving Thomas Jefferson’s Jury: Sparf and Hansen
v. United States Reconsidered, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 353, 354 (2004) (“Federalists and
Anti-Federalists alike all—support the belief in a jury responsible for deciding both fact
and law.”).
49 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 261 (Alexander Hamilton) (Michael A. Genovese
ed., 2009) (“The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in
nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury . . . .”).
50 See Middlebrooks, supra note 48, at 387–88 (noting that the leading Anti-Federalist
described juries as “drawn from the body of the people . . . we secure to the people at
large, their just and rightful control in the judicial department”); ABRAMSON, supra note
40, at 22–29 (quoting Patrick Henry’s insistence that not mandating local juries rendered
jury trials “instrument[s] for tyranny”). Anti-Federalists also suggested that local juries
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oppression.51 Federalists warned that localized juries could compromise partiality.52 Ultimately, while Article III was silent on locality,
the Anti-Federalists won much of the debate.53 The Sixth Amendment
required trial by a jury “of the State and district” of the crime’s commission, and the contemporaneous Judiciary Act of 1789 required trial
in, and a jury drawn from, the county of the offense.54 The Fifth
Amendment’s double-jeopardy bar, too, reflected the drafters’ desire
to preserve the jury’s ability, via acquittal, to permanently place an
accused beyond prosecution.55 Indeed, the jury is fairly called the
“paradigmatic image underlying the Bill of Rights.”56
One could surely question how much historical approaches
should constrain how we think about the modern jury.57 But understanding why the Founders lauded the jury at least offers some basis
for asking whether their reasons have contemporary purchase. At any
rate, the Supreme Court insists that history matters here.58 And the
foundational, Constitutionally-enshrined view of the jury was one of a
localized lay body with power to control local operation of criminal
law, through its interpretations of law and fact and—sometimes—nullification.59 Thus, well into the nineteenth century, federal judges (and
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would be superior fact-finders. See id. at 28–29 (citing Anti-Federalists insisting on the
importance of popular, local influence).
51 See ABRAMSON, supra note 40, at 23–24 (describing juries as “resistance bodies”).
52 See id. at 25–26 (noting Federalist fear that localized juries would be insufficiently
disinterested because of their familiarity with the region and persons involved).
53 See id. at 26–27 (“The Anti-Federalist success in forcing amendment of the
Constitution, shrinking the geography of jury justice to some area smaller than the state,
shows the vitality of the local jury ideal.”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as
a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1186 (1991) (noting that the Sixth Amendment went “a
step beyond the language of Article III”).
54 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 29, 1 Stat. 73; see also
ABRAMSON, supra note 40, at 35–36 (sketching the contents and implications of the Sixth
Amendment and Judiciary Act’s treatment of the jury). The Judiciary Act is
“contemporaneous and weighty evidence of [the Constitution’s] true meaning.” Wisconsin
v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888).
55 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 44, at 48–49 (arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause
“necessarily” implies the “power to decide the law as well as the facts”); see also Peter
Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SUP. CT.
REV. 81, 84, 129–32 (1978).
56 See Amar, supra note 53, at 1190 (observing that jury appears in three amendments
and shaped three others).
57 See, e.g., Joan L. Larsen, Ancient Juries and Modern Judges: Originalism’s Uneasy
Relationship with the Jury, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 959, 964, 1001–02 (2010).
58 See S. Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343, 353 (2012) (“[T]he scope of the
constitutional jury right must be informed by the historical role of the jury at common
law.” (quoting Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 170 (2009))).
59 See, e.g., Laura I. Appleman, Local Democracy, Community Adjudication, and
Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1413, 1416–17 (2017) (sketching the early jury’s
facilitation of local control over “the content of . . . substantive law”); see also Joshua
Kleinfeld, Three Principles of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1455, 1484
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Justices) “instructed [criminal] juries that they were the ‘judges both
of the law and the fact’” and “not bound by the opinion of the
court.”60 The Anti-Federalists’s victory implemented the
Declaration’s paean to the “consent of the governed” as indispensable
to legitimate government.61 It reflected broad acceptance that the
People’s non-expert sense of justice was not only worth respecting but
should often carry the day.62 And the choice of a local scope to define
the relevant People reflected the belief that those within the community where “the crime shall have been committed” have a materially
different stake in the question of guilt than those outside it.63
This vision’s major deficiencies temper any praise it is due. It
excluded enslaved people, and even in “free” Northern states no
African Americans served on juries before 1860.64 Gender, property,
and religious exclusions applied as well.65 United in their praise for
the “consent of the governed,”66 the Federalists and Anti-Federalists
were also united in their hypocrisy. The “People,” as it happened,
meant a particular sort of elite. So it is unsurprising that, while some
juries exercised their power laudably (e.g., nullifying the Fugitive
Slave Act),67 unrepresentative juries often used their power to subjugate, perhaps most notably as part of the post-Civil War backlash
against African American rights.68 Juries were, of course, not the only
defectively honored American commitment, and like other such commitments, later generations have—through struggle—won fuller reali-

43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 95 Side B
04/16/2021 13:23:52

(2017) (describing the jury trial in the Founding Era as “an institution . . . [intending] to
subordinate state power and state officials to the authority of a local laity, and to empower
that laity”).
60 Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries As Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582, 589
& n.22 (1939) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also H. Jefferson Powell, The
Principles of ‘98: An Essay in Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L. REV. 689, 737 (1994)
(recounting Justice Samuel Chase’s acknowledgement of the “jury’s general ‘right to
decide the law’” in a case under the 1798 Sedition Act).
61 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
62 See ABRAMSON, supra note 40, at 30–32; Middlebrooks, supra note 48, at 353–54.
63 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Appleman, supra note 59, at 1417.
64 Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the
United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 884 (1994).
65 ABRAMSON, supra note 40, at 29; see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
350 (limiting to “freeholders”).
66 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
67 Clay S. Conrad, Scapegoating the Jury, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 7, 14–15
(1997).
68 See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 40, at 605–06 (recounting the role nullification played in
thwarting the “promise” of Reconstruction).
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zation of those principles.69 Today’s juries, in theory, better reflect the
entire People.70
Yet, as juries have become better representations of the People,
their power has waned.71 Elite support for nullification and jury interpretation of the law dissipated throughout the nineteenth century.72
Opponents of strong juries argued that their unpredictability contravened the need for professionalized, predictable rule of law, and contended that popular control over criminal laws was less necessary
where the People’s representatives had enacted them.73 All-white
Southern juries’ postbellum obstruction of Reconstruction showed
jury nullification at its worst and caused Republicans to single it out
for opprobrium.74 Today, the Supreme Court and much academic
commentary rejects nullification and jury judgment of the law.75 To be
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69 See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Founders and Slavery: Little Ventured, Little Gained,
13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 413, 414 (2001) (observing that there is a “contradiction of slavery
in a republic based on liberty and self-government”).
70 Better reflection in theory does not always manifest in fact. See, e.g., Thomas Ward
Frampton, For Cause: Rethinking Racial Exclusion and the American Jury, 118 MICH. L.
REV. 785, 788–90 (2020) (collecting studies on racially disparate use of peremptory strikes
and describing study of for-cause removals that showed similar racial disparities); id. at 808
& n.117 (“[R]ace-neutral practices in assembling [jury] venires could result in
[constitutionally suspect] race and sex disparities . . . .”); id. at 826–27 (arguing that forcause challenges are antidemocratic because they exclude a range of perspectives from the
jury, making the jury less reflective of public values).
71 See, e.g., Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 64, at 868 (“[A]s the jury’s composition
became more democratic, its role in American civic life declined.”).
72 Carroll, supra note 40, at 597 (“[F]ederal judges . . . began to instruct juries that they
were not entitled to interpret law but that their role was limited to that of fact finders. . . .
[M]any state courts [began] to follow their federal counterparts.”); see also Douglas G.
Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV.
377, 444–45 (1996) (discussing the decline of jury power during the nineteenth century);
Jonathan Bressler, Reconstruction and the Transformation of Jury Nullification, 78 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1133, 1159–63 (2011) (discussing three prominent nineteenth century legal treatise
authors who agreed that “juries no longer had the right to nullify and instead were
required to take the law from the court”).
73 Carroll, supra note 40, at 598–99.
74 See Bressler, supra note 72, at 1152–53, 1182.
75 See ABRAMSON, supra note 40, at 88–93; see also Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51,
101–02 (1895) (rejecting argument that criminal juries have the right to “disregard the law
as expounded to them by the court and become a law unto themselves,” and holding that
“in the courts of the United States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law
from the court”); Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253,
260 (1996) (arguing that nullification “cuts a broad [negative] path through the criminal
law[,]” leading to “less accurate [verdicts]” and “undesirable incentives for both litigants
and judges”); Barkow, supra note 7, at 1343–44 (observing “[p]opular press” skepticism
towards nullification and voter rejection of pro-nullification ballot initiatives); Marder,
supra note 30, at 905 (noting the “conventional view” that jury nullification “is always
harmful”); Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent
Verdicts, 111 HARV. L. REV. 771, 785 (1998) (observing that “[j]uries are routinely
instructed” that they “must” or “should” convict when the government proves its case
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sure, acquittals remain unreviewable, so juries’ raw power remains the
same.76 But jury instructions adopt the view that juries lack the right
to nullify, notwithstanding that power, and guide jurors away from
exercising it.77 We thus need only make the uncontroversial assumption that many juries comply with those directions to see juries as (relatively) neutered.
To be sure, control over the facts can still be powerful. Think of
the jury that must decide whether, all things considered, a homicide
defendant claiming self-defense reasonably feared for his or her life,78
or in any mine-run case whether to believe a witness.79 But exercising
that sort of power requires a trial. Today, plea bargaining has eliminated trials in huge swaths of cases, which means that even jury influence over the facts has diminished.80 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s
increasingly expansive view of the petty-crime exception to defendants’ jury-trial rights has necessarily narrowed the entitlement to a
jury trial.81 For some, this may be laudable, but it is hard to dispute
the relative meagerness of the jury’s current status.
Paradoxically, the Supreme Court continues to drive home the
jury’s value as representative of the People. So, in requiring that a
jury has found that any facts increasing a crime’s penalty were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, it anoints the jury “the great bulwark of
[our] civil and political liberties,” a hedge against “oppression and tyr-
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“beyond a reasonable doubt”). Some scholars have supported jury nullification. See, e.g.,
Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149,
1155–56 (1997) (arguing that jury nullification “may well improve our chances of acting
within the rule of law rather than subverting it”); Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury
Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 700 (1995)
(positing that, in practicing jury nullification, “it is both lawful and morally right that black
jurors consider race in reaching verdicts in criminal cases”). But academia may be its highwater mark. See, e.g., Brown, supra, at 1151 (“Nullification has more support among
academics than among judges or the popular press . . . .”).
76 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 44, at 49–50 (noting unreviewability of acquittals).
77 See Sparf, 156 U.S. at 106 (declining to recognize “the right of the jury . . . to take the
law into their own hands”); Muller, supra note 75, at 785.
78 See, e.g., Anne Bowen Poulin, The Jury: The Criminal Justice System’s Different
Voice, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1377, 1392 (1994) (discussing self-defense).
79 See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (“The jury’s estimate of the
truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or
innocence . . . .”).
80 See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (observing that “[n]inety-seven
percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions” result from
guilty pleas); DZUR, supra note 25, at 120–21 (discussing the shrinking number of jury
trials over the past century).
81 See, e.g., Colleen P. Murphy, The Narrowing of the Entitlement to Criminal Jury
Trial, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 133, 149, 169, 175–76 (connecting this move in part to fear of jury
power, including nullification).
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anny[,]”82 and an institution on par with “suffrage” in “ensur[ing] the
people’s ultimate control in . . . the judiciary.”83 In Batson 84 cases, it
blesses the jury as the “most substantial [non-voting] opportunity that
most citizens have to participate in the democratic process.”85
Scholars, too, still emphasize the jury’s core democratic role86 and
often hold forth on how to revitalize it.87 Rhetorically, at least, it
seems the jury’s desuetude has left a populist gap in need of filling.
B. The Power of the Public Prosecutor
Before any case reaches a jury, someone—usually a prosecutor—
must decide that charges are warranted.88 Because state prosecutors
possess nearly unbounded discretion in their charging decisions, their
local election could theoretically afford a separate path to localized
control of nonenforcement discretion.89 That move’s plausibility
requires some understanding of the historical roots and contemporary
evolution of the prosecutor. Two historical developments are key:
from presumptively private prosecution to presumptively public prosecution, and from appointed public prosecutors to elected public
prosecutors.
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82 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 239 (2005) (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000)).
83 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004).
84 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (holding that racial discrimination in jury
selection violates a defendant’s right to equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
85 Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2019); see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 407 (1991) (“Jury service preserves the democratic element of the law . . . .”).
86 See, e.g., FREDERICK G. WHELAN, DEMOCRACY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 189
(2019) (finding that jury deliberation is “arguably the most democratic component of
Anglo-American judicial systems”).
87 See generally Barkow, supra note 44; Middlebrooks, supra note 48.
88 Fairfax, supra note 28, at 734. A minority of states do still require a grand jury
indictment to initiate serious criminal charges, see SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., supra note 28,
§ 1:1, but “for the most part it is the prosecutor who determines what witnesses and
evidence the grand jury will hear and what charges will be presented to it.” Id. § 4:15.
While police officers can in some jurisdictions file felony charges directly with the court,
see Bellin, supra note 33, at 182, prosecutors can short-circuit that choice by dismissing the
charges. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Justice on the Line: Prosecutorial Screening Before
Arrest, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 851 (2019) (noting the significant number of cases
prosecutors dismiss after police file charges).
89 See Fairfax, supra note 28, at 734 (discussing breadth of prosecutorial discretion);
Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal Prosecution, the
District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 568, 570 (1984)
(noting prosecutors have “virtually unreviewable discretion to decide whether to
prosecute”); see also Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L.
REV. 69, 88 (2011) (“[T]he grand and petit juries . . . cannot carry the torch of democratic
accountability alone. Voters’ choice of a local prosecutor remains a necessary feature of
preserving democracy in criminal prosecution.”).
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1. Towards the Powerful Elected Public Prosecutor
The American colonies carried forward the English practice of
presumptively private prosecution, under which an aggrieved citizen
would initiate the case by official complaint and take responsibility for
seeing it to completion.90 The public prosecutor emerged in the colonies in the early eighteenth century, when Connecticut abandoned private prosecution, soon followed by some other colonies.91 Notably,
particularly at its inception, public prosecution often preserved considerable private control by tying prosecutors’ pay to the number of
cases they tried.92 This effectively incentivized prosecutors to serve as
conduits for private will, since they were motivated to pursue as many
cases as the citizenry brought them.93 Though states moved away from
that payment model—first generally to payment for conviction94
before settling on salaries—there was no retreat from the public prosecutor itself.95 That model gained popularity over time but only
became predominant in the late nineteenth century, when public
order problems and growing state appetite for using criminal law to
shape social behavior proved incompatible with ad hoc private prosecution.96 Although often criticized, private prosecution still exists in
limited settings.97
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90 Steinberg, supra note 89, at 571–72; Worrall, supra note 26, at 5–6; Davis, supra note
6, at 449.
91 Worrall, supra note 26, at 6.
92 NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION
IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at 42, 255–56, 258 (2013).
93 Id. at 256.
94 This move, which occurred in most states over the course of the nineteenth century,
effectively dissuaded prosecutors from serving as conduits for private will—instead, it
encouraged them to screen cases aggressively to ensure they picked winners. See id. at
42–43.
95 See id. at 272, 363–65 (discussing the transition to salary-based payment and
cataloging the date of that transition in each state).
96 PARRILLO, supra note 92, at 31, 261; see also Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary
Power of “Public” Prosecutors in Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309,
1325–26, 1328 (2002) (connecting 1800s push for fully public prosecution to elite fear of
“riots . . . gang violence” and corruption); Davis, supra note 6, at 450 (positing that private
prosecution “could no longer maintain order” due to population growth and urbanization);
Steinberg, supra note 89, at 582–84 (noting that industrialization and urban growth drove
“public order” problems, which drove the professionalization of police and prosecutors).
Some of the quintessential public order crimes less amenable to a private-driven system
were vice crimes like gambling, drinking, and prostitution, which were (arguably)
“victimless behavior” with broad community acceptance. See, e.g., PARRILLO, supra note
92, at 260–61 (making this point regarding the inadequacies of the pay-per-case
prosecutorial compensation system).
97 See, e.g., Michael Edmund O’Neill, Private Vengeance and the Public Good, 12 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 659, 683–84, 709–10 n.327 (2010) (noting most common contemporary
uses of private prosecution, and collecting criticisms).
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This evolution is suggestive on two fronts. First, private prosecution’s original primacy reminds us that bottom-up criminal-law administration pegged to (or at least reflective of) the common person’s
priorities and concerns is neither new nor limited to the Founding-era
petit jury.98 Second, perhaps less obviously, the shift toward presumptively public prosecution seems to mark a changing approach to discretion. After all, predominantly private prosecution diffused the
discretion inherent in the prosecution decision throughout an entire
population. To be sure, public prosecutors still preferred private victims (if any) to cooperate. But cooperation was no longer necessary,
and a single state actor held the reins of the charging decision.99
As for elections, the proliferation of public prosecutors increased
the importance of their mode of selection. Early public prosecutors
were generally appointed, with the appointing official varying by
state.100 Like other state officials, prosecutors were swept up in the
Jacksonian Revolution, which preached popular sovereignty as the
true embodiment of democracy, best obtained via popular election of
public officials.101 In 1832, Mississippi became the first state to
authorize election of public prosecutors.102 The trend surged over the
next few decades, and almost every state had done so by the early
twentieth century, just as private prosecution ebbed.103 The trend has
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98 Máximo Langer & David Alan Sklansky, Epilogue: Themes and Counterthemes, in
PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 6, at 300,
333–35 (“[G]iving private individuals and entities prosecutorial powers can be interpreted
as a way to implement democratic ideals . . . .”); Worrall, supra note 26, at 6 (“In [English]
common law . . . a crime was viewed not as an act against the state, but rather as a wrong
inflicted upon a victim. The aggrieved victim, or an interested friend or relative, would
personally arrest and prosecute the offender . . . .”); Catherine M. Coles, Evolving
Strategies in 20th-Century American Prosecution, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR, supra note 12, at 177, 203 (“[U]nder the private prosecution
system . . . citizens determined prosecution priorities . . . .”). The citizen-staffed state grand
jury played a similar bottom-up role in the Founding era, but has experienced a decline
much like that of the petit jury. See, e.g., John F. Decker, Legislating New Federalism: The
Call for Grand Jury Reform in the States, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 341, 346–47 (2005).
99 See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 89, at 582 (“Now [after the public prosecutor’s
ascendancy], officers of the state . . . not the individual citizen, were . . . the dominant
actors of criminal justice.”).
100 See Michael J. Ellis, Note, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J. 1528,
1537–39 (2012) (noting who appointed the chief prosecutor in various states: the judge of
the county court in New York and Kentucky; the state legislature in Alabama, Georgia,
North Carolina, and Tennessee; and the governor in Massachusetts and New Hampshire);
see also Worrall, supra note 26, at 7.
101 See, e.g., Gold, supra note 89, at 75–76; Ellis, supra note 100, at 1531, 1550–51
(observing that supporters of elections, inter alia, “believed popular election would
distance the office from patronage politics” and make prosecutors “more responsive to the
concerns of voters” and “the priorities of local communities.”).
102 Ellis, supra note 100, at 1540.
103 Davis, supra note 6, at 451.
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not reversed. Today, “[a]ll but five states elect their prosecutors at the
local level.”104 The Jacksonians, no less than the Founders, applied a
defective conception of the relevant “governed.”105 Yet they provided
a principle to build upon: Wealth and property should not distinguish
the voices that mattered from those that did not.
The public prosecutor’s development helped expand and solidify
its power. Take the embrace of publicness itself. The rejection of a
primarily private system increased the import of the public prosecutor’s discretionary power by making that actor’s charging decision
the one that counted.106 And, as Nicholas Parrillo has argued, the
roughly contemporaneous change in the bases for prosecutorial payment—from cases tried, to convictions obtained, and then finally to
broad adoption of pure salary systems—dovetailed with this trend.107
As he has shown, the choice of salaries likely reflected broad desire
for prosecutors to exercise their discretion in muscular ways, and in
particular for them to expand their equitable nonenforcement in some
cases of factual guilt.108
Elections, too, may have increased prosecutorial “power, independence, and discretion.”109 After all, appointed prosecutors who at
least had to pay some heed to the appointing official if they wanted
reappointment were now theoretically only accountable to the People.
But if the populace had few effective mechanisms for measuring performance, the upshot may have been effectively unchecked
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104 Ronald F. Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, 67 SMU L. REV. 593, 598 (2014).
The exceptions: Alaska’s local prosecutors are appointed by the state’s appointed attorney
general. See HESSICK, NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 5, at 18. Connecticut’s local
prosecutors are appointed by a state commission. Id. at 39. Delaware’s local prosecutors
are appointed by its elected attorney general. Id. at 40. Rhode Island has no local
prosecutors, although its elected attorney general handles criminal prosecutions. Id. at 266.
And New Jersey’s local prosecutors are appointed by the governor, with senatorial advice
and consent. Id. at 207.
105 See, e.g., William M. Wiecek, The Emergence of Equality as a Constitutional Value:
The First Century, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 233, 240–41 (2007) (emphasizing that “racist
hostility to black Americans” compromised the egalitarian vision of both the Founders and
Jacksonians).
106 See Steinberg, supra note 89, at 583–84 (“The assumption of discretion was the key
to the modern era of the public prosecutor’s power. . . . The [key] change was in who held
the power to determine how a case would be disposed . . . . [D]iscretion was lodged less in
the popular bodies and more in the police and public prosecutors.”).
107 See PARRILLO, supra note 92, at 255–94.
108 Id. at 272–73, 277–79, 288–91. The idea, in brief: salaries would free prosecutors from
the profit motive, empowering them to decline enforcement without hurting their own
pockets, which would in turn make prosecutors more amenable to the sort of equitable
nonenforcement that encourages citizens to view the law as legitimate, rather than
exploitative. See id. at 272–73, 288.
109 Davis, supra note 6, at 451.
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prosecutorial power.110 Whatever the causes, courts began to widely
affirm the public prosecutor’s discretion in the late nineteenth century.111 Today, assuming probable cause, the prosecutor’s “decision
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a
grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”112
2. Exercising Discretion: Managerialism or Populism?
Prosecutors’ power over charging can empower them to nullify
on precisely the same ideological grounds that juries might, i.e., opposition to a law in all or a subclass of cases.113 Even leaving aside other
forms of prosecutorial nonenforcement, that alone is an awesome
power requiring a theory of proper exercise.114
The path to that theory runs through the longstanding debate
between two ways of thinking about the proper role of the public in
good governance. One is an elite-driven, managerialist approach that
prizes “technocratic administration” and hopes that “expertise and
insulation from the political process [will] produce better decisionmaking.”115 The other often centers popular sovereignty, is skeptical
of the ability of professionalized expertise to resolve hard moral questions, and centers the need for a tight nexus between the popular will
and policy output.116 American criminal law, in particular, is emblematic of the dispute. Both the decline of the powerful jury and the
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110 See id. But see David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial
Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473, 491–92 (2016) (noting the prevalence of this
argument but offering some skepticism).
111 See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 89, at 570.
112 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); see also Tonry, supra note 26, at 5
(“Discretionary prosecutorial decisions are for all practical purposes immune from judicial
review.”); Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581,
585–88 (2009) (outlining lack of “robust limiting forces” on “individual choices of th[e]
chief prosecutor”); Vorenberg, supra note 7, at 1525 (noting prosecutors’ “virtually
unlimited control over charging”).
113 See Weinstein, supra note 43, at 246 (comparing prosecutorial nullification and jury
nullification); Fairfax, supra note 8, at 1252–54.
114 Cf. Bellin, supra note 26, at 1207 (arguing that there is a “striking” “lack of an
answer” to the question of the proper “role of the American prosecutor”).
115 Rebecca M. Bratspies, Regulatory Trust, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 608 & n.180 (2009);
see also William E. Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth Century:
Reflections on the Dark Side, the Progressive Constitutional Imagination, and the Enduring
Role of Judicial Finality in Popular Understandings of Popular Self-Rule, 81 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 967, 976 (2006); RAHMAN, supra note 25, at 9–10 (explaining that on this view
democracy “recedes into the background” as experts “make socially optimal policy
decisions on the basis of rationality rather than politics”).
116 See, e.g., Kleinfeld, supra note 25, at 1376, 1392–93, 1397 (framing this debate and
endorsing popular sovereignty); K. Sabeel Rahman & Jocelyn Simonson, The Institutional
Design of Community Control, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 679, 689, 742 (2020) (suggesting antipopulist strain reflects “demophobia”); RAHMAN, supra note 25, at 99–100 (arguing that
expertise “can offer insight, but not resolution” and advocating “openly moral debate
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evolution of the public prosecutor evince a push toward anti-populist
views of criminal-law administration.117 Yet, as Stephanos Bibas has
argued, the “deeply moral content” of the criminal law has made it an
area where the public is reticent to “defer to technical experts.”118
Where one lands in this debate informs the resolution of the ultimate
question at hand: whether, and how, a prosecutor’s categorical de
facto repeal of democratically enacted state law can be justified.
To see how, consider the general normative view of the modern
public prosecutor. We can still see the popular sovereignty strain in
the never-reversed move toward prosecutorial elections, driven by
Jacksonian popular sovereignty’s demands for “more public control
over the administration of justice.”119 But a more recent influence is
the managerialist, anti-populist belief in transferring “policy decisions” away from “democratic politics” to “expert management,” to
“depoliticize[]” them and “immunize[] them from democratic contest.”120 Progressive Era reformers and scholars saw increased
prosecutorial professionalism, and an eradication of politics from the
prosecutorial process, as the response to mushrooming, and sometimes corrupt, prosecutorial discretion.121
Stated broadly, recent commentators are surely correct that a
single orthodox view of the American prosecutor (elected or not) is
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through democratic politics”); Thomas Frank, The Pessimistic Style in American Politics,
HARPER’S MAG., May 2020, at 73 (outlining both sides of this debate).
117 See Kleinfeld, supra note 59, at 1483–84; supra Sections I.A & I.B.1.
118 Stephanos Bibas, Restoring Democratic Moral Judgment Within Bureaucratic
Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1687–88 (2017); see also Daniel C. Richman,
Accounting for Prosecutors, in PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL
STUDY, supra note 6, at 40, 48, 50 (emphasizing that “a society defines itself” through how
and whom it criminally condemns (citation omitted)); cf. Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S.Ct. 1021,
1047 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A] community’s moral code informs its criminal
law. . . . [T]he very definition of crime is conduct that merits ‘a formal and solemn
pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community.’” (quoting Henry M. Hart,
Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405 (1958))).
119 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 33, § 1.6(d) (citing DAVID J. BODENHAMER, THE
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND LAW IN ANTEBELLUM INDIANA 49 (1986)).
120 RAHMAN, supra note 25, at 9–10; see also Sklansky, supra note 25, at 1708–10,
1712–14, 1727 (finding similar distrust of mass democracy and preference for expertise
among the mid-twentieth century “pluralists”).
121 See Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial
Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 958–59 (1997) (“The call for professionalism first
came in the 1920s and 1930s from those who decried . . . corruption and favoritism . . . . The
ideal is . . . one of insulation from narrow interest groups and corrupt influences.”); Robert
L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 731
(1996) (observing that government commissions studying criminal justice often connected
“the elective nature of the office . . . to undue political influence on prosecutorial
decisions”); Coles, supra note 98, at 182–86.
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hard to pin down.122 Still, if the question is professionalized expertise
or populism, a dominant academic preference exists for the former.123
The strongest adherents of this view deem the pursuit of “democratic
accountability” to be “puzzling.”124 More moderate opinions still hold
that “prosecutors should pursue the public interest rather than simply
implementing people’s wishes,” acting as “experts, public officials, and
members of responsible elites.”125 Indeed, the widespread academic
opposition to any prosecutorial elections makes the point just as well.
For those opponents, elections are largely a distorting distraction from
the exercise of depoliticized expert judgment.126
The state of play is even clearer in the nonenforcement context,
in which “courts and scholars take it as something of an article of
faith” that prosecutors’ “principal—or even exclusive” charging
authority stems from their “relative competence.”127 The Supreme
Court agrees.128 Consistent with this, distillations of appropriate non-
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122 See generally Bellin, supra note 26 (discussing the lack of a widely accepted
normative theory of prosecution).
123 See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution, 69
AM. U. L. REV. 805, 813 (2020) (“[P]rosecutors serve the public not by satisfying the
preferences of an amalgam of citizens at a particular moment in time but by pursuing the
abstract public interest in justice that is, and ought to be, elaborated within prosecutors’
offices over time.” (emphasis added)); William H. Simon, The Organization of
Prosecutorial Discretion, in PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY,
supra note 6, at 175, 176 (describing the “traditional idea of professional judgment” where
the prosecutor applies expert, professional knowledge to arrive at a decision that is
“substantially tacit and ineffable” and “cannot be explained fully to lay people”); Barkow,
supra note 7, at 1354 (discussing view of prosecutorial discretion as an exercise of
professional judgment and expertise).
124 Tonry, supra note 26, at 12.
125 Máximo Langer & David Alan Sklansky, Epilogue: Prosecutors and Democracy—
Themes and Counterthemes, in PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL
STUDY, supra note 6, at 300, 304–05; see also Green & Roiphe, supra note 123, at 820–21
(arguing that prosecutors are obligated to “pursue the public’s abstract and evolving
interest in justice,” and that “what gives justice meaning beyond the personal view of the
prosecutor is developed traditions and practices of prosecutors’ offices”); Charles E.
MacLean & Stephen Wilks, Keeping Arrows in the Quiver: Mapping the Contours of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 59, 72 (2012) (“[P]olicy makers should be
wary of attempts to ‘democratize’ prosecutorial functions in ways that crystallize
community expectations into mandated responses to . . . problems.”).
126 See, e.g., Daniel C. Richman, Accounting for Prosecutors, in PROSECUTORS AND
DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 6, at 40, 62 & n.97; Sklansky, supra
note 23, at 277–78 (noting the “widely shared view” that “[t]he last thing we should want
from prosecutors is ‘democratic accountability’” and observing that “many” find it
“unfortunate and embarrassing” that American prosecutors tend to be elected, consistent
with the “longstanding critique” of such prosecutors “as overly political”).
127 Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1686 (2010); see also Barkow, supra note 7, at 1354.
128 See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–08 (1985) (justifying presumptive
nonreviewability of prosecutorial discretion by reference to, inter alia, respect for
prosecutorial decisionmaking); Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987)
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enforcement considerations tend to say much about expert
prosecutorial judgment and nothing about the public’s substantive
preferences.129 As a recent interview-based study found, veteran prosecutors tend to “locate[] the responsibility for [nonenforcement] decisions primarily in the prosecutor’s office.”130 Scholarly recognition
that popular values can influence nonenforcement often appears to be
more descriptive than prescriptive.131 True, to some degree any
elected prosecutor’s nonenforcement decisions would likely correlate
with those of the public from which they are drawn, and which they
hope will reelect them.132 But the more critical question is to what
degree such prosecutors might legitimately invoke specific public
policy preferences—say, nonenforcement preferences—to justify their
behavior. And that question goes to the heart of the managerialist/
populist theoretical divide.
***
Most agree that “discretion is necessary in criminal administration because of the immense variety of factual situations . . . and the

43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 100 Side B
04/16/2021 13:23:52

(plurality opinion) (emphasizing that “charging decisions are rarely simple,” requiring
prosecutors to weigh “tangible and intangible factors” and “allocate . . . scarce resources”).
129 See, e.g., Coles, supra note 98, at 183 (listing considerations such as “evidentiary
concerns . . . achieving objectives more satisfactorily through [other means]; weighing
potential harm to the victim or undue harm to the suspect; and costs to the system”);
MacLean & Wilks, supra note 125, at 61 (placing “popular sentiment” among the “less
appropriate factors” that prosecutors use to make decisions); Bowers, supra note 127, at
1657–58 (noting that the “conventional wisdom” that “the prosecutor is best situated to
exercise charging discretion” ignores what the “public’s moral code” might dictate); id. at
1706–07 & n.243 (explaining how prosecutors weigh a range of factors when deciding
whether to charge). As an example, the closest the American Bar Association’s sixteen
factors relevant to dismissing a legally sufficient charge come to invoking the public’s value
preferences are the “impact . . . on the public welfare” and the possibility that “the public’s
interests in the matter might be appropriately vindicated” through non-criminal means—
i.e., not that close. AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.4 (4th ed. 2017). The National District Attorneys
Association’s National Prosecution Standards are similarly quiet. See, e.g., NAT’L DIST.
ATT’YS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS §§ 4-1.3, 4-2.4, 4-3.5 (3d ed. 2009).
130 Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome, 56
ARIZ. L. REV. 1065, 1081, 1087 (2014).
131 For example, two scholars observe that the “chief prosecutor sets priorities among all
the available criminal charges to reflect the current values of the legislature and the local
public[,]” inspired, in some cases, by “democratically declared priorities among crimes.”
See, e.g., Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 154
(2008). But this follows a descriptive review, and it is unclear whether they approve. Nor is
it clear how they envision priorities being “democratically declared.” Id.
132 See, e.g., id. at 148 (“Chief prosecutors . . . understand that some legally valid
applications of the criminal law would be political suicide.”); Tonry, supra note 26, at 26–27
(noting that American prosecutors tend to factor “public opinion, media attentions, and
political implications” into their work).
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complex interrelationship of the goals sought.”133 The Founding-era
powerful jury reflected a desire for the demos to exercise localized
control over that sort of discretion. But that jury has disappeared.
Because prosecutors have substantial charging discretion, tying
prosecutorial discretion closely to the views of their electorate (if
expressed in some discernible way) could have provided an alternative
path to the same end. But that option runs into the dominance of the
prosecutor-as-expert view, under which any nonenforcement decisions
primarily should rest on prosecutors’ expertise, not the distorted or
misguided views of the public.134 That dominance appears to stem at
least in part from the same distrust for popular competency to control
criminal law that undermined the jury.135
Yet the district attorney remains elected. And though many elections are low-salience and low on substance,136 some recent prosecutors have bucked both of those trends, choosing instead to advocate in
their platforms de facto substantive change of the state’s law (through
nonenforcement).137 They are choices in need of a theory. The next
Part takes up the task of explaining why a populist view can fill that
gap.
II
DEMOCRACY, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, AND DISTRICT
ATTORNEY SUBSIDIARITY

04/16/2021 13:23:52

133 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 33, § 13.2(d) (quoting James Vorenberg, Narrowing the
Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DUKE L.J. 651, 662).
134 See Barkow, supra note 7, at 1354 (“In contrast to juries and executives, prosecutors
are seen as making an ‘expert’ determination . . . when they choose not to bring charges.”);
Bowers, supra note 127, at 1660 (observing that, under this view, the prosecutor is the
“most competent” institutional actor to make charging decisions); BARKOW, supra note 25,
at 105–07 (contrasting the prosecutor-as-expert view with the populist view where “the
masses . . . set policies directly”).
135 See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 40, at 88 (observing that the reduction of jury
power reflected a rejection of the “presum[ption that] ordinary citizens were competent to
make independent judgments about the law”); cf. Wright & Levine, supra note 130, at
1086 n.98 (quoting prosecutors complaining about juries they disagreed with); see also
supra text accompanying notes 71–75.
136 See, e.g., Wright, supra note 112, at 582–83, 597, 600; Sklansky, supra note 110, at
515; cf. HESSICK, NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 5, at 5–6 (finding that most prosecutor
elections are uncontested).
137 See supra Introduction; infra Section V.A.
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Part I’s history of criminal-law populism shows that a prosecutor
invoking the People’s will to justify her nonenforcement policy would
not be wholly sui generis. But descriptive analogy does not carry us all
the way to normative justification, or tell us whether, why, and when
deviation from managerialist orthodoxy might be warranted.
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Perhaps some of the answer lies in a hoary piece of democratic
rhetoric: the People rule. Most know the hits. The Constitution
invokes “We the People,” the Declaration of Independence warns that
legitimate governments need “the consent of the governed,” and no
one would dare deny that our government is of, by, and for the
people.138 The Supreme Court, too, expounds American democracy
by drawing on the Declaration and the Constitution to endorse the
“people’s ultimate sovereignty.”139 Indeed, quite different Justices,
speaking individually, agree that “‘ultimate sovereignty’ resides in the
governed,”140 and that “all sovereignty ‘emanates from [the
people].’”141
Reality rarely duplicates rhetoric. The Constitution and Bill of
Rights alone reveal the strong anti-populist currents in American
political thought.142 Whether, how, and how much the People really
ought to rule are longstanding questions.143 Like liberty, “[w]e all
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138 U.S. CONST. pmbl.; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776);
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg, in
7 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 17, 23 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953); see also
KRAMER, supra note 45, at 11 (claiming the Constitution reflected “a political ideology
that celebrated the central role of ‘the people’ in supplying the government with its energy
and direction”); Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government:
Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV.
749, 749 (1994) (“[The] corollaries of popular sovereignty . . . were bedrock principles in
the Founding, Antebellum, and Civil War eras.”); James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy
and Elections: Implementing Popular Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U.
PITT. L. REV. 189, 209–11 (1990).
139 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2675
(2015); see also Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2328 (2020) (noting that a State’s
punishment of a faithless elector “accords . . . with the trust of a Nation that here, We the
People rule”); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 821 (1995) (“Ours is a
‘government of the people, by the people, for the people.’” (quoting LINCOLN , supra note
138, at 19)); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 672 (1976) (“Under
our constitutional assumptions, all power derives from the people . . . .”); see also Fred O.
Smith, Jr., Local Sovereign Immunity, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 409, 476 (2016) (discussing the
Court’s jurisprudence on state sovereignty).
140 Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1990 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(quoting Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2675)).
141 Id. at 1999 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,
404–05 (1819)); see also Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (“‘We the people . . . ordain and establish this Constitution’ . . . was a radical
claim, an assertion that sovereignty belongs not to a person or institution or class but to the
whole of the people.” (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.)).
142 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 49 (James Madison) (critiquing “pure”
democratic majoritarianism); Steven Frias, Note, Power to the People: How the Supreme
Court Has Reviewed Legislation Enacted Through Direct Democracy, 31 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 721, 734 (1998) (discussing Madison’s fear of majority rule (citing, inter alia, THE
FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra (James Madison))); see also Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal
Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1070 (1980) (arguing that the 1780s brought an American
“reaction against mass democracy”).
143 See infra Section II.A.1.
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144 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Address at Sanitary Fair, Baltimore, Maryland, in 7 COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 138, at 301.
145 Sklansky, supra note 23, at 283 (quoting W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts,
56 PROCS. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167 (1956), reprinted in CORNELL U. PRESS, THE
IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE 121, 135 (Max Black ed., 1962)).
146 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xviii (1996) (describing the “problem of
political liberalism” as follows: “How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable
and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though
incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?”).
147 See Sklansky, supra note 23, at 283.
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declare for [the people’s rule]; but in using the same word we do not
all mean the same thing.”144 Democracy may literally mean “rule by
the people,” but its “essentially contested” nature lies at the root of
many heated battles over institutional design and optimal
outcomes.145
Those battles, unsurprisingly, have high stakes. Diverse societies
generate material differences of opinion on a host of fundamental
issues.146 Resolving those differences, e.g., through law, inevitably displeases individuals, and groups of individuals, who would prefer alternative resolutions. One line of thought holds that this is as it should
be. Social living means one cannot always get one’s way, and democratically enacted laws should be enforced. True, resource limitations
and anomalous circumstances may prevent full enforcement, but that
is a far cry from resource-independent programmatic nullification to
upend disliked democratic results. This Part contests this legitimacybased attack on programmatic prosecutorial nullification. Of course,
this Article cannot render democracy uncontestable, and some normative judgments are inescapable.147 Yet from at least one legitimate
perspective, local direction of prosecutorial nullification actually
advances democratic values. That perspective is thus worth understanding and applying.
This Part returns to the debate on popular involvement in
prosecutorial conduct and situates it within a broader democratictheory debate between advocates of managerialist democracy and
proponents of popular sovereignty. Then, drawing on the centrality of
autonomy and anti-domination to democracy, it selects popular sovereignty’s tenets as a useful lens for gauging the legitimacy of categorical
prosecutorial nullification. The Part concludes by exploring an important entailment of that lens—the all-affected principle—and the ways
in which the devolution seen in district attorney elections dovetails
with that entailment.
Two notes before beginning. First, although some of my arguments might justify some increased reliance on direct democracy, it is
no doubt true that modernity’s complexity necessarily renders exclu-
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sive governance through direct democracy infeasible, thus requiring
some type of indirect democracy (governance effected through elected
representatives). I thus do not delve into the arguments on either side
of that institutional-design divide.
Second, I recognize that “legitimacy” is yet another word of many
meanings.148 Here, I use it in the “moral” sense, focused on “respectworthiness,” that Professor Richard Fallon describes.149 Categorical
prosecutorial nullification is vulnerable on precisely that front—it is
easy to see the argument that de facto repeal of a democratically
enacted law through unilateral nonenforcement does not “deserve
respect”150 or that other political actors should not consider it “worthy
of being followed.”151 Yet I invoke “democratic legitimacy” here to
suggest that categorical nullification may sometimes nevertheless be
defended as normatively “legitimate” by reference to substantive
democratic norms, i.e., norms with more heft than mere “majorities
should rule.”152 To give one concrete example in this Article’s milieu:
why ought state actors with broad power to overrule or limit local
activity153 ever permit local prosecutors’ categorical deviation from
the state legislature’s enactments?
To be sure, the specifics of those substantive democratic norms
that guide this sort of analysis may be disputed, but that is why
democracy is an essentially contested concept.154 The point is that
there must be reasons it is good for the People to rule, and interrogating those reasons illuminates both what such rule should mean, as
applied, and what legal institutional approaches best effect it.155
43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 102 Side B
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148 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,
1789–90, 1790 n.5 (2005).
149 Id. at 1796; see also id. at 1790–91, 1795–99 (discussing how “legitimacy” can be used
in a legal, sociological, or moral sense).
150 Id. at 1799 (describing “moral legitimacy”).
151 Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L.J. 1331,
1353–54 (2012) (describing “normative legitimacy”).
152 Though some phenomena surely warrant a flat designation as illegitimate, it also
seems fair to say that, past some standard of minimal legitimacy, we deal with a continuum
rather than a binary. See, e.g., Fred O. Smith, Jr., Abstention in the Time of Ferguson, 131
HARV. L. REV. 2283, 2355–57 (2018). That paradigm is useful when, as is often the case,
actors possess discretion regarding how to respond to a phenomenon (e.g., voters
evaluating prosecutorial conduct or state-level actors considering whether to override local
behavior).
153 See infra Section IV.D.2.
154 See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in
Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 648–49 (1995).
155 See id.; cf. ROSS HARRISON, DEMOCRACY 228–30 (1993) (exploring the implications
of there being scrutable reasons for democracy).
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A. Autonomy’s Applicability
1. Managerialist Democracy and Popular Sovereignty
Start with one implication of praising democracy—rule by the
People is, in some sense, per se positive. Everyone who claims the title
of democrat thus acknowledges the need for some input/output connection between the demos and governmental action.156 The longstanding debate over that connection’s scope can be oversimplified
into two major schools of thought that track the managerialism/populist (or anti-populist/populist) divide I outlined in Section I.B.2.
Managerialism fits into the broader cluster of ideas that disdains
the value of approximating popular rule by the people at large, sometimes treating that aim as anathema to functioning democracy.157
Oftentimes rejecting the idea of a discernible “popular will,” and
deeming the People in any case generally incapable of productive collective decisionmaking,158 this view focuses instead on producing highquality decisions, consistent with protecting negative individual rights.
Thus, real decisionmaking power should lie with a select group (or
groups), who hash out society’s direction among themselves, with reference to expert guidance as necessary.159 Here, democracy is primarily useful as the best device “to protect citizens from the power of
government.”160 The People are not irrelevant, but their chief role is
to “throw the rascals out,” not to have their “will” implemented.161
This line of thinking has many names. For present purposes, I call it
managerialist democracy, although in practice the label of liberal constitutionalism also fits.162 Recent years have seen an uptick in advo43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 103 Side A
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156 See Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 43 (2004); see also
ALBERT WEALE, DEMOCRACY 51 (2007) (arguing that all “conceptions of democracy”
demand that rules defining a society’s “public life . . . should be the product of decision
making by a body that is, in some systematic way, dependent upon the views of those who
are citizens of that society”).
157 See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 25, at 1708–17 (sketching one manifestation of this
tradition, under the title “pluralism”).
158 WEALE, supra note 156, at 45–46, 157; see Sklansky, supra note 25, at 1712, 1725–27,
1739, 1810 (outlining this view in governing, judging, and policing).
159 See Sklansky, supra note 25, at 1721–27 (outlining the view that government policy
ought to be shaped and driven by elite-composed groups); WEALE, supra note 156, at
45–46.
160 WEALE, supra note 156, at 101.
161 Id. at 131. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY (1942) (outlining this theory of democratic governance).
162 See WEALE, supra note 156, at 101 (discussing liberal constitutionalism).
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cacy for this perspective, particularly as a counterweight to what
members of this school see as dangerous populism.163
The other approach is a popular sovereignty that treats “popular
participation [as] central to the very conception of democracy.”164
Beyond participation, it views the pursuit and approximation of popular control over governmental outputs as vital for reasons beyond
reaching the “best” decision.165 Rather, it assigns substantial, independent value to individuals’ and groups’ ability to control their own
destinies. Denying the superiority of rule by elites and experts, this
school insists that democracy “is not just a synonym for good government” with no strong normative orientation on popular control.166 On
this view, a popular will is intelligible and worth seeking.167
Much more could be, and has been, said on both sides, and both
sides could probably be described otherwise. I aim merely to set out
the democratic perspectives on offer for evaluation of a democratic
phenomenon. Rather than attempting to disprove one or another, I
focus on the key democratic value of autonomy, which I also mean to
capture the ideals also denominated as anti-domination or selfdetermination.168 Its importance is relatively uncontestable. And it
offers plausible reasons for selecting the popular sovereignty perspective as a worthy prism for evaluation.
2. Individual and Group Autonomy
Consider, on that note, “[t]wo features . . . typically taken to be
basic to any substantive account of democracy: the political equality of
43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 103 Side B
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163 See, e.g., FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT
HOME AND ABROAD 241–56 (2003) (arguing that democracy should be “[d]elegated” to
expert institutions); Jonathan Rauch & Ray La Raja, Too Much Democracy Is Bad for
Democracy, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/
12/too-much-democracy-is-bad-for-democracy/600766; JONATHAN RAUCH & BENJAMIN
WITTES, CTR. EFFECTIVE PUB. MGMT. BROOKINGS, MORE PROFESSIONALISM, LESS
POPULISM: HOW VOTING MAKES US STUPID AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2017); JASON
BRENNAN, AGAINST DEMOCRACY (2016); Frank, supra note 116 (cataloguing widespread
recent support for this view).
164 WEALE, supra note 156, at 101; Kleinfeld, supra note 25, at 1393–94 (connecting
democracy’s core to collective self-rule).
165 See, e.g., Kleinfeld, supra note 25, at 1390 (“[D]emocracy requires conveying
government into the hands of the population living under that government . . . .”).
166 Id. at 1394; see also Sklansky, supra note 25, at 1758–61, 1790–91 (discussing how
proponents of participatory democracy believe that democracy is more than “solely a
mechanism for delivering good policies” and noting the distrust of elites).
167 See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 25, at 1784 & n.430.
168 See Robert Post, Democracy and Equality, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 24, 25–26 (2006); Ian Shapiro, On Non-Domination, 62 U. TORONTO L.J. 293, 307–10
(2012); RAHMAN, supra note 25, at 79–80; PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF
FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 51–79 (1997) (defining freedom in terms of nondomination).
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169 David Owen, Democracy, in POLITICAL CONCEPTS 105, 107 (Richard Bellamy &
Andrew Mason eds., 2003).
170 See, e.g., id. at 110–11 (reviewing the problem of speaking of the “popular will,”
given the contingency of democratic outputs upon the democratic decision rules chosen).
171 WHELAN, supra note 86, at 1–2.
172 See Ian Shapiro, Three Ways to Be a Democrat, 22 POL. THEORY 124, 132 (1994);
Post, supra note 168, at 28, 32, 35 n.12.
173 See Shapiro, supra note 172, at 134, 139–40. Interesting research suggests some
biological predisposition to seeking autonomy. See, e.g., Lauren A. Leotti, Sheena S.
Iyengar & Kevin N. Ochsner, Born to Choose: The Origins and Value of the Need for
Control, 14 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCIS. 457 (2010).
174 Post, supra note 168, at 31–32.
175 See, e.g., WHELAN, supra note 86, at 186–87 (“Under [a unanimity rule] no members
can claim to be forced to accept anything against their will.”); Leslie Green, Law,
Legitimacy, and Consent, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 795, 795 (1989) (observing the persistence of
political theories seeking to “tame[]” the “radical potential” of hinging governmental
legitimacy on the consent of the governed).
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citizens and the idea of collective self-rule.”169 Everyone agrees some
popular input is necessary. But why? Ascertaining the content of that
input in an intelligible, neutral way is slippery.170 One might obviate
that uncertainty by handing over power to a dictator, or perhaps a
cadre of elite guardians. Or take outcomes. No doubt, the people at
large may suffer from deficiencies in disinterestedness, expertise, or
long-term perspective that make their decisionmaking suboptimal,
even granting that there may sometimes not be an objectively best
decision. Why not conclude that we’re better off the more that elites
(perhaps guided by experts) rule?
A response drawing on autonomy offers a justification for a dose
of popular sovereignty. At the core of autonomy is the command to
value the individual’s “capacity for thought, judgment, and choice
without external pressure except rational persuasion by others.”171
Granting that much aligns with the common democratic position that
people are in material respects equal moral agents.172 It flows, too,
from a recognition that the boundaries of the good can often be contested.173 These principles arguably demand giving the ruled control
over the direction of their lives. And they animate arguments that
democracy requires “an equality of autonomous self-determination,”
and that tie democratic legitimacy to citizens’ “autonomous participation” in self-government.174
Yet individual autonomy plainly must be limited. Embracing it
without qualification would justify (if not require) granting each
person a governance-crippling veto over government action.175 So it is
that the state has long been justified as embodying the relinquishment
of some personal freedom or power in order to secure a greater
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degree of those liberties.176 Here, indeed, is where “[a]ll the real questions of power and government start.”177
Granted, managerialists might well object that, compared to popular sovereignty, their democratic vision is just as cognizant of individual autonomy and the contestability of the good. To borrow and
tweak an apt example, they could be equally sensitive to the difficulties of translating a broad commitment to national health into particular policy choices on vaccination and family planning.178 Shifting
focus to group autonomy adds a helpful wrinkle and suggests how
popular sovereignty can shine as a legitimator.
To see how, consider what flows from insisting upon respect for
groups of individuals acting “in a reasonable manner, within physical
and social constraints, to advance their goals.”179 In a thin sense, we
might grant that respect because it valorizes political equals exercising
their autonomy in tandem with likeminded others to determine
society’s course.180 On that view it might be merely a factor of
summed individual autonomy.181 A thicker sense of group autonomy
emerges from the communitarian tradition’s insistence that groups
have independent value beyond the atomistic behavior of their constituent individuals.182 To communitarians, groups possess indepen-
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176 See, e.g., LESLIE GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 71–72 (1988) (suggesting
that the net effect of state coercion, threatened or real, “may . . . be to reduce coercion”).
177 HARRISON, supra note 155, at 5; see also WHELAN, supra note 86, at 3 (noting that, in
democracies, an individual acting alone generally cannot effect her preferred political
outcome).
178 Cf. SCHUMPETER, supra note 161, at 252 (drawing on these examples in his critique
of the concept of a single common good).
179 WHELAN, supra note 86, at 2; see also Frug, supra note 142, at 1122 (connecting
“group autonomy” to “the ability of a group of people, working together, to control
actively the basic societal decisions that affect their lives”).
180 See Owen, supra note 169, at 107–08 (discussing how democracy can be justified as
an aggregation of equals making collective decisions).
181 See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 390
(2001) (describing a view of community as “the sum of its parts (the individuals)”); cf.
Andrew Altman & Christopher Heath Wellman, The Deontological Defense of
Democracy: An Argument from Group Rights, 89 PAC. PHIL. Q. 279, 286 (2008) (arguing
that the violation of a group’s “right of self-determination” harms “each individual
member in her role as [a] member of the group”).
182 See Amitai Etzioni, A Moderate Communitarian Proposal, 24 POL. THEORY 155,
155–59 (1996) (describing the value of groups in the context of the debate between
communitarians and libertarians); David Hollenbach, Virtue, the Common Good, and
Democracy, in NEW COMMUNITARIAN THINKING: PERSONS, VIRTUES, INSTITUTIONS, AND
COMMUNITIES 143, 147–49 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995) (“Democracy requires more than
[solitary individuals]. It requires the virtues of mutual cooperation, mutual responsibility,
and what Aristotle called friendship, concord, and amity.”).
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dent autonomy worth protecting beyond merely summing individual
desires.183
True, we can no less give every group an indefeasible veto over
government decisionmaking than we can give one to every individual.
But prizing groups’ ability to self-determine seems more compatible
with popular sovereignty’s emphasis on “collective selfdetermination” than managerialist democracy’s disdain for popular
control.184 Popular sovereignty treats the self-determination available
at the ballot box to groups and their constituent individuals as a good
worthy of independent pursuit.185
Careers have been spent grappling with autonomy’s implications
and meanings. Nor is it the only thing that matters in democracy. But
it does matter, group self-determination is a major piece of it, and it
offers a compelling if not unanswerable justification for applying a
popular sovereignty perspective to evaluate democratic institutional
phenomena.186 Programmatic prosecutorial nullification—especially
when pursued by elected prosecutors—is such a phenomenon.
B. The All-Affected Principle, Subsidiarity, and Self-Determination
Acknowledging the impossibility of absolute autonomy provokes
institutional design questions about how best to maximize it. The popular sovereignty lens just sketched suggests one answer of particular
relevance to evaluating categorical prosecutorial nullification. Its
focus on self-determination first points us toward the all-affected principle, under which one’s “democratic say” in political decisionmaking
ought to track “the degree to which [one is] affected by the out-

R
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183 Etzioni, supra note 183, at 155–56; Thomas A. Spragens, Jr., Communitarian
Liberalism, in NEW COMMUNITARIAN THINKING: PERSONS, VIRTUES, INSTITUTIONS, AND
COMMUNITIES, supra note 182, at 38; Schragger, supra note 181, at 393 (discussing the
“deep” view of community).
184 See Kleinfeld, supra note 25, at 1390–94.
185 In practice, all democracies restrict the vote, with major exclusions often including
non-citizens, children, and people previously convicted of felonies. See, e.g., WHELAN,
supra note 86, at 99–100, 107–11. Taking self-determination seriously might well render
these exclusions suspect. But while this may suggest flaws in applied definition of the
relevant “People,” it does not weaken autonomy’s universal democratic relevance. Cf.
Post, supra note 168, at 34 & 35 n.15 (observing the problem of defining “the set . . . who
must be deemed participants”).
186 Cf. Frug, supra note 142, at 1068–69 (observing long-running “critique” of the
“limited ability of individuals to control their own lives” afforded by the “development of
Western society,” and the critics’ focus on the “limited objective” of “reorganizing society
to increase the degree of individual involvement in societal decisions” (emphasis added));
Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 434, 443
(1998) (recognizing it might be quixotic to attempt to prove in some irrefutable sense the
deontological superiority of a popular sovereignty based on “full and equal popular input,”
but arguing nevertheless that it can be defended as “normatively appealing”).

43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 105 Side B

04/16/2021 13:23:52

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-1\NYU103.txt

206

unknown

Seq: 34

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7-APR-21

17:25

[Vol. 96:173

come.”187 That sounds in the register of the individual and group selfdetermination just discussed. And that move suggests another: the
presumptive political devolution flowing from a commitment to subsidiarity.188 Again, that principle comports with the popular sovereignty vision. After all, it holds that “legitimate authority rests,” at
least as an initial matter, with “those moral agents most obviously
affected by political decisions,” and that legitimate coercion must be
responsive to those agents’ “equal moral standing as . . . the subject
and final author of that coercion.”189 Applied, it justifies various forms
of “localism,” although the degree of devolution can be flexible. Elections for regional representatives like district attorneys to execute
state criminal law are classic examples.
Subsidiarity, guided by the all-affected principle, can amplify
autonomy in several ways. First, because it reduces voting-unit size, it
increases the probability that any given vote will be determinative,
increasing the value of each.190 That is, it increases the likelihood that
a participating individual or group will shape a social decision.
Second, because it increases vote value and the degree of control
people consequently feel over their daily lives, subsidiarity can
increase participation.191 Third, and relatedly, by actually devolving
decisionmaking it in fact increases the degree of control one has over
the locally relevant parts of one’s life.192 Fourth, subsidiarity reduces
coercion in an absolute sense: As voting-unit size decreases, so does
the absolute number of people who must submit to a disliked decision.193 Finally, subsidiarity inverts James Madison’s hope of
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187 Daniel Weinstock, Cities and Federalism, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 259,
262 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014).
188 See id. at 261 (describing subsidiarity as “directing that powers or tasks should rest
with the lower-level sub-units” of a political order absent compelling contrary reason
(quoting Andreas Føllesdal, Subsidiarity, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 190, 190 (1998)); Loren King,
Cities, Subsidiarity, and Federalism, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 188, at
291, 291 (“Subsidiarity . . . counsels that decisions be made at the lowest feasible scale of
organization.”).
189 King, supra note 189, at 301.
190 See, e.g., WHELAN, supra note 86, at 149; Richard Briffault, Localism and
Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2000) [hereinafter Briffault, Localism and
Regionalism].
191 See, e.g., George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the
European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 340, 405 (1994)
(discussing how subsidiarity “enhance[s] the individual’s sense of dignity and autonomy”);
Frug, supra note 142, at 1069–70 (noting how subsidiarity can boost “popular
participation”); RUSSELL J. DALTON, THE PARTICIPATION GAP: SOCIAL STATUS AND
POLITICAL INEQUALITY 4–6 (2017) (cataloguing democratic arguments for prizing
participation).
192 See infra Section III.B.1.
193 See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 222 (2000) (“[B]ecause preferences for governmental
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“extend[ing] the sphere” in a surprisingly helpful way.194 He hoped
that expanding a polity could protect individual rights by thwarting
consensus.195 While he was right that consensus can harm dissenters,196 less dissensus suggests less coercion, and may make it more
reasonable to infer a singular popular will from an election.
Real-world subsidiarity can be imperfect. County-level
prosecutorial districts, for example, contain multitudes. Perhaps in
some sense district-level decisions represent the will of the community
of district inhabitants, but in another sense they do not, since dissenting subcommunities of interest do not disappear just because they
lacked the political pull to shape the district-level decision.197 Conceivably, greater devolution would sharpen subsidiarity’s benefits
(although it might well exacerbate its downfalls without eradicating
dissent).198 Indeed, noting that much reminds us that political “communities” themselves are contingent products of political will.199 But
none of this erases the benefits of the system that our institutional
path dependency200 has left us. Relative to more-centralized alternatives, district attorney elections still catalyze the autonomy of individuals and groups within a bounded area by increasing their power to
decide who executes criminal law where they live. Losers are inevitable in a majoritarian system; the difference is that devolution
increases the chances for losers to have real influence on outcomes.201
***
One’s position on popular control affects how one analyzes a
democratic phenomenon. To some degree, the theoretical disagree43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 106 Side A
04/16/2021 13:23:52

policy are unevenly distributed among the states and regions of the nation, more people
can be satisfied by decentralized decisionmaking.”); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:
Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493 (1987) (“[M]ore people
can be satisfied by decentralized decision making than by a single national authority.”).
194 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 49, at 53 (James Madison).
195 Id. (positing that expanding a polity will “make it less probable that a majority of the
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens”).
196 See generally infra Section IV.A.
197 See Rappaport, supra note 25, at 746–48 (questioning the intelligibility of
“communities” and community consensus).
198 See infra text accompanying notes 416–32.
199 See Schragger, supra note 182, at 403–05 (“[C]ommunity itself is a result of forceful
acts of literal and figurative boundary creation . . . .”); id. at 404 (“[L]aw is as constitutive
of social geographies as it is of social institutions.”).
200 See Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 252 (2000) (employing the definition of path dependence as
describing circumstances in which steps down a particular path increase the cost of
deviating from that path).
201 See infra Section III.B. See infra Section IV.A, below, for a discussion of Madison’s
fear: Majorities trampling losing minorities.
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ments in this space are insoluble. Yet a focus on autonomy and selfdetermination at least can justify the choice of a popular sovereignty
lens for evaluating a democratic phenomenon like prosecutorial
programmatic nullification.
III
WHOLESALE JURY NULLIFICATION
It is easier to extol popular sovereignty than to elaborate what it
means for the People to be sovereign. But it at least seems plain that
the power to create law—and to unmake it through particularized
exceptions—lies near sovereignty’s heart.202
That said, this Part considers the difficulty of apparently unilateral prosecutorial nullification of state law. Potential critiques are not
wanting, whether one roots them in the separation of powers,203 the
rule of law,204 some sort of local infringement on state sovereignty,205
or just a rough understanding that voters who elect prosecutors are
doing just that: electing a prosecutor, not an emperor,206 and certainly
not one empowered to make decisions that might spill over onto
people who didn’t even get to vote on them.207 Yet it’s worth considering whether the phenomenon may at least sometimes be justified.
This Part argues that it may. All state prosecutor categorical nullification decisions are not created equal. Some, it turns out, grow
from the same democratic root as our once-muscular juries. When
prosecutors nullify not unilaterally, but consistent with a reasonably
ascertainable popular will, they act as a conduit for the wholesale
achievement of what the same population might otherwise have done
43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 106 Side B
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202 See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law,
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1860 (2009); Austin Sarat &
Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty, and the Limits of
Law, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 390–91, 410–11 (2008) (calling the power to make
exceptions a “fragment of sovereignty”); cf. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985)
(“Foremost among the prerogatives of sovereignty is the power to create and enforce a
criminal code.”).
203 See, e.g., Price, supra note 20, at 677; Sawyer, supra note 24, at 618–22.
204 See generally infra Section IV.B (discussing rule-of-law critiques of categorical
nonenforcement).
205 Cf. Heath, 474 U.S. at 93 (extolling as key to state sovereignty power to “create and
enforce” its criminal law).
206 Cf. CHARLES STIMSON & ZACH SMITH, “Progressive” Prosecutors Sabotage the Rule
of Law, Raise Crime Rates, and Ignore Victims, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Oct. 29, 2020),
https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/report/progressive-prosecutors-sabotage-therule-law-raise-crime-rates-and-ignore (“Elected rogue prosecutors assert arrogantly that
they, and they alone, know what is best for the districts they represent . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
207 Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of Polarization, 128 YALE
L.J. 954, 976–77 (2019) (warning of dangers of externalities on outsiders).
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retail through jury control of the law. This is populist prosecutorial
nullification: a hydraulic descendant of strong juries.208 Viewed thusly,
it merits respect as a democratically legitimate phenomenon. That
respect, however, is contingent on the anti-domination principles that
can justify this phenomenon. The framework, therefore, will not legitimate a policy that invidiously infringes upon the self-determination
rights of losers in democratic policy debates. I conclude by sketching
the phenomenon’s specific democratic benefits.
A. The Framework

1. Distilling the Popular Will
I argue that a nonenforcement policy that de facto repeals democratically enacted law can nevertheless obtain legitimacy if it can be

04/16/2021 13:23:52

208 Cf. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999). This seminal article argued that money in elections
acts hydraulically; its owners will always find a way to affect the process. See id. at 1705,
1708; see also Bowers, supra note 127, at 1687 n.146 (“[D]iscretion is a hydraulic force.”).
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This Section contends that we may sift programmatic
prosecutorial nullification by considering the degree to which the
policy (1) reflects a discernible popular will, and (2) respects the
autonomy of those whose wills it does not implement.
My scaffolding is Part II’s treatment of popular sovereignty. On
that view, the degree to which a political choice comports with or
implements a particularized popular will is central to its legitimacy. As
Section II.B explained, popular sovereignty can also support an application of the all-affected principle under which the relevant popular
will is divined from a devolved political area, such as the regions that
elect most American prosecutors. Applying those principles, I aim to
offer one way to think about the legitimacy of programmatic
prosecutorial nullification.
Though I proceed through this lens, I do not entirely reject the
possibility that the managerialist could glean some value from my
approach. It is true that what I am searching for in the first part of my
framework—a kind of popular authorization—is less important to the
anti-populist views I rejected above. Yet the managerialist prosecutor
certainly need not treat it as entirely unimportant. One can imagine a
prosecutor making a relatively technocratic decision still finding popular preferences to be worth considering, even if she thinks of her job
as delivering a primarily technocratic all-things-considered decision.
That said, the force of my proposal may well decline as one moves
toward the managerialist end of the spectrum.
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tied to the People’s authorization.209 To concretize that claim, the
framework first asks whether the nullification policy reflects a reasoned, public, pre-election promise that context indicates was
electorally salient.
Take first the need for a reasoned, specific, pre-election promise.
The voters’ choice of a prosecutor after the proposal’s public ventilation through the formal election process is some evidence that they
approve (or at least condone) its implementation.210 The weight of
that evidence reasonably turns in part on the clarity with which the
policy proposal is explained and justified. That reflects the generally
accepted requirement that legitimate government action be nonarbitrary.211 Moreover, if the legitimator here is the public will, it appears
sensible to interrogate the degree to which the prosecutor is an
“honest agent” of “the public’s interests.”212 Interest alignment
requires not just that the proposal be aired but that its principles be
aired in a form sufficiently specific to facilitate public consideration.
One critique of the idea of popular intent from the direct democracy context underscores the importance of specificity. Initiative lawmaking may indeed render it quixotic to ask whether the “People”
intended an answer to a specific question of application that the initiative’s text generates.213 But so stated, the problem suggests that
imputing intent becomes more reasonable the further one moves away
from such questions. For example, we reasonably treat a majority’s
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209 Any discussion of the People must acknowledge involuntary exclusion from the
electorate, see supra note 186, and the possibility that the composition of the electorate can
be manipulated by the electorate’s supposed agents—whether through gerrymandering,
making it harder to vote, or a variety of other ways that legislators can affect the electoral
backdrop. See generally Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The
Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491 (1997). Nevertheless, although that sort of
manipulation can raise questions beyond this Article’s scope about the legitimacy of the
entire democratic system, there is still value in considering, as I do here, whether one
particular part of that system is (or is not) uniquely illegitimate.
210 Cf. Fairfax, supra note 8, at 1280 (contemplating voter engagement with potential
nullification promises).
211 See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (“[T]he touchstone of
due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government . . . .”
(citation omitted)); Osofsky, supra note 21, at 92–93 (noting that agency action has been
justified on the basis of its nonarbitrariness).
212 Cf. Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 84–88 (2017) (emphasis omitted)
(considering reason-giving and intent in overenforcement context).
213 See Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in
Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 110–12, 158–59 (1995) (querying whether it was
sensible to ask whether California voters’ approval of a lengthy criminal-law initiative
indicated any specific intent regarding whether the alterations authorized “hearsay
testimony in a preliminary hearing by someone without personal knowledge of the case” or
whether they “authorized a court to order disclosure of a defense witness’s address and to
sanction a noncomplying attorney”).
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voting for a candidate as reflecting their “intent” that the candidate
take office. Specificity helps move nullification promises along this
spectrum by tightening the nexus between the proposal and the election, thus reducing the space for doubt regarding intent.
Specificity dovetails with the importance of the proposal’s salience. One potential strike against prosecutorial nullification is that
many prosecutorial elections lack salience.214 That makes sense. It is
harder to claim that the popular will embraces an issue unimportant to
the election.215 But it is worth considering the issue at greater length
in order to clarify how salience helps legitimize prosecutorial nullification. Consider the obvious objection: we generally elect candidates
who implement policies rather than voting on the policies directly.
This practice could muddy any policy-specific authorization to act
inferable from an election, notwithstanding a candidate’s pre-election
promise. Some would say it is fatal to any attempt to speak of a coalesced popular issue preference.216 Yet even those skeptics acknowledge that an election “delivers an electoral mandate” if “voters’
intentions concerning issues are clear and decisive.”217 Perhaps more
importantly, politicians and citizens seem to believe that policy
promises matter, whether as evidence of what the candidate will do if
elected, a basis for sanction at the next election if deviated from, or
both.218 It at least seems reasonable to infer a popular issue prefer-
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214 See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 8, at 1269–70 (noting scholarly critique that
prosecutorial elections often “fail[] . . . to highlight prosecutorial policies for voter
consideration”). But see Wright, supra note 112, at 591 (suggesting some inherent salience
in the prosecutorial role).
215 It is theoretically possible that a prosecutor’s electoral “type” (e.g., her presentation
as progressive) may be so striking that it might in fact embrace some specific issues even if
not explicitly flagged. Cf. James D. Fearon, Electoral Accountability and the Control of
Politicians: Selecting Good Types Versus Sanctioning Poor Performance, in DEMOCRACY,
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 55, 60 (Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes &
Bernard Manin eds., 1999) (arguing that voters tend to see elections as tools for
prospective selection of “good types”). But I start from the premise that programmatic de
facto repeals require a healthy dose of robust justification. Because I tie that justification
to the strength of the difficult-to-grasp popular will, I maintain that pre-election ventilation
of the proposal remains critical. Some concrete existing pledge is particularly important if,
as many maintain, the only really effective tool of electoral control is retrospective sanction
for unwanted behavior. See id. at 56 (describing how some theorists focus on politicians’
fear of losing reelection as the main tool of electoral accountability).
216 See e.g., WHELAN, supra note 86, at 354–55, 372 (noting skepticism of the idea of a
specific popular preference on a given issue).
217 Id. at 372; see also Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski & Susan C. Stokes,
Introduction to DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION, supra note 216,
at 1, 8, 12–13 (contemplating the existence of mandates as signals of voter preference
communicated via elections).
218 See Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski & Susan C. Stokes, Elections and
Representation, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION, supra note
216, at 29, 38 (stating that reputational concerns motivate politicians to keep their policy
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ence when electoral context can be said to offer clear indicia on the
matter.219
This reasoning is not foreign to the law. The objection here bears
a family resemblance to arguments against the general idea of collective intent.220 Yet courts resolving discrimination cases have long
wielded effective tools for inferring, or imputing, a group’s “intent.”221
Indeed, we routinely, and necessarily, attribute intent—a supposed
will—to bodies that could not literally possess a single undifferentiated intent.222 The question is not whether such attribution is ever
appropriate, but what conditions justify it.
In that regard, salience is a reasonable guidepost. It serves the
same function in this iteration of indirect democracy as the single subject rule serves in direct democracy: It justifies an inference that the
majority intended some outcome by their vote.223 And objective
indicia exist. Helpfully, for prosecutors, at least two ever-present
pieces of context will cut in favor of salience. First, the inherent novelty of any campaign promise to nullify warrants granting at least a
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promises); Fearon, supra note 216, at 58–59, 82–83 (arguing that a politician’s policy
promises help voters decide if that politician is a good type, i.e., “the type who want[s] to
do in office what [the voters] would want done” (emphasis omitted)); José Marı́a Maravall,
Accountability and Manipulation, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND
REPRESENTATION, supra note 216, at 154, 154–57 (suggesting that elections may influence
politicians both prospectively and retrospectively). Consider here the evidence that elected
officials really do try to fulfill campaign promises, see Ezra Klein, Contrary to Popular
Belief, Politicians Often Keep Campaign Promises, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2012), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/contrary-to-popular-belief-politicians-oftenkeep-campaign-promises/2012/01/19/gIQAAgq6BQ_story.html, and that politicians who
deviate from campaign promises feel compelled to justify that deviation, see Manin et al.,
supra, at 38 (suggesting that politicians provide justifications for breaking campaign
promises because voters expect those promises to be kept).
219 See Lawrence J. Grossback, David A.M. Peterson & James A. Stimson, Electoral
Mandates in American Politics, 37 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 711, 711 (2007) (describing strong
congressional reactions to elections with clear political mandates).
220 See Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 556–57 (2018) (noting
appearance of skepticism about determining collective intent in various legal contexts).
221 See id. at 556–60 (describing how courts have looked at context to determine
collective intent in constitutional cases and Title VII cases); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523, 527–28 (2016)
(describing a variety of judicial approaches to determining collective legislative intent).
222 ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 34–35 (2014) (observing that we
attribute intent to “local governments, trade associations, and businesses”); see also Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (invalidating statewide initiative as discriminatory);
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 390–91, 393 (1969) (invalidating city initiative as
discriminatory).
223 See Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy and the
Single Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 706–09 (2010) (discussing justifications for
the single subject rule—i.e., the common requirement that direct democracy initiatives “be
confined to ‘one subject’”).
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224 See, e.g., Osofsky, supra note 21, at 94 (“[C]ategorical nonenforcement can increase
the salience of nonenforcement decisions, making it more likely that the politically
accountable branches and the public will focus on them . . . providing a particularly
transparent statement of nonenforcement.”).
225 See Wright, supra note 112, at 590–91, 602 (describing how the localized character of
prosecutor elections helps voters understand and respond to candidate policies).
226 See HESSICK, NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 5, at 5.
227 Indeed, in some respects, this would prove too much. It is not necessarily the case
that uncontested elections are inherently defective signals of whom the people have
selected.
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mild per se presumption of salience for any such proposal.224 After all,
the more the proposal grabs the public’s attention, the more reasonable it is to treat the election as a referendum on the proposal.
Second, remember the geographic and subject-matter constraints on
district attorney power. Simply put, a prosecutor candidate’s platform
is likely to contain fewer, and more localized, planks than actors with
more capacious bailiwicks (e.g., a gubernatorial candidate).225 There is
simply less to distract onlookers from the promised policy when a
prosecutor takes the unusual step of promising nullification.
Beyond those indicators, salience is contextual. Of substantial
importance is the presence of an opponent, often absent in
prosecutorial elections, although most voters live in jurisdictions
where a choice is likely.226 The absence of an alternative cuts against
the significance of the electorate’s “selection” of a candidate. Yet a
contested election is not strictly necessary. Other indicia of authorization can counterbalance uncontested status. Examples would include
the reelection of a prosecutor after her implementation of a previously promised policy (perhaps in an opposed election), high turnout,
or a policy that represents such a dramatic break with the status quo
that opposition would be expected if it contradicted local views. While
the question of contestation is close, localities should not be barred
from accessing this sort of local control merely because (for example)
they are too small, or an incumbent prosecutor is too popular and
effective to generate regularly contested elections.227 Moreover,
increasing the import of elections, as this proposal would, should also
raise the likelihood that they will be contested.
Other relevant fact-specific considerations can be imagined. Did
the candidate center the nullification proposal in his or her selfportrayal? That makes more sensible an inference that voters understood it as key to the candidate’s political project, and thus one the
candidate would prioritize implementing post-election. Perhaps media
covered the proposal as key to the campaign; that too suggests sali-
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ence.228 Or maybe the candidate’s opponents attacked the proposal
directly, which arguably defines the election’s stakes in relation to the
proposal. Or the election may have generated unusually high turnout
for a prosecutorial election.229
In sum, the nexus between a programmatic nullification policy
and an election matters for divining democratic sanction. The subsidiarity of district attorney elections tightens that nexus in ways that
can sometimes permit a prosecutor to claim legitimately that the district has authorized her nullification program.
2. Outsider Effects and Invidious Domination

04/16/2021 13:23:52

228 Cf. Schacter, supra note 214, at 131–33, 155 (noting media power to shape electoral
stakes).
229 Referring to turnout raises the specter of apathy and nonvoters. Cf. Rappaport,
supra note 25, at 751–52 (arguing that for “most ordinary people” participatory democracy
is too time consuming). For these purposes, I consider choices not to vote nullities, i.e.,
expressions of indifference between the status quo and the policy preferences of the not
indifferent. Indeed, this may be a place where some of the democratic difficulties posed by
differing intensities of interest work themselves out. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Voting with
Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 111, 142–48 (2000) (considering whether and how to account
for different intensities of interest in democratic decisionmaking); ELAINE SPITZ,
MAJORITY RULE 27–30 (1984) (discussing the benefits and difficulties of considering
intensity in democratic processes).
230 Kleinfeld, supra note 25, at 1393–94.
231 JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 13 (1999) (emphasis omitted).
232 Cf. Kerrel Murray, Note, Good Will Hunting: How the Supreme Court’s Hunter
Doctrine Can Still Shield Minorities from Political-Process Discrimination, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 443, 445, 453 (2014) (considering this challenge in the context of the Supreme Court’s
political-process doctrine).
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Populist prosecutorial nullification advances autonomy by legitimating local self-determination. But if we think the all-affected principle helps justify this practice, we must grapple with the likelihood
that not all affected assented. Perhaps popular sovereignty is “at the
irreducible core of democracy,” but that does not mean majoritarianism is coextensive with democracy.230 Prong two aims to ensure the
policy, as implemented, minimizes supralocal effects on those beyond
the district who literally had no say, and treats a policy as suspect if it
impermissibly tramples the autonomy of losing minorities. “Impermissibly” must do work here. As Jeremy Waldron argues, “nothing tyrannical happens to me merely by virtue of the fact that my opinion is not
acted upon by a community of which I am a member.”231 Yet sometimes a policy loss is not just a loss, but something fundamentally
antidemocratic in a way that our normative frameworks must at least
attempt to detect.232
On that note, take first those outside the district. At the outset,
we can draw again on the all-affected principle to posit that my gener-
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233 A fair analogy here is the insufficiency of mere “psychic [dis]satisfaction” for Article
III standing. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998). I thus
disagree with those who would give veto-justifying weight to supposed “intangible
externalities.” See, e.g., Todd E. Pettys, The Mobility Paradox, 92 GEO. L.J. 481, 498 (2004)
(advocating for weighting intangible externalities).
234 To be sure, outsider harms are only possible after first defining outsiders via the
contingent political definition of the relevant community. See Schragger, supra note 182, at
464 (describing how local norms influence jurisdictional boundaries). Though the point is
well taken, this Article takes those contingent borders as given.
235 See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69 (1978) (“A city’s
decisions inescapably affect individuals living immediately outside its borders.”).
236 Section III.B offers further reason to think this would be a good thing.
237 See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Decentralization, and Development, 102 MINN. L.
REV. 1649, 1649, 1662 (2018) (discussing foot voting, i.e., interjurisdictional migration
undertaken because the migrant prefers the policies of his or her new jurisdiction). I
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alized moral disapproval of the choice that another region’s voters
made does not justify granting me the power to veto that choice. If
just having an opinion on an issue sufficed to place one on an equal
“affected” footing with those whom the policy choice affects more
tangibly, the principle would seem to mean little.233 Of more concern
are those out-of-district effects that constrain the autonomy of outsiders (including those who regularly travel into the district).234 To
address that worry, we should view nullification pledges as most
defensible when aimed at crimes committed within the jurisdiction, by
residents, against residents.
This is not to say that any negative spillover effect invalidates a
policy. Establishing boundaries carries with it some degree of unavoidable spillover from policy decisions,235 and we should not treat
populist prosecutorial nullification more harshly than other decisions
in that regard. I mean only that spillover must be taken seriously
enough to sometimes delegitimize otherwise valid populist
prosecutorial nullification. To be sure, determining when spillover
crosses the line can present a close question (as I suggest in Sections
IV.D and V.A.3). In such cases, the popular sovereignty lens applied
here would give the tie to the local nonenforcement policy.236
Within-district “outsiders” (dissenters) stand in a fundamentally
different position. They possess a clear stake in how their district’s
criminal law operates. Yet majoritarian democracy necessitates dissenters, so their existence is not dispositive. Through the popular sovereignty lens applied here, the opportunity to influence the result
through voting and other political engagement warrants a healthy, but
rebuttable, presumption of legitimacy. Generally, in these situations, it
is the dissenters’ burden either to make their case in the next election
or take advantage of the relative ease of “foot voting” by moving
away.237 That said, even the strongest advocates of popular sover-
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acknowledge that relative ease does not always mean possible in practice, but the
possibility of foot voting still warrants mention.
238 See, e.g., Kleinfeld, supra note 25, at 1393–94, 1401, 1409–10.
239 See Kleinfeld, supra note 59, at 1466 (denying “democratic authority” where one
part of society invidiously dominates or denies equal citizenship to another part) (emphasis
omitted); Natapoff, supra note 24, at 1755 (deeming underenforcement illegitimate when it
acts to render some members of communities “lesser citizens” without “serious
justifications”); Vicki C. Jackson, The (Myth of Un)Amendability of the U.S. Constitution
and the Democratic Component of Constitutionalism, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 575, 600–01
(2015) (arguing that democratic processes premised on equality cannot legitimate
ostensibly democratic decisions that deny equality).
240 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 414–15 (1985)
(noting that “hard cases” may arise when there are “questions about the result announced
by a clearly applicable rule”).
241 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969).
242 Thus, I do not advocate untrammeled “neighborhood constitutionalism” under
which devolution per se legitimates otherwise unconstitutional practices. See Schragger,
supra note 182, at 382–83 (describing that model). Constitutions are fundamentally
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eignty acknowledge that some things are not up for majority vote.238
The question is what those things are, and how we know. For present
purposes, two limitations flow from the same justification for
increased popular control outlined in Part II.
The first returns to autonomy. Democratic majoritarianism is not
worth having because there is something magical about fifty percent
plus one. On the popular sovereignty view, majoritarianism is valuable
(if it is) because it reflects and advances a measure of equal selfdetermination for individuals and groups. If popular sovereignty goes
beyond merely displeasing losers to disparate infringements on that
equal self-determination, it becomes invidious domination inconsistent with its raison d’être.239 Although, in practice, that sort of holistic
standard may generate close cases,240 their existence does not vitiate
the point, especially when some cases are not close. Consider the easy,
and easy to imagine, case of a refusal to prosecute assaults at only
certain voting precincts. A legitimating theory based on selfdetermination must at least imply equal access to the means of selfdetermination. That flows into the second limitation: constitutional
protections. Keeping in mind the “why” of democracy helps justify the
Supreme Court’s observation that the “sovereignty of the people is
itself subject to . . . constitutional limitations.”241 Individual-rights provisions, like those in the Bill of Rights and Reconstruction
Amendments, are not just consistent with a thick sense of democracy
as more than bare majoritarianism. They perfect it by ensuring that all
members of the community may participate in democracy. While constitutional violations are not always obvious, their general proscriptions provide a baseline against which the actions discussed here can
be measured.242
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different from ordinary legislative acts. The former are exercises of a sort of “original
right” by the people themselves, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176
(1803), while the latter represent at most the acts of the people’s “agents,” see THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 49 (Alexander Hamilton).
243 Cf. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 208.
244 HESSICK, NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 5, at 10.
245 See 50A C.J.S. Juries § 266 (describing the ways vicinage is defined for jury
selection); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 33, § 16.1(b) (distinguishing the concepts of venue
and vicinage); id. § 16.1(c) (outlining the formula for designating venue in criminal trials).
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In sum, this model can justify elected prosecutors’ programmatic
nullification when (1) context reveals localized electoral authorization
and (2) the programs operate consistent with the self-determination
rights of dissenters in and outside of the jurisdiction. That is populist
prosecutorial nullification.
This reveals a before-now unappreciated analogy to historical
practice. When prosecutors exercise their robust discretion programmatically to nullify, pursuant to a policy for which they can legitimately claim public approval, they accomplish wholesale what juries
once might have done retail. They tie the law’s application, or nonenforcement, to the People’s will. Populist prosecutorial nullification is
thus a hydraulic descendant of our once-strong juries.243 Like those
juries, it empowers the governed to judge the law, either per se or as
applied in a subset of cases. In my view, the practice can be justified
independent of this analogy, particularly under a popular sovereignty
lens. Section III.B sketches several such justifications. But the parallel
matters. The jury’s populist roots, coupled with the subsidiarity-based
justifications for those roots, suggest that the modern-day demise of
jury trials opened a distinctly democratic hole in our institutions—a
hole that populist prosecutorial nullification is well-suited to fill.
The analogy is useful both for the similarities it invokes and the
distinctions it acknowledges. Take, for example, a key point of
coextension that underscores the populist connection: the composition
of prosecutorial electorates. Prosecutors are usually elected from districts tracking one or multiple counties to prosecute crimes in those
districts.244 Juries are generally drawn from the same geographic
region in which trial is proper (usually, where the crime was committed).245 Accordingly, those who elect a prosecutor comprise generally the same population from which that region’s juries would be
drawn.
Looking to that population suggests a point of distinction worth
elaboration. One defense of jury nullification, sounding in popular
sovereignty, has been that “the entire polity has the relevant exper-
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tise” on “the question of what constitutes justice in a particular
case.”246 But juries are still samples of the polity, often skewed by forcause and peremptory challenges.247 The rejoinder is predictable: the
jury is “unelected, unaccountable to a constituency, and only
obliquely a ‘representative’ of the area from which it is drawn.”248 To
these critics, there is thus no “necessary correlation between community values and an acquittal.”249 Indeed, if the community disagrees
with nullification, an acquittal might actually harm the community’s
interests.250 These challenges, in short, question the democratic chops
of jury nullification. Conversely, populist prosecutorial nullification
draws on all who are able and choose to vote. Although voting pools
are not skew-free,251 those imperfections are generally as applicable, if
not more so, to jury pools.252 The upshot is that populist prosecutorial
nullification offers unusually strong assurance that nonenforcement
represents the community.
Another place of disanalogy accentuates the point. Since the
Founding, some crimes have always been treated as petty and thus
outside the jury-trial guarantee.253 Conversely, prosecutors wield discretionary authority over petty and non-petty crimes. But this just
demonstrates the hydraulic nature of local, popular control. I argue
not that the populist prosecutor envisioned here replicates every
aspect of the strong jury, but that it affords localities the same sort of
power those juries had. At most, the disanalogy shows only that this
phenomenon offers more of that power. And if those who contend
246

Barkow, supra note 7, at 1362.
See, e.g., Frampton, supra note 70, at 788–90 (describing racial disparities in the
exercise of both peremptory strikes and challenges for cause); Jeffrey Abramson, Two
Ideals of Jury Deliberation, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 125, 128 n.11 (1998) (recognizing that
for-cause and peremptory challenges can make a jury unrepresentative); Joshua Revesz,
Comment, Ideological Imbalance and the Peremptory Challenge, 125 YALE L.J. 2535, 2537,
2543–46 (2016) (contending, based on survey data, that peremptory challenges result in
ideologically skewed juries).
248 Leipold, supra note 75, at 299.
249 Id. at 308.
250 Id. at 307–08 (describing situations where jury nullification fails to conform with
community values).
251 See supra note 186.
252 See, e.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 33, § 22.2(b) (“Lists of voters and drivers’
license holders are most commonly used to create the list of potential jurors.”); Nina W.
Chernoff, Black to the Future: The State Action Doctrine and the White Jury, 58 WASHBURN
L.J. 103, 138–39 (2019) (calling attention to the ways in which racial voter registration
disparities have been and can continue to be the product of discriminatory governmental
conduct).
253 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1394 n.7 (2020) (recognizing that both
common law tradition and current precedent allow trials for petty offenses to occur
without a jury (citing Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379 (1966))); Murphy, supra
note 81, at 137–40 (sketching the Supreme Court’s approach to petty offenses).
247
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that the Supreme Court has narrowed the jury-trial right through its
interpretation of the petty-crime exception are correct,254 the
hydraulic relationship is clear: populist prosecutorial nullification
offers communities a type of power that judicial construction has
vitiated.
I acknowledge the possibility that, all else equal, an unbroken
pattern of jury nullification in a jurisdiction may generate a stronger
inference regarding the “popular will” than knowing only that a candidate promised not to enforce a law. After all, electoral success generally requires just a bare majority, while the relative randomness of
jury selection may make blanket nullification quite unlikely unless
community opposition well exceeds fifty percent plus one.255 As
noted, though, the legitimacy of populist prosecutorial nullification
does not rest on its perfect replication of its progenitor. This potential
point of departure underscores the importance of this Part’s focus on
the nature of the promise and the election in which it is made: An
electoral win, on its own, may be an insufficient barometer of a popular will warranting implementation.
In any event, beyond the minutiae of the analogy, this framework
offers an administrable heuristic for evaluating these policies. Its value
does not hinge solely on its judicial enforceability. To be sure, this
model can inform any case where the legitimate reach of prosecutorial
discretion matters.256 Consider Parisa Dehghani-Tafti, a Virginia district attorney elected in 2019 on a platform that included refusing to
prosecute marijuana possession.257 When she began implementation,
unelected county judges began requiring apparently unprecedented
43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 112 Side A
04/16/2021 13:23:52

254 See Murphy, supra note 81, at 149, 169 (explaining how the Supreme Court has
narrowed the right to a criminal jury trial).
255 How unlikely depends, among other things, on whether a jury nullifies when it hangs
because of some jurors’ intent to nullify. See, e.g., Marder, supra note 30, at 881 & n.7, 887
(noting the technical difference between a hung jury and a nullifying jury but arguing that
when a jury hangs because of some jurors’ intent to nullify, it should be considered a
nullifying jury).
256 See, e.g., infra Section V.A.1 (suggesting that this framework could have informed a
judicial decision affirming the reassignment of cases); Michael Jonas, One Year in, Rollins
Takes Stock, COMMONWEALTH (Feb. 18, 2020), https://commonwealthmagazine.org/
criminal-justice/one-year-in-rollins-takes-stock-2 (noting two cases of state trial courts
attempting to block Rachael Rollins’ refusal to prosecute); cf. State v. Winne, 96 A.2d 63,
73–74 (N.J. 1953) (allowing criminal charges against a prosecutor for the bad-faith exercise
of nonenforcement discretion).
257 See Rebecca Burnett, Commonwealth’s Attorney Takes Circuit Court to Va. Supreme
Court, WDVM VA. (Sept. 4, 2020, 6:42 PM), https://www.localdvm.com/news/virginia/
commonwealths-attorney-takes-circuit-court-to-va-supreme-court (describing DehghaniTafti’s platform).
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“specific, written explanations” for her attempts to dismiss charges.258
At least one court hinted that it would reject any dismissal that it
believed constituted “partisan enforcement of the laws.”259 DehghaniTafti attempted to challenge this judicial resistance before the Virginia
Supreme Court.260 Although the court declined to rule on procedural
grounds, a properly presented case would squarely implicate this
Article’s framework.261 In such a case, it should at least count in
Dehghani-Tafti’s favor that she was elected on this platform, that this
judicial second-guessing was apparently unprecedented, and that the
second-guessers were appointed, not elected.
Beyond emphasizing that those types of facts should matter, this
Article is agnostic regarding the precise way that judges might employ
this framework, or whether it can or should necessarily be judicially
enforced to its “full conceptual limits.”262 That should not trouble us.
Legal rules and norms matter beyond the bench; courts need not, and
should not, be the only actors concerned with lawfulness.263 Whether
or not this Article’s specific framework is adopted, some normative
view of the prosecutor’s role and power should inform prosecutors’
perception of their power, voters’ willingness to select or reject prosecutors, and the frequency with which empowered actors like states
choose to preempt local prosecutorial behavior.264
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258 Rachel Weiner, Virginia’s Highest Court Sidesteps Marijuana Dispute in Arlington,
WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/
arlington-prosecutor-judge-dispute/2020/12/22/5863f8ea-43b7-11eb-b0e4-0f182923a025_
story.html; see also Parisa Dehghani-Tafti, Why I Am Fighting for Prosecutorial Discretion,
WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/localopinions/why-i-am-fighting-for-prosecutorial-discretion-in-arlington/2020/08/20/9395512ee0c6-11ea-b69b-64f7b0477ed4_story.html (asserting that the order was “unprecedented”);
Circuit Court–17th Judicial Circuit, ARLINGTON CTS. & JUD. SERVS., https://
courts.arlingtonva.us/circuit-court (last visited Feb. 8, 2021) (noting that Arlington Circuit
Court judges “are elected by a majority vote of each House” of the state legislature);
Judicial Selection in Virginia, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Judicial_selection_in_
Virginia (last visited Feb. 8, 2021) (noting that all Virginia state judges are elected by a
majority vote of legislators, not direct election).
259 Dehghani-Tafti, supra note 258.
260 See Weiner, supra note 258 (describing Dehghani-Tafti’s petition).
261 See id. (noting that the Virginia Supreme Court declined to rule for lack of a case or
controversy).
262 Cf. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1221 (1978) (arguing that constitutional
norms that are “understood to be legally valid to their full conceptual limits” may
nevertheless properly be “underenforced” by judicial decisions that stop short of those
limits). Similarly, some aspects of my normative framework may be more amenable to
judicial weighing than others.
263 See id. (emphasizing that norms underenforced by the judiciary still “remain in full
force” for other actors).
264 See infra Section IV.D (discussing the role of this state authority).
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B. Democratic Benefits
While its benefits draw on the strong-jury tradition, populist
prosecutorial nullification offers independent, novel democratic
advantages. This Subpart highlights three notable benefits: offering
communities increased autonomy through devolved control over some
aspects of their criminal law, investing individuals and groups more
deeply in the value of the broader political unit, and enhancing democratic accountability.
1. Particularized, Devolved Empowerment
In some ways, this issue is about where power resides.265 Who,
that is, should decide whether a community permits sex work, or recreational drug possession, unlicensed cosmetology, or a host of other
possible legal declarations of what ought or ought not happen?266
Even under the (perhaps unwarranted) assumption of representative
legislatures, nonrandom geographic ideological sorting267 may mean
legislative views on a law may not align with the views within a given
locality. And while we should not equate a district’s electorate with
one undifferentiated “community,”268 we should have little difficulty
imagining some (or most) of a district’s discrete groups objecting to
laws that contravene their values. It remains useful, then, to speak of
community interests, particularly with subsidiarity at work.
This Article problematizes the denial of community ability to
define the good as its values dictate and live accordingly.269 District
attorney elections can mitigate that problem. Through facilitating
local control over the state’s most coercive domestic activity—crim43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 113 Side A
04/16/2021 13:23:52

265 See Pfaff, supra note 18 (emphasizing complexity of “the question of who should
define our criminal laws” and asking why legislators and voters not based in an area should
necessarily “determine what conduct demands criminal enforcement” there).
266 See Steadman, supra note 1 (discussing a candidate’s promise not to enforce
prostitution laws); Wagner, supra note 3 (noting that Tiffany Cabán promised not to
enforce recreational drug offenses if elected); N.Y. Penal Law § 230.00 (McKinney 2020)
(making prostitution a misdemeanor); Id. §§ 221.05–25 (regulating marijuana possession);
MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 329.250, .030, .010 (West 2020) (regulating cosmetology).
267 Rick Su, Intrastate Federalism, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 191, 197–205 (2016) (discussing
the implications and origins of intrastate political divides); Theodore W. Ruger,
Preempting the People: The Judicial Role in Regulatory Concurrency and Its Implications
for Popular Lawmaking, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1029, 1046 (2006) (noting uneven
distribution of policy preferences).
268 See supra text accompanying notes 197–98; Rappaport, supra note 25, at 745–47, 746
nn. 208–09 (arguing that popular understandings of “community” fail to recognize the
divergent interests and unique characteristics of the individuals said to belong to that
community).
269 See Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959,
976 (2004) (contending that “we . . . deny . . . communities’ autonomy” when we
“suppress” their normative views in favor of others).
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270 See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 282 (Francis Bowen
& Phillips Bradley eds., Henry Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf 13th prtg. 1980) (“He who
punishes the criminal is . . . the real master of society.”).
271 See supra text accompanying notes 175–76.
272 Shapiro, supra note 168, at 322; see also Smith, supra note 139, at 418–20, 486
(describing the expansive role of local governments).
273 Carissa Byrne Hessick & Joseph E. Kennedy, Criminal Clear Statement Rules, 97
WASH. U. L. REV. 351, 363 (2019) (describing how legislators evade responsibility by
drafting broad criminal statutes); see Brown, supra note 75, at 1162 (characterizing the
need for interpretation when applying legal rules as “unavoidable”).
274 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 468 (1982) (quoting Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969)).
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inal law enforcement—populist prosecutorial nullification can return
a measure of autonomy to groups and individuals.270 Perhaps in some
sense a unanimity decision rule would maximize autonomy. But if that
is infeasible and might well decrease autonomy by neutering the
state’s ability to protect freedom,271 devolving decisionmaking to
increase the “number of issues over which people are free to choose”
may be the next best thing, particularly given the primacy of local
action in most people’s lives.272 In this way, populist prosecutorial nullification serves the same function that powerful localized juries could:
a counterweight to the normative preferences of a more distant
sovereign.
Outright nullification is one clear means of control. But the control can be finely grained as well, permitting communities to equitably
trim laws. Legal rules often sweep beyond the core disfavored conduct
that prompted them, sometimes because of human fallibility, and
sometimes because legislatures craft them that way to punt tailoring
to enforcers.273 Good-faith disagreement may also exist about the
core’s proper size. Without populist prosecutorial nullification, a community opposed to a law’s enforced breadth, but without the statewide
clout to alter it, must hope that cases make it to a jury for ex post
nullification (if the jury trial right even applies). With populist
prosecutorial nullification, communities, through their prosecutors,
may ex ante declare some cases of factual guilt permissible.
Finally, it is worth noting how particularized empowerment can
have a net anti-subordinating effect. Any locality could avail itself of
this Article’s path. But just as the “majority needs no protection
against discrimination,”274 groups that have been, and continue to be,
well represented at higher levels of government may find no need for
populist prosecutorial nullification to achieve desired ends. Conversely, historically disenfranchised and subordinated groups that are
local majorities may well still stand in a relatively disenfranchised
position at the state and federal levels. Opening populist prosecutorial
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nullification to all localities may, on balance, have a leveling effect
with respect to bottom-up control over criminal law governance.275
2. Binding the Polity

04/16/2021 13:23:52

275 See, e.g., Pfaff, supra note 18 (building a normative case for prosecutorial
nullification, in part, based on its ability to empower historically subordinated groups who
lack the ability to influence higher levels of government).
276 See Shapiro, supra note 172, at 139–40 (observing that “there cannot be an
undisputed list of goods” in a pluralistic society).
277 See GREEN, supra note 176, at 74–75 (“[T]he credibility of most threats . . . [to coerce
behavior] depends precisely on their being unnecessary for most citizens. . . . Coercion
secures authority and makes it efficacious, but it does not constitute it. Coercive threats
provide secondary, reinforcing motivation when political order fails in its primary
normative technique . . . .”); see also Gary J. Jacobsohn, Citizen Participation in PolicyMaking: The Role of the Jury, 39 J. POL. 73, 88 (1977) (discussing the need for juries to be
perceived as legitimate); Fallon, supra note 148, at 1812 n.97 (discussing the role of
legitimacy in the constitutional context).
278 Cf. Owen, supra note 169, at 114–15 (discussing that there is “democratic stability in
the sense of a strong identification of citizens with their democratic institutions”).
279 See Bressler, supra note 72, at 1149–50 (arguing that a proper reading of the
Reconstruction Amendments requires an understanding of the context in which they were
ratified); see generally MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986) (summarizing the history and
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Benefits also flow to higher levels of government. Political devolution makes sense in part because good-faith disagreement on the
common good is inevitable,276 but no amount of subsidiarity obviates
the need to sometimes bind dissenters. Societies thus only work upon
wide belief that non-coerced submission to the legal order is proper,
even when one disagrees.277
Yet most people would prefer to avoid repeated submission to
disfavored, unconsented-to rules. A popular-sovereignty perspective
reveals such submission as imposing a sort of autonomy tax, or as creating democratic stressors that alienate people from their government.278 Think here of your least favorite Supreme Court decision,
which binds you notwithstanding its (to you) obvious logical flaws.
Commentators sometimes quail about the degree to which Americans
are divided, often on issues that are decided at the national level. And
while our present disagreements may pale in comparison to past internecine division, much unpleasantness and associated inefficiency can
occur short of formal disunity. It is thus valuable for our legal rules
and institutions to consider how to combat the risk that actual—or
perceived—policy domination will generate this sort of alienation.
Of course, our legal tradition rejects absolute individual (or local)
immunity from top-down direction. Perhaps most notably, the
Fourteenth Amendment applied the Bill of Rights to the states to protect former enslaved persons against abuse by local majorities.279 As
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that example indicates, top-down direction may sometimes be
required precisely to protect autonomy. Few deny that some rights are
too important to submit them to majority whim; the disagreement
comes in the identification of those rights and their proper scope. And
beyond protection of individual rights, there are surely some instances
where unleavened populism, localized or otherwise, would preclude
effective governance.280 Nevertheless, top-down domination has costs
for the losers and consequent costs for democratic stability.281
Devolving control over criminal law can aid the broader political unit
by tempering those costs.
After all, an easy way to make people feel as though they have
control over their lives and societies is actually providing it.282 Mechanisms like populist prosecutorial nullification visibly scratch that itch.
In so doing, they ought to make those instances where top-down control is unavoidable more palatable (and more easily rationalized as
unavoidable). This can create safety valves for democratic stressors,
binding together the superior polity by making it more resilient to
those tensions. I draw here on Heather Gerken’s insight that federalism can “integrat[e] rather than divid[e] the national polity” by
“pulling” empowered localities “into the project of governance and
giving them a stake in its success.”283 It “take[s] the sting out of
losing” and “helps bind winners and losers to national politics.”284
Localism and subsidiarity can act the same way,285 since all forms of
devolution should help societies survive “sustained friction over the
long run.”286 Without encouraging constant defiance, devolved cate43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 114 Side B
04/16/2021 13:23:52

purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment). The Constitution itself falls within this tradition.
See McConnell, supra note 194, at 1489.
280 Cf. Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Don’t End or Audit the Fed: Central Bank
Independence in an Age of Austerity, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8–12 (2016) (justifying
separating central banks from the political process).
281 See Owen, supra note 169, at 114 (raising concerns that minority interests will be
ignored or valued less in majority rule democracies).
282 Cf. DZUR, supra note 25, at 159 (warning that “expert justice” can cause the
“perpetuation of social distance between the people and their power-wielding
institutions”).
283 Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J.
1889, 1892, 1898 (2014).
284 Id. at 1897 (emphasis added).
285 See, e.g., id. at 1891 (“Both devolution and centralization are . . . means to the same
end: a well-functioning democracy.” (emphasis omitted)); id. at 1910 (extending that
reasoning to local institutions like “locally elected prosecutor’s offices”).
286 Id. at 1900 (citing unpublished manuscript). Indeed, because state lines are weaker
predictors of communities of interest than they were at the Founding, local-level
devolution may be a more targeted means of amplifying autonomy (and obtaining socialbinding benefits) than mere state-level devolution. See Su, supra note 261, at 251–52; Daryl
J. Levinson, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term—Foreword: Looking for Power in Public
Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 103–05, 105 n.406 (2016).
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gorical nullification can permit dissenters to feel in control, notwithstanding sometimes-unavoidable submission to external control.287 In
short, populist prosecutorial nullification supercharges prosecutorial
discretion’s ability “to reconcile the populace with a distant
sovereign.”288
Finally, this model also implicates key elements of Philip Pettit’s
“contestatory mechanisms,” part of his anti-domination democratic
thought.289 These mechanisms permit minorities to challenge a disliked decision, not through a veto, but “to call [it] into question” and
“trigger a review” in an impartial forum.290 Populist prosecutorial nullification sends a clear message to other levels of government about
the community’s views. To the extent that this message may serve as a
catalyst for broader change, populist prosecutorial nullification also
aligns with the venerable, though sometimes criticized, “laboratories
of democracy” tradition.291 And as discussed more fully in Section
IV.D, the state’s retention of various ways to override local action
means that this local move can trigger precisely the sort of higherlevel political review the contestatory mechanism model contemplates.292 Ultimately, contestatory mechanisms, by allowing dissenters
to place the status quo on the political agenda for potential reconsideration, offers those losers additional reason to remain engaged and
invested in the political unit.
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287 Cf. Gerken, supra note 277, at 1898 (“Decentralization . . . gives dissenters the ability
to speak truth with power, not just to it.”); Post, supra note 168, at 28 (noting the
importance for democracies of ensuring that “citizens . . . maintain their identification with
the state” even when “the state acts in ways inconsistent with [their] ideas and values”).
288 Sklansky, supra note 110, at 506; cf. PARRILLO, supra note 92, at 256–58 (discussing
how different forms of prosecutorial compensation shaped the prosecutor’s relationship to
their community).
289 Owen, supra note 169, at 114 (citing Philip Pettit, Republican Freedom and
Contestatory Democracy, in DEMOCRACY’S VALUE 163, 178–79 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano
Hacker-Cordón eds., 1999)) (describing Pettit’s contestatory mechanisms).
290 Owen, supra note 169 (quoting Pettit, supra note 283); cf. DZUR, supra note 25, at
136 (describing jury nullification as a “feedback mechanism” for signaling disapproval of
“executive or . . . legislative” action); Jacobsohn, supra note 271, at 94 (suggesting that jury
nullification serves as a way to test community perceptions of laws and policies).
291 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may
. . . serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.”). But see Gerken, supra note 277, at 1901 (noting critiques of the
laboratory theory).
292 See Gerken, supra note 277, at 1900 (devolution can “build a national movement,
force issues on the national agenda, and tee up national debates, all with an eye to forging
a national norm”); see also infra Section IV.D (discussing state power to limit localities).

43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 115 Side B

04/16/2021 13:23:52

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-1\NYU103.txt

226

unknown

Seq: 54

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7-APR-21

17:25

[Vol. 96:173

3. Democratic Accountability
Democrats of all stripes generally applaud accountability.293 It
has also been long lamented as lacking for American prosecutors,
although perhaps opponents of prosecutorial elections would praise
its absence.294 Nevertheless, if Americans continue to desire meaningful popular accountability for prosecutors (and the persistence of
prosecutorial elections suggests that they do) populist prosecutorial
nullification is a boon.
Much of the prosecutorial accountability gap stems from the difficulty of evaluating performance. Some of that opacity may be a result
of the ascendancy of a managerialist view of prosecutors.295 But this
Article’s model requires a transparent, reasoned, pre-election
promise, which supports meaningful accountability, particularly relative to the status quo.296 While this proposal may not fully satisfy
those who lament prosecutor unaccountability, it does impose something like a reasoned decisionmaking requirement, which constrains
the extent to which programmatic nullification can be untrammeled.297 The transparency necessary for actual accountability in this
sphere means that prosecutors and voters will perceive a greater
chance that pledge compliance will be checked.298 To the extent that
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293 Accountability can mean both that an official is expected to give reasons for their
actions and that the official is subject to sanctions for conduct of which the public
disapproves. WHELAN, supra note 86, at 344; see also Richman, supra note 126, at 65
(defining accountability similarly).
294 E.g., Richman, supra note 121, at 960–65 (sketching tension between need for
accountability and prosecutorial independence); Davis, supra note 6, at 408 (noting
accountability complaints in the early twentieth century). But see Tonry, supra note 26, at
12 (deeming calls for accountability “puzzling”).
295 E.g., David Alan Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape for Elected
Prosecutors, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 647, 671 (2017) (arguing that “voters . . . are poorly
positioned to assess the performance of an elected prosecutor” and blaming “lack of
transparency” and “conflicting expectations about how prosecutors should do their jobs”);
Simon, supra note 123, at 191–92 (connecting low substantive content of many prosecutor
elections to the “traditional conception of prosecutorial work that emphasizes individual,
ineffable judgment”).
296 See, e.g., Eoin Higgins, Progressive DA Rachael Rollins Hasn’t Stopped Prosecuting
Petty Crimes, Despite Pledge. Police Are Still Furious, INTERCEPT (Mar. 24, 2019), https://
theintercept.com/2019/03/24/rachael-rollins-da-petty-crime (reporting community group
critique of Rachael Rollins’ pledge fulfillment); cf. Vorenberg, supra note 7, at 1551
(arguing that guiding nonenforcement discretion renders criminal justice “more principled,
visible, and understandable”).
297 Compare Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (reasoned decisionmaking requirement), with Wright, supra note
112, at 609–10 (calling for importation of these administrative law principles to the
prosecutorial context).
298 See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Ely and the Idea of Democracy, 57 STAN. L. REV. 737, 755
(2004) (positing that a lack of transparency in governmental action renders real
accountability by the polity more difficult); Higgins, supra note 296 (noting Rachael
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the prosecutorial accountability deficit stems from community confusion “about the prosecut[orial] function,”299 we may gain much from
the organic education that populist prosecutorial nullification
generates.
Accountability, accordingly, can also be instrumentally valuable
to boost participation. Giving voters more confidence that prosecutors
will follow through, and encouraging prosecutors to follow through by
requiring public precommitment, ought to go far to ensure the implementation of popular preferences.300 To the extent that participation
deficits reflect a sense that promises are never kept, accountability
may reverse that sense.
IV
SOME PROBLEMS
Those familiar with jury nullification may be seeing the ghosts of
its discontents at this point. Surely aligning populist prosecutorial nullification with jury nullification’s injection of popular sentiment risks
the latter’s well-known faults—most notably, the potential of exclusionary policy. This Part thus begins by considering whether this proposal can offer any more optimism regarding risks to local minorities
than jury nullification. It then engages other important critiques:
whether this proposal is compatible with the rule of law, whether it
authorizes impermissible “suspension” of the law, whether its
weighting of supralocal effect saps its efficacy, and whether practical
limitations on its impact weaken its utility.

We cannot “affect ‘a pure proceduralist’s nonchalance’” about
what the People made sovereign may do.301 Indeed, prizing selfdetermination demands concern about the potential that populist
prosecutorial nullification might violate individuals’ autonomy.302 History shows democracy at its worst when majorities simply use the
political process to rent seek and either neglect or oppress outgroups.

04/16/2021 13:23:52

Rollins’ ostensible equanimity with a community group checking her compliance).
Another instrumental benefit of transparency—antidiscrimination—receives independent
treatment, see infra Section IV.A.1.
299 Davis, supra note 6, at 209–10.
300 See, e.g., supra note 219 and sources cited therein.
301 See Kramer, supra note 263, at 996.
302 See HARRISON, supra note 155, at 231 (arguing that “the same reasons which give . . .
[democratic] majorit[ies] their normal legitimacy” (such as equality of democratic respect)
limit what those majorities may do to minorities); Shapiro, supra note 172, at 147
(connecting “the democratic ideal” with a “suspicion toward hierarchy,” and noting the
possibility that majorities might reach decisions inconsistent with that suspicion).
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For example, the populist Jacksonians explicitly framed their democracy as exclusionary.303 And the history of local control is replete with
condemnable popular choices.304 If that is unavoidable, injecting populism in pursuit of autonomy may be more trouble than it is worth.305
True, many prosecutors receiving recent press have been dubbed
“progressive prosecutors,”306 invoking a particular ideological tradition. The potential that historically disenfranchised groups might
invoke localism to advance their aims is of independent interest, given
American localism’s checkered history. But nothing about
prosecutorial power self-limits to “progressive” application.307 Today,
pro-gun sentiment is rarely coded progressive, yet a pro-gun community might well elect a pro-gun prosecutor who promises to nullify
gun-control laws. This Article does not attempt the difficult task of
justifying populist prosecutorial nullification on the grounds that it
will necessarily have a single ideological valence.308
Yet the abuse of local control is a serious risk. True, the potential
for good-faith disagreement about good policy reveals tangible democratic benefit in maximizing individual and group opportunity to
shape the world in ways consonant with their values. Take the guncontrol example just given. Many would consider this a policy area
where at least some good-faith disagreement is possible. Yet even
while respect for autonomy requires maintaining space for disagreement, that same respect also means the space is finite. And the history
of American majoritarianism reveals the potential for minority
303
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See, e.g., Forbath, supra note 115, at 970–71.
See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 208, at 976–77 & n.87 (noting potential for
antidemocratic, exclusionary localism, and collecting resources on “the racial dimensions
of local exclusion”); Erika K. Wilson, The New School Segregation, 102 CORNELL L. REV.
139, 149–50, 201–02 (2016) (describing “destructive localism”—when “local autonomy is
afforded to one group such that its members are able to enjoy the benefits of classic
localism at the cost or expense of another group”); id. at 149–51 (recounting Southern
municipalities’ attempts to evade desegregation post Brown v. Board of Education);
Leipold, supra note 75, at 304–07 (criticizing juries that acquitted on racist or otherwise
bigoted grounds).
305 See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 8, at 1274–75; Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries
of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1861 & n.41, 1879
(1994) (sketching the persistent tension between views of localism as a protector against
“potential tyranny of the state” and an optimizer of responsive democracy and the risks
localism can “pose to individual autonomy”).
306 See, e.g., The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution,” supra note 24, at 750; Reisman,
supra note 18.
307 See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 26, at 1252 (“A . . . sense that prosecutors . . . should[]
bend the laws to further individual conceptions of justice will not be limited to certain
prosecutors.”).
308 This Article thus avoids difficulties faced by “democratizers” who prize popular
control as means to certain substantive ends. See Rappaport, supra note 25, at 807–08.
304
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oppression lurking in invocations of popular sovereignty, especially
when coupled with praise for localism.
Prong two of my model aims to address this risk by condemning
populist prosecutorial nullification that invidiously dominates intradistrict minorities. But history demands more than just saying that
invidious domination would be bad if it happened. While I cannot
show that such outcomes are impossible under this proposal, there are
reasons for guarded optimism.
1. Transparency as Safeguard

309

04/16/2021 13:23:52

WHELAN, supra note 86, at 544.
See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 368 n.2 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]t is healthful to keep charging practices visible to the general public . . . .”);
Bibas, supra note 25, at 923–29, 934.
311 Bibas, supra note 25, at 947, 950–51.
312 WEALE, supra note 156.
313 See id. at 950–52 (deriding secrecy and opacity as obstacles to meaningful public
participation); WHELAN, supra note 86, at 543 (positing that both publicity and
transparency to the public are necessary for effective administration of the law). But see
Sklansky, supra note 25, at 1789 (discussing how elite-centered theories of democracy are
less interested in transparency).
314 See WHELAN, supra note 86, at 544 (observing that lack of transparency may cause
“popular frustration, distrust, and hostility to government”); Bibas, supra note 25, at 950.
310
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Much of this Article’s persuasiveness may depend on whether
one finds the popular sovereignty perspective congenial. But a distinct, universal advantage—and potential safeguard against invidious
parochialism—lies in its transparency. Most, regardless of their view
on popular control, seem to recognize some value in conducting government action in a way that is “clear and intelligible to the people at
large.”309 Transparency has often been praised, and its absence
lamented, in the criminal justice context broadly and the prosecutorial
context specifically.310 Opacity, as Stephanos Bibas explained, hampers deterrence and reduces faith in the justice system.311 And it
impedes any sort of public involvement in the criminal law governing
their lives, which ought to concern even those who would limit the
public’s role to “throwing the rascals out”;312 presumably, they still
want technocratic decisionmaking to be publicly comprehensible.313
Worse, hearkening back to democratic stressors, opacity engenders
resentment and alienation among the excluded, for whom government
stands in the position of ruler rather than agent.314
Concerns about prosecutorial nullification can rightly draw on
jury nullification’s negative potential. But transparency offers a key
distinction. Jurors need never explain their decisions and can lie if
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315 See Leipold, supra note 75, at 306–07 (emphasizing the risk of malicious nullification,
and dubbing it “startling . . . that the decisions are not subject to any review” and that “no
explanations are ever required from the decisionmakers”).
316 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–65, 469 (1996); see also Robinson
v. United States, 769 A.2d 747, 757–58 (D.C. 2001) (applying selective-prosecution
doctrine in state-court prosecution); State v. Keene, 693 N.E.2d 246, 253 (Ohio 1998)
(same). That prosecutor has also violated the ethical rules of any state that has adopted
ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), which proscribes “harassment or discrimination” on the basis of
the usual suspect classifications (as well as “marital” and “socioeconomic status”). To be
sure, ethical rules are often underenforced against prosecutors. See Bruce A. Green &
Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a Remedy for Abuses of
Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
143, 147 (2016). Yet an unconstitutional practice may at least generate a response from
unbiased state disciplinary authorities.
317 See infra Section IV.D (discussing this state power).
318 Cf. Bibas, supra note 25, at 961 (“Having to articulate reasons for decisions . . .
would discipline prosecutors, much as having to write reasoned opinions disciplines
judges.”).
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they do explain.315 Conversely, populist prosecutorial nullification
demands public pre-election justification of the policy. Not only does
this provide the per se benefits of transparency and accountability, it
offers some security against the worst excesses of popular control.
To see why, take a plainly unconstitutional policy like racially
selective prosecutorial nullification. The prosecutor who proceeds on
such a policy has run afoul of the Supreme Court’s recognized constraints on discretion and provided the “clear evidence” of a constitutional violation that is usually rather difficult to find.316 Assuming the
entire state does not subscribe to that prosecutor’s views, such a prosecutor would have also given the state ample justification to regulate
the policy out of existence.317
Surely, a skeptic might say, a malicious prosecutor would cloak
invidious intent behind facially neutral justification. We could even
imagine a prosecutor obtaining electoral authorization from a bigoted
electorate through coded messages that made clear the real racist
intent (for example) of a facially nondiscriminatory policy. Yet even
this is not unanswerable.
First, this model at least means that the prosecutor must say that
she plans to act and say why. The problem of pretext is not unique to
this context. But requiring a reason is better than not; we can detect
pretext by comparing reasons to reality.318 And requiring that the
policy be announced pre-election gives citizens and non-governmental
organizations time to investigate, analyze, respond during the election
process, and prepare to contest through other means if the prosecutor
wins.
Second, unlike acquittals, the degree to which an announced categorical prosecution policy might be judicially reviewable remains
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unsettled.319 After all, “[t]he closest analog to the prosecutor’s vast
discretion” is agency nonenforcement discretion, upon which the
Supreme Court has lavished similar deference and presumptive
nonreviewability.320 As the leading case suggests, however, a “consciously and expressly adopted . . . general policy” of agency nonenforcement might be “so extreme” as to perhaps be reviewable.321 The
same may apply here. If not categorically reviewable, such policies
might at least be sufficiently unique that discovery may sometimes be
warranted on whether a prosecution that is apparently legitimate
should actually be reviewable because it is “based on an unjustifiable
standard.”322 None of this is certain, but its plausibility is a clear point
of difference with jury nullification.
Transparency also points up the following reassuring distinction
with our prosecutorial status quo. Value-laden prosecutorial nonenforcement already occurs.323 Indeed, legislatures and citizens expect
prosecutors to exercise their nonenforcement discretion in ways more
substantive than mere resource prioritization.324 As an example, consider the interview-based study that found “experienced prosecutors”
gauging the propriety of punishment against their personal view of
whether a defendant is a “hardened, dangerous actor[]” or a “normal
working pe[rson]” that has “made mistakes.”325 Prosecutors are
human—it is not surprising that their nonenforcement could be influenced by individual idiosyncrasies like “individual character traits,
family background, and religious faith.”326 Unfortunately, although
their substantive nonenforcement seems far more accepted than jury
43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 118 Side A
04/16/2021 13:23:52

319 Cf. David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 265, 274 (2013) (suggesting that, inter alia, the “clarity and . . . generality” of a
prospective statutory nonenforcement policy “makes judicial review seem more
appropriate”).
320 See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 989, 1048 (2006); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (analogizing
the two).
321 See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4; Barron & Rakoff, supra note 313, at 274; Zachary S.
Price, Law Enforcement as Political Question, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1571, 1574, 1625
(2016) (providing a framework for judicial review of agency nonenforcement).
322 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996).
323 See Vorenberg, supra note 7, at 1551.
324 See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 110, at 505–06 (describing substantive use of
nonenforcement discretion to induce submission to top-down directives); Hessick &
Kennedy, supra note 267, at 353–54, 363 (discussing reliance on nonenforcement to
reasonably narrow over-broad and vague laws in practice); Simon, supra note 9, at 226
(arguing that “[p]rosecutorial nullification is widely considered legitimate” where applying
a statute would create “an especially harsh or anomalous result” or run contrary to
“contemporary sentiment”).
325 Wright & Levine, supra note 130, at 1085.
326 Id. at 1071.
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327 See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 8, at 1263; Barkow, supra note 7, at 1352–53, 1353 n.99.
Consider: the now “standard method” of “resolv[ing] a criminal investigation of a
corporation” is “a deferred or non-prosecution agreement.” Peter J. Henning, Dealing with
Corporate Misconduct, 66 FLA. L. REV. F. 20, 20 (2015).
328 See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and the
Allocation of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 189 n.15 (2008) (collecting sources
on biases and foibles of prosecutors); see also Bibas, supra note 25, at 939 & n.124
(collecting sources on sentencing disparities, including those stemming from prosecutorial
discretion); P.S. Kane, Comment, Why Have You Singled Me Out? The Use of
Prosecutorial Discretion for Selective Prosecution, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2293, 2300 (1993)
(presenting evidence of racially disparate charging); Darryl K. Brown, Structure and
Relationship in the Jurisprudence of Juries: Comparing the Capital Sentencing and Punitive
Damages Doctrines, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1323 (1996).
329 K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an
Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 304 (2014).
330 Id. at 288 n.15.
331 Vice laws have often lain unused in circumstances strongly indicating deliberate
prosecutorial nonfeasance. See, e.g., State v. Winne, 96 A.2d 63, 74 (N.J. 1953).
332 See supra text accompanying notes 309–16.
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nonenforcement,327 prosecutors are equally able to act for illegitimate
reasons, then lie about it (or give no reason at all). That opens the
door for invidious factors to infiltrate the process. It is thus unsurprising that the opacity of technocratic prosecutorial decisionmaking
can—and has—hidden disparate treatment.328
This all means that rejecting populist prosecutorial nullification
would do nothing for the exclusionary potential of technocratic
programmatic nullification. Populist (as I mean the term) prosecutors
did not invent ideological decisions not to prosecute “entire classes of
cases.”329 Consider this selection of apparently managerialist categorical nonenforcement decisions: refusals to prosecute homeless people
for sleeping in public spaces, refusals to prosecute polygamy cases
(absent abuse or coercion), and refusals to prosecute illegal concealment of weapons absent “evil intent.”330 Those are just examples, and
it cannot be denied that the power not to charge has been often
employed silently and programmatically.331 By demanding transparent electoral authorization, this Article’s model actually cabins
programmatic nullification for the same (just noted) reasons that it
offers advantages over jury nullification.332 A malicious managerialist
prosecutor needs no theory of populist prosecutorial nullification to
implement evil policy.
One might finally concede that denouncing populist prosecutors
will not stop bad actors, yet still reject this model for fear that bigoted
localities will push their prosecutors to new heights of populist exclusion. But it is worth remembering that orthodox prosecutors drawn
from that locality would likely reflect that locality’s parochial tendencies. In the end, blame for malicious exercise of government power

43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 119 Side A

04/16/2021 13:23:52

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-1\NYU103.txt

April 2021]

unknown

Seq: 61

POPULIST PROSECUTORIAL NULLIFICATION

7-APR-21

17:25

233

seems better placed on the people who seek it, not on a facially neutral concept like populist prosecutorial nullification, which can, after
all, just as easily be turned to inclusive and egalitarian ends by historically disenfranchised communities.333
Transparency is no cure-all. But it may make us more comfortable with pursuing the upsides of populist prosecutorial
nullification.334
2. Solidaristic Populism
While appeals to the People can facilitate discrimination, we
should not downplay populism’s salutary potential, or conclude that it
is necessarily anti-pluralist.335 Consider perhaps the most famous
American electoral success by avowed populists—the fusion between
the North Carolina Republican and Populist parties in the 1890s,
which briefly broke the Democratic Party’s post-Reconstruction political stranglehold.336 One primary basis of that collaboration, and a
main reason revanchist Democrats violently crushed it, was its frontal
assault on the ideologies of white supremacy and racial solidarity
between white elites and poor whites.337 And, more broadly, it is easy
to see why a populism rooted in an affirmation of equal selfdetermination for all members of society could produce inclusionary
results.338
In other words, at the risk of Pollyannaism, popular sovereignty
may offer a path to building a democracy that advances ideals of equal
dignity and autonomy. Part of that equation, no doubt, is the commitment to formal political equality shared by most proponents of
43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 119 Side A
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333 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 75, at 1171, 1195 (making these points to defend jury
nullification).
334 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 123, at 180 (“[D]ecisions under explicit norms are more
transparent to observers, so they are more easily assessed and changed.”).
335 See, e.g., AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 176–81, 193 (2010)
(sketching the attempts of late nineteenth-century Populists to build an egalitarian,
transracial democratic movement).
336 See, e.g., THOMAS FRANK, THE PEOPLE, NO: A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANTI-POPULISM
79–82 (2020); James L. Hunt, Fusion of Republicans and Populists, Encyclopedia of N.C.
(2006), https://www.ncpedia.org/fusion-republicans-and-populists; Jedediah Purdy, North
Carolina’s Long Moral March and its Lessons for the Trump Resistance, NEW YORKER
(Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/north-carolinas-long-moralmarch-and-its-lessons-for-the-trump-resistance.
337 See FRANK, supra note 336, at 79–82; Purdy, supra note 330; Hunt, supra note 330;
RANA, supra note 329, at 200, 211. Attempts at similar fusion elsewhere in the South often
met similar ends. See FRANK, supra, at 81; Purdy, supra; Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H.
Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV.
643, 661–62 & 662 n.73 (1998) (discussing similar populist uprisings in Texas).
338 See RANA, supra note 329, at 181 (describing grand initial aims of “inclusive and
egalitarian . . . [p]opulism”).
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democracy. In getting down to brass tacks, however, it also seems
indispensable to think hard about how to encourage citizens to “ask
[not] only what is in their private interest, but also what will best serve
the community in general.”339 Put another way, perhaps one way to
guard against democracy’s “dark side”340 is to generate the sort of
community and solidarity that makes exclusion unappealing.
That is easier said than done.341 Some once saw the jury, in its
robust, populist form, as a solution. To Tocqueville, for example, juries
made “all feel the duties which they are bound to discharge towards
society and the part which they take in . . . government,” and, by
“obliging [all] to turn their attention to other affairs than their own,
. . . rub[bed] off that private selfishness which is the rust of society.”342
On this view, prizing popular involvement required optimizing it,
which in turn required citizens to develop a “notion of right” and an
objective perspective through which to “judge [their] neighbor as
[they] would [themselves] be judged.”343 The jury, then, acted as an
instrument of self-government that, itself, built the civic virtue necessary for proper self-government.344
Contemporaneous exclusionary realities like American slavery
and Native dispossession dull that rhetoric’s shine.345 But the principles, honestly applied, have dramatic inclusionary potential. In modest
ways, modern cases reflect this possibility when they treat illegitimate
jury composition as injurious not just to the accused but to the community and “democratic ideal[s].”346 And studies align with the
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339 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1550 (1988);
see also Spragens, supra note 183, at 47–50.
340 Forbath, supra note 115, at 970.
341 See, e.g., RANA, supra note 329, at 217–18 (describing the internecine, often
racialized blame-casting among the early twentieth-century populists that attended the
movement’s collapse).
342 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 270, at 285.
343 Amar, supra note 53, at 1186 (quoting Tocqueville).
344 See, e.g., Alan Hirsch, Direct Democracy and Civic Maturation, 29 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 185, 210–12 (2002) (discussing the early jury’s perception as providing “the civic
maturation needed for a thriving . . . democracy”); Amar, supra note 53, at 1186–88
(expanding upon the numerous civic roles early American thinkers expected juries to
play).
345 See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, The Moral Exclusivity of the New Civil Society, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 555, 567 (2000).
346 Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979) (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S.
187, 195 (1946)) (discussing specifically the exclusion of Black people from juries); see also
Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2019) (noting the democratic implications of
racially motivated peremptory strikes of jurors); Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Greene Cnty.,
396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970) (addressing the same issue in the context of grand juries).
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modern-day proponents of civic virtue347 in supporting the view that
political participation, like jury service, particularly in concert with
others, builds citizenship.348
Absent a jury revival, populist prosecutorial nullification may
secure some of the benefits of this “collective public decisionmaking”
today.349 An explicit, salient pre-election nullification proposal
encourages voters to engage the issue and each other. Making public
reasoning about justifications and counterarguments meaningful can
help develop community and build communal morality.350 Should sex
work really be decriminalized, or would commodifying it be immoral?
Would decriminalizing public order offenses like shoplifting and trespassing lead to worse crimes, or do they harm offenders unnecessarily? State laws represent one point of view on these sorts of
questions, but more devolved communities may have different views.
Perhaps encouraging deep moral engagement in the exercise of collective decisionmaking authority can form new social bonds, if not
rebuild those that have been lost.
One need not be too cynical to question whether communitarian
ideology can transcend its exclusionary past, or the increasing alienation of the present, to make civic virtue and solidarity workable in the
twenty-first century.351 But the possibility that devolving control may
actually help build modern communities should not be dismissed too
lightly. Indeed, given the risks of atomization in a changing world,
making the attempt may be a necessity.352
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347 GERAINT PARRY, GEORGE MOYSER & NEIL DAY, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND
DEMOCRACY IN BRITAIN 286–87 (1992); DZUR, supra note 25, at 70, 72 (advocating for
jury in Tocquevillian tradition).
348 See PARRY ET AL., supra note 341, at 288–89, 293; see also id. at 291 (“[P]articipation
with others in organisations [sic] reinforces and expands political experiences in the ways
that the educative theory [i.e., Tocqueville’s theory] would suggest.”); Rappaport, supra
note 25, at 726 (citing generally JOHN GASTIL, E. PIERRE DEESS, PHILIP J. WEISER &
CINDY SIMMONS, THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION PROMOTES
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (2010)) (linking increased jury
deliberation and increased voting).
349 William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1340 (1991);
see also DZUR, supra note 25, at 70, 72 (describing jury participation as instructive not only
for the jurors but also for the architects of the criminal legal system).
350 See, e.g., RAHMAN, supra note 25, at 103–06, 110.
351 See Rappaport, supra note 25, at 742–43 (raising precisely these sorts of questions).
352 See Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the TwentyFirst Century The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137,
138–39 (2007) (arguing that increasing social heterogeneity—descriptively—poses risks to
social solidarity that must be confronted through “creat[ing] a new, broader sense of
‘we’”).
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***
In the end, “[n]o form of democracy” can “guarantee just, wise,
or public-spirited outcomes.”353 Despite American popular control’s
checkered history, populist prosecutorial nullification may offer some
reasons for guarded optimism. I acknowledge, however, that one’s
willingness to risk the downsides may turn on one’s belief in the
upsides.
B. Rule of Law

353

04/16/2021 13:23:52

WHELAN, supra note 86, at 198.
See, e.g., Osofsky, supra note 21, at 118; Brown, supra note 75, at 1154 (recounting
evolution of the “conception of the rule of law”).
355 Brown, supra note 75, at 1157–58; see also Osofsky, supra note 21, at 118–19
(emphasizing the basic need for “consistency and notice”).
356 See Natapoff, supra note 24, at 1759–60.
357 Brown, supra note 75, at 1150–51; see also Carroll, supra note 40, at 581 & n.8
(collecting rule-of-law critiques).
358 See generally Butler, supra note 75 (arguing that the violation is necessary to combat
the racialized overenforcement of nonviolent offenses); Brown, supra note 75, at 1152–53
(discussing Butler’s theory at length).
359 Brown, supra note 75, at 1161–62.
360 See id. at 1169–70, 1200–01. Consider the “rule of lenity,” under which courts resolve
“ambiguities about the breadth of a criminal statute” in a defendant’s favor. United States
v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2333 (2019). But ambiguity suggests that the statute could be read
to cover a defendant (otherwise the rule of construction would be unnecessary). Applying
the rule rejects a permissible reading in favor of extratextual fair-notice norms. See id.
354
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The concept of the rule of law is often ambiguous and contestable,354 but it is fair to say it at least denotes rejection of a rule of
arbitrariness, and an insistence that law be “general, knowable, and
performable,” and predictable by those to whom it applies.355 Scholars
have often cast underenforcement as a potential foe of the rule of
law.356 Rule-of-law arguments against jury nullification, in particular,
have contended that a “verdict in contravention of what the law
authorizes and requires” violates the rule of law and “subject[s] citizens . . . to power based on . . . subjective predilections.”357 At first
blush, these criticisms seem applicable to populist prosecutorial
nullification.
One response might draw on jury nullification defenders like Paul
Butler to concede a rule-of-law violation but deem it a necessary
evil.358 Also pertinent is Darryl Brown’s defense of jury nullification.
As he noted, because “general rules” are “inevitab[ly] over- and
underinclusive[],” their application is often “inherently interpretive.”359 Literal application can sometimes contradict not only the
law’s purpose but its reasonably expected application in light of
broader relevant social norms.360 It may thus be that adherence to the
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See Brown, supra note 75, at 1164.
See id. at 1164, 1200 (“In many . . . cases, nullification occurs within the rule of law,
because the circumstances that prompt [nullification] are often grave matters of justice
arising from a great disparity between the statute or its application and other sources of
law and social convention.”); Bowers, supra note 127, at 1673 (“Decisionmakers advance
the rule of law by tailoring the law to fit the incident and the offender, and by, in some
instances, even exercising discretion not to proceed with legally sustainable charges.”).
363 See, e.g., Jacobsohn, supra note 271, at 76 (“[A] consistent pattern of acquittals . . .
has in fact effected a change in policy.”).
364 See Brown, supra note 75, at 1189; Wright & Levine, supra note 130, at 1071, 1085;
cf. Ronald F. Wright, Persistent Localism in the Prosecutor Services of North Carolina, 41
CRIME & JUST. 211, 219 (2012) (“How a prosecutor disposes of a case tells us something
about its relative importance . . . . High dismissal rates for particular crimes sometimes
reveal that the office places greater emphasis on other crimes . . . .”).
365 See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 96 (1945) (recounting this supposed
practice of the Emperor Caligula).
362
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rule of law goes beyond the apparent prescriptions of decontextualized text to include those sorts of extratextual principles.361 If so, the
rule of law may sometimes require referring to those principles to
counteract or override the result literalism would prescribe.362 So too
for populist prosecutorial nullification. Literal application of the law
may sometimes contradict more important principles that the rule of
law also incorporates (e.g., autonomy, subsidiarity, or particular localized substantive values). On that view, the rule of law may be seen to
permit localized control over the criminal law.
But populist prosecutorial nullification may have even more to
offer rule-of-law sticklers. Consider its distinctions with the related
nonenforcement alternatives this paper has discussed, jury nullification and managerialist prosecutorial nonenforcement. While repeated
jury nullification might imply an inferable local policy of sorts,363 that
policy is still substantially unknowable and unpredictable. Juries are
unbound by prior decisions and need not justify their decisions. Moreover, not only does their shifting membership make prediction of
future performance based on past behavior unreliable, but any decisions also inconsistent with past acts are unpunishable. Similarly, the
managerialist prosecutor making nonenforcement decisions often acts
on intuitive judgments about the blameworthiness of defendants, on
the basis of nontransparent, nontechnical principles and values.364
These opaque, unpredictable decisions about whom the law regulates
have something in common with the quintessential rule-of-law violation: publishing the law, but placing it where it cannot be read.365
Conversely, the nullification policy adopted pursuant to a reasoned, salient pre-election promise epitomizes the sort of fair notice of
the line between proscribed and permitted that is core to the rule of
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law, even without formal instantiation in legislation.366 True, prosecutors are technically unbound by past decisions, but past performance
is more predictive where the same prosecutor’s office handles all decisions. Unlike the jury and the orthodox prosecutor, this type of nonenforcement must be justified. Finally, deviation from the public
promise can be noted and punished at the ballot box, absent satisfactory explanation. Indeed, here, rule-of-law values dovetail with
antidiscrimination values, as a policy announced widely is much
harder to deviate from on biased grounds than a policy followed sub
silentio.
As mentioned, the “rule of law” can be slippery, and one might
imagine a counter in this register that stresses the importance of the
written law as paramount.367 On this view, transparency may be salutary in the abstract, but transparently ignoring clear legislative enactments flouts the rule of law. But I have no problem assuming
arguendo that populist prosecutorial nullification undermines the primacy of the statute nullified. The burden of this Article (and part of
the point of Part II) is that at least sometimes we may validly do so—
i.e., when we can identify a more-primary authority, such as the
People from which legislative authority derives.368
C. Impermissible Suspension

04/16/2021 13:23:52

366 See Natapoff, supra note 24, at 1761 (noting view of the rule of law under which “a
rule is public and provides notice ‘whenever strong social agreement exists in practice’”);
Luna, supra note 10, at 795 (envisioning rule-of-law benefits to overt prosecutorial
decriminalization).
367 See, e.g., Zachary S. Price, Seeking Baselines for Negative Authority: Constitutional
and Rule-of-Law Arguments over Nonenforcement and Waiver, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
252–55 (2016) (warning that the rule of law may require attention to the “rule of the
statute”).
368 Cf. id. at 252 (“[D]emocratic legitimacy run[s] down from the people through their
legislative representatives . . . .”).
369 Compare Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 n.4 (1980) (describing federal
separation of powers doctrine as “not mandatory on the States”), with Price, supra note 20,
at 675–76 (focusing on federal Take Care Clause and separation of powers principles). Nor
are the stingiest federal separation-of-powers views necessarily correct. See Neal Kumar
Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1809–12 (1998). For example, if
imported to the state context, the implications of “the inherently imprecise” federal Take
Care Clause, Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U.
PA. L. REV. 1835, 1866 (2016), might well be properly informed by the popular sovereignty
lens this Article applies.
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Much of the scholarship on federal prosecutorial nonenforcement
has rested on federal constitutional principles not necessarily applicable to state practice.369 To the extent it reflects a more general concern regarding prosecutors stepping beyond their proper roles that
those scholars would extend to state practice, this Article takes a func-
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370 My general separation-of-powers analysis is thus compatible (though not
coextensive) with Logan Sawyer’s advocacy of a “functional” treatment of separation-ofpowers questions. See Sawyer, supra note 24, at 627–32 (pointing, among other things, to
possible benefits to “democratic decision-making”).
371 Price, supra note 20, at 692–94, 692 n.71.
372 See id. at 690–91.
373 See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 64, at 871–74; see also supra text accompanying
note 44.
374 See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 64, at 874.
375 See Peter M. Shane, Faithful Nonexecution, 29 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 405, 436
(2019).
376 See Price, supra note 20, at 691–92 (sketching this history).
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tionalist view under which the local, elected status of state prosecutors
offers reasons for comfort absent in the federal context.370
A related point is more difficult. As Zachary Price points out,
many modern state constitutions contain bans on executive “suspensions” of the law.371 These provisions are rooted in the Founding generation’s experience with unilateral monarchical declarations that
existing statutes no longer had force or that particular individuals
were excused from compliance.372 If populist prosecutorial nullification was analogous to these suspensions of law, it might weaken my
normative case. But the practice can be distinguished.
Start by recalling the colonial jury that nullified a seditious libel
prosecution against John Peter Zenger.373 It turns out that this was
part of a broader pattern—before the Revolution, grand and petit
juries “all but nullified the law of seditious libel.”374 Juries were,
indeed, part of a categorical colonial resistance to the homeland. The
Founders seem to have had little problem with “suspensions” via popular juries, notwithstanding the views eventually enshrined in their
state constitutions. This makes sense. Although they used different
textual formulations, the state constitutions drew on, and essentially
incorporated, the substance of the suspension prohibition in the
English Bill of Rights.375 And that prohibition targeted a particular
kind of suspension: peremptory, unilateral suspension of law without
consent of parliament.376 All told, the Founders’ fear seemed to be of
peremptory, unaccountable (even undemocratic, insofar as it ignored
parliament) suspension of law from the top down, and not so much a
rejection of the popular sovereign’s ability to shape the law from the
bottom up.
Thus, far from repackaging royal suspension, this Article’s proposal fits comfortably within the historical tradition of muscular, localized shaping of the law through nonenforcement. Indeed, recognizing
the suspension question as a separation-of-powers problem helps
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make the point.377 The Founding generation separated powers to protect (their admittedly crabbed concept of) individual liberty from the
potential tyranny of concentration.378 This Article’s framework, in
fact, recognizes this danger. The election, or appointment, of a prosecutor, without more, does not make them emperors empowered to
enact freewheeling policy preferences. That something more, I argue,
can be found in the will of the People.
D. Spillover and State Power
1. The Externality Problem

04/16/2021 13:23:52

377 See id. at 690–92 (situating English Bill of Rights provision within “long history of
struggle . . . over executive power”).
378 David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb
— Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689,
748 & n.183 (2008).
379 See Lawrence Rosenthal, Romer v. Evans as the Transformation of Local
Government Law, 31 URB. LAW. 257, 273 n.50 (1999) (collecting sources); WEALE, supra
note 156, at 219 (recounting John Stuart Mill’s contemplation of spillover-based limitations
on devolved political power).
380 See Weinstock, supra note 188, at 262; Schragger, supra note 181, at 444–45
(observing the difficulty that spillover effects pose to an account of democracy premised on
giving individuals “a voice in the decisions that affect them”); supra Section II.B.
381 Cf. Levine, supra note 12, at 34 (“Crime transcends individual state borders because
of the inherent mobility of criminals and the ease of moving the tools and spoils of crime
vast distances in a short time.” (citation omitted)).
382 Cf. Frug, supra note 142, at 1117 (explaining that “purely local” matters can rarely
be found).

43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 122 Side B

Why—if autonomy is this important, and if local control of law is
so effective to advance it—ever decide any criminal issues at a higher
level than the locality? The response, partly, is that this proposal is not
absolute. A strong reason to find a policy inappropriate would be significant supralocal effect, which even strong localism advocates generally concede weighs against deferring to localities.379 The all-affected
principle and this Article’s focus on autonomy suggest as much: One’s
say in a policy outcome should track the degree to which one is
affected.380 Part III’s framework thus stressed the need to minimize
spillover effects.
But the risk warrants further discussion. Unlike, e.g., real property, crime is mobile and need not respect political boundaries.381
Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect some effects from a nonenforcement policy to spill into nearby political subdivisions.382 Modernity enhances this risk, since spillover effects likely have increased
over time, at least in metropolitan areas, as “local borders frequently
abut each other, and people range widely in their daily activities

43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 123 Side A

04/16/2021 13:23:52

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\96-1\NYU103.txt

April 2021]

unknown

Seq: 69

POPULIST PROSECUTORIAL NULLIFICATION

7-APR-21

17:25

241

across multiple local boundaries.”383 Practically, then, if the proposed
fix to avoid making all criminal law local is to recede from this
Article’s prescriptions upon detecting spillover, does the fix not just
make it all nonlocal? Not quite.
As an initial matter, the continued desire for local administration
indicates readiness on the part of the public to accept some degree of
spillover.384 Any amount of policymaking devolution will engender
some divergence, which in the criminal law sphere can hardly avoid
leading to spillover.385 The task is striking a principled balance
between local control and the minimization—not elimination—of
negative externalities. In other words, the problem is not spillover qua
spillover. It is spillover of a sort that renders the policy engendering it
suspect.
How might we identify such spillover? Even if one insists that
modernity leaves “very little . . . ‘purely local,’”386 a large chunk of
criminal laws cannot be credibly cast as having problematic spillover
implications if not enforced. Consider Rachael Rollins’s promise not
to enforce resisting arrest charges—a physically and temporally limited crime if one ever existed.387 At some point, for some crimes, the
necessary links of causality to claim that a policy has meaningful
supralocal effects become farcical. Much criminal activity fits into my
prong two’s focus on crimes committed within the jurisdiction by
residents where any proximate victim is also a resident.388 Take, as
one of many possible examples, the Supreme Court’s recognition that
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383 Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, supra note 191, at 18; see also Wilson, supra
note 298, at 185.
384 After all, there has been no successful countermovement against local district
attorney elections. More generally, recent surveys show a public overwhelmingly more
satisfied with their local communities than the nation as a whole. See, e.g., SAMUEL J.
ABRAMS, KARLYN BOWMAN, ELEANOR O’NEIL & RYAN STREETER, AM. ENTER. INST.,
AEI SURVEY ON COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY: SOCIAL CAPITAL, CIVIC HEALTH, AND
QUALITY OF LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES 1–2 (2019).
385 Cf. Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control,
and Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1833–34, 1874 (2005) (arguing
that decentralized criminal law enforcement means that crime may relocate based on one
locality’s behavior).
386 Frug, supra note 142, at 1117.
387 Rachael Rollins, Charges to Be Declined, RACHAEL ROLLINS FOR SUFFOLK DA,
https://rollins4da.com/policy/charges-to-be-decline (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
388 See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 1409, 1419–20 (2001) (collecting evidence that “the human consequences and
articulated explanations of crime are largely local in nature” (footnotes omitted)).
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an “attempt by a jilted wife to injure her husband’s lover” by using a
chemical was “purely local.”389
The goose-gander principle might suggest discounting some spillover complaints from localities that—given modernity’s interconnectivity—are bound to impose some externalities on neighbors at some
point. Perhaps that is part of the bargain of accessing the benefits
associated with local self-determination. But even on that view, some
externalities might violate that bargain. We can sensibly distinguish
between externalities that are collateral effects of a truly local policy
and those whose primary operation is to transport one district’s
problems to another district. Put another way, with self-determination
as a touchstone, one might train attention on whether the policy regulates supralocally as a primary rather than a collateral matter, looking
to whether the policymaking locality is internalizing a proportionate
amount of the negative effects it generates.
One last point. Externalities can be difficult to compare and measure.390 The same forces that might draw behavior to a region in a way
that neighboring jurisdictions dislike might also draw that behavior
out of those neighboring jurisdictions, to reside primarily in the
lenient jurisdiction. That potential for positive externalities justifies a
substantial degree of deference, at least in borderline cases.
2. The Overriding State

04/16/2021 13:23:52

389 Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 848 (2014). The Court may have been using the
phrase to distinguish attempts with federal character, but the point stands; some crimes
simply have no effect beyond a de minimis one anywhere but the locality they occur.
390 See, e.g., Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 801, 817 (2009) (outlining some difficulties pertaining to spillover
analysis).
391 Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978) (quoting Hunter v.
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907)); see also Schuette v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action,
572 U.S. 291, 327 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Generally, ‘a State is afforded wide
leeway when experimenting with the appropriate allocation of state legislative power.’”
(quoting Holt, 439 U.S. at 71)).
392 Logan, supra note 382, at 1423 (explaining that home rule jurisdiction states consider
each municipality as a miniature state within the state). Home rule states recognize (to
varying degrees) their local governments’ “freedom from state interference in areas of
local concern” and broad intra-locality lawmaking authority. Richard Briffault, Our
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I have suggested a normative line that disfavors substantial, disproportionate externalities and permits de minimis ones. While that
may be easier said than enforced, the state’s capacity to overrule and
control its localities can put some meat on that proposition’s bones.
Municipalities are creatures of the state upon which the state confers
power in its “absolute discretion,” alterable at will.391 This rule holds
despite most states’ status as home rule jurisdictions.392 Formally,
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states remain “the legal superiors of their local governments,” even
though in practice local governments tend to operate with substantial
latitude, by custom and by dint of parent state declination to step
in.393 Accordingly, states retain the power to modify local control over
particular subject matter if the will exists to retract that control. The
state thus arguably has some normative stake in how municipalities
exercise their delegated powers, especially where the municipal choice
affects the implementation of state law.394
A concrete example demonstrates how this could work. Imagine
a prosecutor who promises not to enforce criminal prohibitions on
drinking-water pollution.395 Perhaps his district’s residents are unconcerned with the law (imagine that their pollution only affects downstream districts). On this Article’s framework, this is a clear case of
illegitimate supralocal effect, and the state has several options to
counteract it. First, most states permit supersession—i.e., mandatory
direction from state officials to local prosecutors to take an action in a
criminal case or reassignment of the case away from the local prosecutor—in some circumstances.396 Second, the state could give statelevel prosecutors under the statewide attorney general’s office “exclu-
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Localism: Part I—the Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1990)
[hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism]; see also Laurie Reynolds, A Role for Local
Government Law in Federal-State-Local Disputes, 43 URB. LAW. 977, 1000 (2011) (noting
the “tremendous range” of home rule approaches). To oversimplify, “all powers are
granted until retracted.” Briffault, Our Localism, supra, at 10. But (as the last quote
suggests) this is consistent with the Supreme Court’s broad recognition of state authority to
retract the locality’s power.
393 Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 386, at 112–14 (tying “limited use” of state
authority to override local action to “systemic belief in the social and political value of
local decision making”); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What
the Feds Can Learn from the States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 569 (2011) [hereinafter
Barkow, Federalism] (“[M]ost state legislatures allow local authorities to operate without
much oversight in the day-to-day application of that law.”).
394 See Davidson, supra note 208, at 961 (“[T]he general welfare of the state is inherent
in the delegation of legal authority to geographically bounded local communities.”). See
generally Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutors and Their State and Local Polities, 110 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 823 (2020) (arguing that local prosecutors administering state law have
“competing loyalties to statewide voters and local voters”).
395 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.010 (LexisNexis 2020) (contamination of
drinking water is a “gross misdemeanor”); Ryan P. Kelly & Margaret R. Caldwell, Ten
Ways States Can Combat Ocean Acidification (and Why They Should), 6 WASH. J. ENV’T
L. & POL’Y 288, 336–37 (2016) (noting prevalence of state-law criminal clean-water
provisions).
396 Tyler Quinn Yeargain, Discretion Versus Supersession: Calibrating the Power Balance
Between Local Prosecutors and State Officials, 68 EMORY L.J. 95, 98, 110–11 (2018); see id.
at 111–12 (cataloguing state variation regarding circumstances where supersession is
permitted).
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397 See Barkow, Federalism, supra note 387, at 545; see id. at 570 (“[T]he majority of
state legislatures identify specific categories [of crimes] suitable for the state-level
prosecutor.”).
398 See id. at 546–49 (collecting crimes that states tend to treat in this manner, including
public corruption and election fraud, benefits fraud, and various regulatory crimes).
399 See, e.g., Levine, supra note 12, at 37 (noting that over ninety percent of local
prosecution “is funded exclusively with local money” (citation omitted)).
400 See id. (“State-directed prosecutorial efforts . . . encourage local district attorneys to
prosecute crimes in their home districts using state money and in furtherance of stateidentified priorities.”).
401 See, e.g., id. at 41–43 (describing how then-California governor Pete Wilson
effectively offered state money to local prosecutors to escalate statutory rape
enforcement).
402 See, e.g., Anika Singh Lemar, The Role of States in Liberalizing Land Use
Regulations, 97 N.C. L. REV. 293, 349 (2019) (noting that externalities, without more, “do[]
not ensure that the state will step in”).
403 But see Joshua S. Sellers & Erin A. Scharff, Preempting Politics: State Power and
Local Democracy, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1364 (2020) (observing the occurrence of
“aggressive and often punitive . . . state preemption that ‘assumes that local voices should
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sive or concurrent jurisdiction” over these prosecutions.397 This can be
done legislatively, and would do no more than slightly expand the category of crimes over which states have extended such jurisdiction.398
Third, it can offer a fiscal carrot. Normally, local funds support most
local prosecution efforts.399 But states can provide funds conditioned
on a municipality’s use of those funds to pursue state-level prosecution priorities.400 Often communities welcome these funds when
residents’ priorities align with the state’s priorities. But states can also
coerce policy adjustment when communities need the funds, even
when prosecutors and their communities do not share the state’s priorities. This was sometimes true when California sought to encourage
statutory rape prosecutions in the early 1990s.401
The important takeaway is that none of this is automatic. Rather
than trying to pinpoint the precise point at which supralocal effect
becomes too substantial, we can look to whether the parent state has
acted to squelch a nonenforcement policy. Here, the power of inertia
and the cost of action benefit subsidiarity.402 Although a state technically could wipe out every exercise of local prosecutorial policy-based
nonenforcement, the cost of doing so when there is minimal tangible
harm outside the district will be a strong counterweight against action.
Conversely, if state decisionmakers take the time and energy to place
the local nonenforcement on the agenda and exercise state power to
extinguish it, I am willing to take that behavior as probative evidence
that the harms were indeed perceived to be meaningful.
This solution is imperfect, even assuming genuine state-level
commitment to respecting local choice absent true supralocal harm.403
One can imagine supralocal effects that hit a few other localities hard
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but are insufficiently statewide to prompt a statewide solution. This
may be partly addressed by the unique level of subsidiarity that district attorney elections represent. Prosecutorial districts generally
track county boundaries.404 Counties often contain multiple municipalities, which are themselves local governments.405 Counties’ relative
size means they represent larger communities and varieties of interests than, e.g., a particular city within the county.406 Expanding the
corpus of participants makes the decisionmaking pool more heterogeneous, increasing the likelihood that the interests of those outside the
pool will be represented. That modulates the parochialism that a
smaller decisionmaking unit containing more limited interests might
generate. In other words, non-absolute subsidiarity may help limit the
worst externalities. Indeed, this expansion of the local might also help
limit oppressive intra-district actions for the same reasons Madison
supported the expansion of the national sphere.407
District attorney elections, then, might be best thought of as representing regional subsidiarity.408 This undoubtedly limits some of the
benefits of subsidiarity extolled above, insofar as those benefits relate
to smallness.409 But if the hope is for balance, it may be that American
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almost never take the lead in crafting substantive policy’” (citation omitted)); infra text
accompanying note 410.
404 See HESSICK, NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 5, at 10; PERRY & BANKS, supra note 5,
at 2 (outlining that Alaska, Delaware, Connecticut, and Rhode Island are exceptions, with
one office for the entire state).
405 See, e.g., Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion at
the Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1140 n.156 (2008) (observing that counties are
rarely “disaggregated from municipal governments” analytically).
406 Cf. William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The
Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J.
1325, 1343–44 (1993) (making this point for counties vis-à-vis states).
407 See supra text accompanying notes 195–97 (referring to Madison’s belief that
expanding the national sphere would protect individual rights); see also THE FEDERALIST
NO. 10, supra note 49, at 53 (James Madison) (“[T]he same advantage which a republic has
over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small
republic . . . .”); Neil S. Siegel, After the Trump Era: A Constitutional Role Morality for
Presidents and Members of Congress, 107 GEO. L.J. 109, 134 (2018) (explaining that
Madison believed that an extended national sphere would generate “greater social
heterogeneity” making majority factions both less likely and less effective); cf. Rappaport,
supra note 25, at 758 (suggesting that the more extreme the devolution, the worse the
problem of spillover).
408 See, e.g., Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, supra note 191, at 17–18 (offering
similar externality-limiting justifications in contending that “the arguments for localism
actually begin to make the case for some kind of region-level policy-making and
governance”); see also id. at 20 (arguing that while it is unnecessary for regionalism to
wholly supplant localism, it is necessary in some circumstances to address externalities
caused by local actions).
409 Cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) Need a Democratic
Defense of City Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2025 (2000) (reviewing GERALD E. FRUG,
CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS (1999)) (attacking
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path dependency on the county system provides an unexpected
panacea.
E. Practical Limitations
I close with some ways in which theory may bump up against
reality.
First, it is true that progressive prosecutors have often targeted
crimes that many other prosecutors would have deprioritized anyway
(with death-penalty nullification a notable exception).410 In one district attorney’s words: “I chuckle when I hear people who call themselves reformers say they’re not going to prosecute low-level drug
offenses . . . . No one does that . . . .”411 Perhaps. But we need a rule
for all cases, not just the contemporary ones. And, as the judicial resistance to Parisa Dehghani-Tafti’s marijuana policy shows, a crime’s
supposed insignificance does not necessarily insulate nonenforcement
from attack.412 Furthermore, even if resource-driven underenforcement already occurs, an announcement that some crimes will categorically not be prosecuted is something different in kind, requiring
special justification. Indeed, this Article helps problematize sub
silentio, nontransparent nullification couched as resource-based
prioritization.413
At any rate, even minor nullification matters. Any conviction can
have substantial effects on the defendant’s future and status as part of
the political community.414 So can the arrests that nullifying even
minor crimes discourages.415 Nor should we forget that some minor
crimes have identifiable victims, whom nullification necessarily
43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 125 Side B
04/16/2021 13:23:52

region-centric reforms offered by a localism proponent as “undermin[ing] the political
advantages of ‘smallness’ that he extols”).
410 See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 26, at 1237 (“[T]here are enough . . . politically
mandatory crimes to occupy all or nearly all of local prosecutors’ time and manpower.”
(quoting Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 600 (2005))).
411 Reisman, supra note 18.
412 See supra text accompanying notes 258–63.
413 See Urska Velikonja, Accountability for Nonenforcement, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1549, 1558–60, 1564 (2018) (describing issues associated with quiet nonenforcement, such
as protection from judicial review, asymmetric treatment of groups, lack of fair notice, and
transparency); cf. Sawyer, supra note 24, at 625–26 (flagging possibility of unannounced
blanket nonenforcement).
414 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of
Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790, 1799–1800, 1799 n.49 (2012) (discussing
severe collateral consequences of convictions for both felony and misdemeanor offenses).
415 See Krumholz, supra note 33, at 5 (noting that prosecutor conduct is likely to affect
police-arrest conduct); see also Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809,
820–25 (2015) (describing the potentially severe consequences of being arrested,
particularly for minor behavior).
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affects. After all, even if one maintains that recreational drug offenses
are purely victimless, we can imagine that some property owners
might have some qualms about a refusal to prosecute trespassers, larceny under $250, or receiving stolen property.416
State power poses a separate problem. Why celebrate communities’ autonomy-affirming power to control criminal law if they can
only exercise it at the pleasure of the parent state? To be sure, part of
this Article’s goal is providing guidance to states on whether preemption would be appropriate. Nevertheless, one need not be a cynic to
think that state officials will be tempted to step in upon mere substantive disagreement.417 But inertia matters. Overriding local policy is
neither cost-free nor inevitable. It may not be worth it in some cases
for the state to act; in others, legislative snags may halt the action.
Those practical brakes can slow state overreach. Moreover, there is an
important theoretical distinction between a legal landscape that
rejects populist prosecutorial nullification and one that affirms it as
presumptively legitimate, albeit alterable by affirmative state action.
Treating populist prosecutorial nullification as a default rule for any
jurisdiction that elects a prosecutor would be a tangible change to the
status quo.
Additionally, discrete state action may be challenged. States
cannot exercise their admittedly broad power over localities in unconstitutional or irrational ways.418 In that vein, some argue that it may
sometimes be “irrational to deny local governments the power to
address local problems.”419 Perhaps courts might appropriately invalidate state actions on subjects not “properly the [state’s] concern”—
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See, e.g., Rollins, supra note 378 (including these offenses).
See, e.g., Rachel Proctor May, Punitive Preemption and the First Amendment, 55 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1, 4 (2018) (noting recent uptick in state laws passed to deprive cities of
power); Akela Lacy & Ryan Grim, Pennsylvania Lawmakers Move to Strip Reformist
Prosecutor Larry Krasner of Authority, INTERCEPT (July 8, 2019, 5:55 PM), https://
theintercept.com/2019/07/08/da-larry-krasner-pennsylvania-attorney-general (recounting
Pennsylvania state legislators’ alteration of Pennsylvania law to give the state attorney
general power to prosecute some firearms offenses). In perhaps another example of this
possibility, states have stepped in to reassign death-eligible cases away from district
attorneys who refused to seek it. See, e.g., Ayala v. Scott, 224 So. 3d 755, 756 (Fla. 2017);
Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002, 1003 (N.Y. 1997).
418 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–36 (1996) (invalidating a statewide
initiative barring local governments from passing or enforcing laws specifically protecting
LGBT persons).
419 Rosenthal, supra note 379, at 268–69; see also David J. Barron, The Promise of
Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 493–94 (1999)
(speculating that the Supreme Court’s decisions in localism cases may give constitutional
dimension to the idea of the local).
417
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e.g., overruling local decisions with purely local consequences.420 I
plan to explore further in a future Article how this Article’s framework might affect local defenses of local experimentation, but for present purposes what matters is that it is at least plausible.
In the end, the background threat of possible state regulation
probably will affect populist prosecutorial nullification.421 That ultimately may be a veil-of-ignorance feature, not a bug. No one can be
sure, after all, that this power will be exercised nationwide consistently with his or her ideological preferences (in fact, it seems unlikely
to be). If realpolitik dissuades localities from pushing too far in either
direction, the resultant moderation may in fact be a mark in populist
prosecutorial nullification’s favor.
V
LESSONS
A. Evaluating the Trend

1. Electoral Authorization: Aramis Ayala & Larry Krasner
Shortly after taking office as the State Attorney for Florida’s
Orange and Osceola Counties, Aramis Ayala announced for the first
time that she would never seek the death penalty.422 She explained
that death is never “‘in the best interest of th[e] community or in the
best interest of justice,’ even where an individual case ‘absolutely
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420 See Rosenthal, supra note 379, at 270 (questioning whether a state legitimately
overrules local decisions with truly local effects where the most directly affected people
cannot hold those state policymakers accountable).
421 Cf. Levinson, supra note 280, at 59–60 (observing this reality in the state-federal
relationship).
422 See Cordeiro & Weiner, supra note 3; Gray Rohrer, Gov. Rick Scott Calls on Ayala
to Recuse Herself in Loyd Case, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 16, 2017 11:50 AM), https://
www.orlandosentinel.com/politics/os-death-penalty-scott-ayala-recuse-20170316story.html.

43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 126 Side B

Programmatic prosecutorial nullification ought to (1) reflect
localized popular will and (2) be crafted to respect the selfdetermination rights of those inside and outside the jurisdiction. That
framework reveals a legitimate core: populist prosecutorial nullification. This Part considers a selection of recent, instructive cases to
ascertain this model’s usefulness for public and private evaluation of
these promises. Of course, I cannot judge these prosecutors too
harshly ex post for not adhering perfectly to my suggested standard.
Any critiques are highlighted only to help show how this model can
guide analysis.
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deserve[s] [the] death penalty.’”423 The Florida Governor stepped in
to reassign her death penalty cases, as Florida law permitted.424 The
Florida Supreme Court upheld that decision, reasoning that a
“blanket refusal” could not be couched as discretion but was instead
an (impermissible) “‘functional[] veto’ of state law.”425 Conversely,
Larry Krasner’s campaign for Philadelphia District Attorney highlighted that he would “never seek the death penalty.”426 He has kept
that promise, and has even attacked the death penalty as unconstitutional on appeal.427
Prong one helps sift these cases. The populist prosecutor can
draw on an electorally generated signal of popular will for the special
authorization needed to take the drastic step of categorically nullifying the death penalty. Krasner met this prerequisite by making his
promise central and salient before votes were cast. Ayala’s after-thefact unilateral judgment that the death penalty is improper likely does
not measure up.428 Indeed, applying this framework suggests that
while perhaps still correct, the Florida Supreme Court’s decision may
have been stated too broadly. The problem was not that Ayala had
exercised a “‘functional[] veto’ of state law”;429 the problem was that
she could point to no local authorization of that veto.
Prong one also can distinguish among the same prosecutor’s policies. Consider Krasner’s policy of presumptively not charging some
423

Ayala v. Scott, 224 So. 3d 755, 756–57 (Fla. 2017) (alterations in original).
See id. at 757.
425 See id. at 758–59 (quoting Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (N.Y. 1997)).
426 See, e.g., Krasner For DA, Larry Krasner on Larry Krasner, YOUTUBE (May 7,
2017), https://youtu.be/IsEFPHMrAKc (Larry Krasner’s campaign ad); Abraham Gutman,
‘Never’ Death Penalty Is What Got Larry Krasner Elected. Now, That Campaign Promise Is
Broken, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 25, 2018, 5:46 PM), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/
opinion/commentary/da-larry-krasner-death-penalty-promise-reneged-20180625.html
(“When I knocked on doors as a volunteer for the campaign, people said that they would
vote for him because of his strong stance against the death penalty.”).
427 See generally Commonwealth’s Brief for Respondent at 51, Cox v. Commonwealth,
2019 Pa. LEXIS 5498 (Sept. 27, 2019) (No. 102 EM 2018). Krasner received some criticism
for a plea deal that a critic characterized as using the death penalty as leverage. Gutman,
supra note 418. As the critic acknowledged, however, the death penalty was not sought,
and Krasner was in fact criticized for what the victim’s family members viewed as a
decision “not to pursue the death penalty.” Claire Sasko, Brothers Plead Guilty to Killing
Police Officer, Avoid Death Penalty, PHILA. (June 25, 2018, 5:08 PM), https://
www.phillymag.com/news/2018/06/25/robert-wilson-murder-plea-deal.
428 For reasons noted above, see supra note 214, it won’t do to argue that Ayala’s
“progressive” self-identification was so clear that she could claim a popular mandate for
any policies that could receive that label. This calls to mind the old statutory interpretation
trope that no legislature “pursues its purposes at all costs,” see Rodriguez v. United States,
480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987) (per curiam); presumably something similar could be said of
the electorate.
429 Ayala v. Scott, 224 So. 3d 755, 758 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Johnson, 691 N.E.2d at 1007).
424
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marijuana-related offenses or prostitution offenses.430 While he did
promise generally to “shift prosecutorial resources to focus on the
most serious crimes against people,”431 he never specifically targeted
those offenses for nullification pre-election. That degree of specificity
is insufficient. For my model, the significant step of categorical nullification requires more than a generalized reform campaign.
2. Antidomination and Outsider Effects: Chesa Boudin & Rachael
Rollins
Prong two’s focus on “outsiders” also matters. Take Chesa
Boudin, elected in 2019 as San Francisco District Attorney after clear
promises not to prosecute quality-of-life crimes like offering or soliciting sex, public camping, or blocking a sidewalk.432 Prong two helps
assess this example of populist prosecutorial nullification. These are
classic cases of offenses committed within the district by residents,
with any offended parties also being residents. While intra-district dissent is conceivable, it is not credible to cast this policy choice as an
example of invidious domination of those intra-district losers.
It also helps here to return to Rachael Rollins, elected in
Massachusetts on a platform including a suite of offenses warranting
presumptive nonenforcement.433 Rollins’s emphasis on her proposed
nullification, and the explicit electoral vetting via the attacks she
fended off from her general-election opponent and unsupportive community stakeholders, are ideal for this model.434 At prong two, most of
her list also can only be fairly described as focusing on truly local
crimes; trespassing and minor larceny give a flavor.435 Nor does
43095-nyu_96-1 Sheet No. 127 Side B
04/16/2021 13:23:52

430 Memorandum from Larry Krasner, Dist. Attorney, City of Philadelphia, New
Policies Announced February 15, 2018, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/
4412996-Krasner-Memo-March-13-2018.html#document/p1.
431 Krasner for District Attorney, supra note 3.
432 See Charnock, supra note 1.
433 See supra text accompanying note 16.
434 See Rollins, supra note 381 (presenting a list of charges that will be declined by
default); Daniel Medwed & Brendan Deady, Rachael Rollins and the Power to Decline to
Prosecute, GBH NEWS (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.wgbh.org/news/politics/2018/09/18/
rachael-rollins-and-the-power-to-decline-to-prosecute (describing Rollins’s hard-fought
and surprising victory despite negative reactions to her campaign promises before the
election); Trea Lavery, Rollins Rolls Out Policy Changes, BAY STATE BANNER (Mar. 27,
2019), https://www.baystatebanner.com/2019/03/27/rollins-rolls-out-policy-changes
(reiterating Rollins’s campaign promise to decline to prosecute low-level, nonviolent
offenses); Samantha Michaels, Boston’s New DA Is a Black Woman Who Is Out to Change
the City’s Racist Sentencing Disparities, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 16, 2018), https://
www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2018/11/a-black-woman-running-for-boston-da-is-outto-change-the-citys-racist-sentencing-disparities (noting that Rollins faced an independent
candidate with police support in the general election).
435 See Rollins, supra note 381.
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refusing to prosecute crimes like receiving stolen property or drug
possession raise legitimate fears of malicious domination.
Her inclusion of drug possession with intent to distribute, however, gives some instructive pause. Drugs are easily transportable.
That renders more tangible the specter of harmful impact on out-ofdistrict residents, who are equally entitled to make differing judgments about the harms of drugs and how to prevent them. But, as
implemented, Rollins’s policy directs subordinates to ask whether the
violator presents “clear indicia of intent to distribute beyond mere
quantity,” which I take to be a de facto kingpin safety valve.436 Mass
distribution, it would seem, poses unique risks of engendering spillover beyond the people who had the ability to participate in Rollins’s
election. This sort of careful work to mitigate supralocal effect is
exactly what prong two seeks. And it shows how prong two may properly cabin what prong one might otherwise authorize.
3. Harder Cases: Tiffany Cabán

436

04/16/2021 13:23:52

THE RACHAEL ROLLINS POLICY MEMO app. C-7 (2019).
See Steadman, supra note 1 (quoting Cabán’s pledge to “not prosecute sex workers,
customers, [or] the promoting prostitution charges” and reporting one of her opponents’
criticism of Cabán’s decriminalization proposal); see, e.g., Emma Whitford, DA Candidates
Stake Out Positions on Sex Work Decriminalization, QUEENS DAILY EAGLE (Mar. 13,
2019), https://queenseagle.com/all/2019/3/13/da-candidates-stake-out-positions-on-sexwork-decriminalization (reporting candidates’ responses to questions about sex work
decriminalization).
438 See Jonathan M. Barnett, The Rational Underenforcement of Vice Laws, 54 RUTGERS
L. REV. 423, 424–25 (2002) (classing prostitution among consensual crimes).
437
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This model does not eliminate the need for judgment. Tiffany
Cabán’s (barely) unsuccessful try for Queens District Attorney is an
example. To pick one part of her platform, she likely would have satisfied prong one with respect to her planned nullification of prostitution
laws. The clarity with which she campaigned made her plan salient,
facilitated its public ventilation, and engendered attacks from her
opponents.437
But prong two would have been trickier. One might say prostitution offenses simply ban consensual conduct between adults.438 On
that view, sufficient harm to others—either intra- or inter-district—to
justify overriding the district’s choice seems unlikely. Yet some might
argue that decriminalizing vice will have criminogenic effects that spill
into neighboring districts. On the other hand, perhaps Cabán’s policy
would have provided a positive externality by drawing this behavior
out of neighboring districts.
Similar shades of grey arise in the invidious intra-district domination context. True, this policy does not fence minorities out of the
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decisionmaking process or trample any established constitutional
rights in ways that would make such domination obvious. Yet dissenters both inside and outside the district might contend that
decriminalization would lead to the sort of exploitation (say, human
trafficking) that an anti-domination framework cannot countenance.439 There would be counters, of course: the causal chain may be
too attenuated, and perhaps the individuals who will supposedly be
harmed generally support the policy. In my view, Cabán would have
the better of the debate, but this model cannot eliminate or conclusively resolve these difficult value-laden questions. It does suggest,
however, that we gain something important in channeling them to the
people most affected by their resolution.440
B. Future Applications
1. Jury Nullification

2. Beyond Elections: Community Prosecution and Lesser Controls
This Article also supplements scholarship on prosecutorial
conduct.

04/16/2021 13:23:52

439 See, e.g., Allie Sisson, Access to Justice for Undocumented Female Victims of Sex
Trafficking, 17 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 91, 121, 127–28 (2019) (noting this risk but still
advocating decriminalization).
440 See, e.g., RAHMAN, supra note 25, at 103–05, 109–11 (arguing for the intrinsic value
and concrete benefits of empowering laypeople within democratic decisionmaking).
441 See supra Section IV.A.1 (arguing that populist prosecutorial nullification affords
more transparency and accountability than jury nullification, thus safeguarding against the
worst excesses of popular control).
442 See supra text accompanying notes 274–89 (noting that providing people with the
feeling of control over their own lives and societies can unite local polities).
443 See, e.g., Butler, supra note 75 (arguing for anti-racist use of jury nullification).
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This Article’s analysis offers one unexpected contribution to
debates on jury nullification. While much of the reasoning could bolster pro-jury nullification scholarship, this Article may suggest that
jury nullification is less necessary than its supporters think. After all,
while populist prosecutorial nullification embodies populist local control, it contains safeguards that may suppress some of jury nullification’s worst tendencies. Its transparency offers a greater check on its
negative use than jury nullification,441 and it puts the nullification
choice to a larger, more representative portion of the polity.442 Finally,
unlike acquittals, we can at least imagine some populist prosecutorial
nullification being judicially reviewable. In fact, ironically, this Article
may supplement anti-jury-nullification scholarship by offering those
who endorse jury nullification for purposive ends443 a safer, more
effective path to those ends.
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First, it rejects a view of American prosecutorial elections as an
embarrassing nineteenth-century relic.444 Far from an unfortunate vestige best suppressed, prosecutorial elections should be prized as mechanisms to maximize democratic self-determination. After all,
prosecutorial elections will continue for the foreseeable future. Those
focusing on ways to undermine them may be missing legitimate reasons to embrace the popularly guided prosecutor. Even those
unwilling fully to endorse populist prosecutorial nullification should
find reasons here to consider anew whether, and to what extent, the
post-election prosecutor “should be guided in her discretionary decisions ‘by an honest effort to discern public needs and community concerns.’”445 While this Article cannot offer an exhaustive further
analysis of what that would mean, it can sketch some suggestions.
At minimum, this Article’s reasoning supports so-called “community prosecution.” Better still, it offers a grading rubric. Although
many now invoke community prosecution, the term can be amorphous and often seems not to prescribe any particular policies or
modes of operation.446 It may “at the very least . . . connote[] ‘a decentralization of authority and accountability, with the ultimate aim of
enabling an office to anticipate and respond to community
problems.’”447 But this can be quite consistent with a façade of community input that “hears” citizens but changes nothing about how the
office does business.448 This Article’s framework allows us to see why
such façades provide little of the democratic legitimacy they invoke
and to identify versions of community prosecution with real heft.449
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444 See, e.g., Richman, supra note 126, at 62–63 (arguing that “most domestic and
comparative scholars” view “prosecutorial elections” with “dismay”).
445 Ramsey, supra note 96, at 1318.
446 See, e.g., Levine, supra note 12, at 35 (“[T]he contours of the term ‘community
prosecution’ remain somewhat unspecified.” (citations omitted)).
447 Id. (citation omitted).
448 See Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 321, 358 (2002) (“It is far easier to invoke the specter of ‘the community’ and to
purport to speak and act on its behalf than to work at discovering its varied voices, goals,
and concerns.”); Justin Murray, Reimagining Criminal Prosecution: Toward a ColorConscious Professional Ethic for Prosecutors, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1595 (2012)
(noting that some initiatives represent little more than “shak[ing] hands and hold[ing]
meetings, in a semblance of engagement” (quoting Cecelia Klingele, Michael S. Scott &
Walter J. Dickey, Reimagining Criminal Justice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 953, 982)); cf. M. Elaine
Nugent-Borakove & Patricia L. Fanflik, Community Prosecution: Rhetoric or Reality?, in
THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR, supra note 12, at 211, 212
(“Community prosecution has generally been described as a grassroots approach to justice,
involving citizens . . . in problem-solving efforts to address the safety concerns of the local
jurisdiction.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
449 See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide Accountability Deficit
for Prosecutors, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1587, 1611–12 (2010) (holding that community
prosecution “gathers public opinion about enforcement practices” to “emphasize[] the
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Additionally, this Article supports further democratization of
prosecutorial flexibility. Life does not wait for elections, and community needs may change during a prosecutor’s tenure. Short of nullification, it may be appropriate for prosecutors to create more mechanisms
to incorporate community sentiment regarding resource allocation.450
That sort of workaday enforcement decision is not one that demands
formal electoral authorization, given our background expectations
regarding resource-driven prioritization. Yet the principles that do
require such authorization for programmatic nullification indicate that
government actors should work harder to operationalize the input of
those by whose consent they govern.
Two possibilities present themselves here. The state grand jury’s
influence over charging is widely considered to have fallen into
decrepitude, and many perceive the institution now to operate (when
it operates at all) as a pro forma “rubber stamp” for desired
prosecutorial charges.451 This Article’s reasoning may counsel in favor
of broader, more substantive use of grand juries. That is, prosecutors
might elect to use grand juries more when they have the option452 and
might treat them as a meaningful veto point over the ultimate
charging decision rather than manipulable tools in service of a desired
prosecutorial end.453 For similar reasons, prosecutors may wish to
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prosecution of cases that will contribute the most to the public’s sense of safety”); Coles,
supra note 98, at 195 (asserting that under community prosecution “priorities in
prosecuting cases reflect determinations by citizens as to which offenses are most
significant”).
450 Some scholars caution against the potential of referenda on individual cases. See
Sklansky, supra note 289, at 673–74 (warning of “[t]he danger of politicizing the handling
of particular cases” and suggesting it could be deemed “prosecution by plebiscite”). This
criticism warrants attention in considering my model’s implications outside the prospective
categorical nonenforcement context, although jury verdicts could be viewed as a sort of
community referendum in a particular case, insofar as juries represent the community.
Grand juries, too, represent a version of community control over the prosecution decision.
451 See Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2352
& n.99 (2008) (reviewing common clichés and metaphors used to describe criticisms of
grand juries); Fairfax, supra note 28, at 758 (noting that many believe that the grand jury
fails to protect individual rights from encroachment by the government); Decker, supra
note 98, at 345–47, 385 (detailing history and decline of the grand jury in the United
States).
452 Cf. SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., supra note 28, § 8:2 (observing that prosecutors in
states that do not give the accused the right to demand a grand jury indictment for serious
crimes may still choose to utilize grand juries).
453 See, e.g., Decker, supra note 98, at 385–87 (observing substantial prosecutorial power
over the grand jury’s operation); SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., supra note 28, § 4:15 (same).
For similar reasons, we might push more states to give felony defendants the right to insist
upon indictment by grand jury. See, e.g., Decker, supra, at 354 (“About half of the states
do not require a grand jury indictment to prosecute any type of criminal offense . . . .”);
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 33, § 15.1(c) (noting nineteenth-century state rejection of the
right to insist upon indictment by a grand jury).
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increase and democratize their use of prosecutorial metrics by, for
example, consulting the public on what information it desires.454
CONCLUSION
Generally, critics of programmatic prosecutorial nullification may
have a point. Prosecutors’ broad control over charging does not equal,
without more, license to remake democratically enacted law. But that
something more, at least at the state level, can lie in the nexus
between locally elected prosecutors and their communities. Much
about what democracy entails is fundamentally contestable. Yet a
view of the concept focused on subsidiarity-aided autonomy reveals a
surprising justification for programmatic prosecutorial nullification.
When it is populist prosecutorial nullification, far from antidemocratic
flouting of the rule of law, it advances some of democracy’s most
important ends.

454 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 123, at 188–89 (advocating use of metrics to “measure
process (such as charges filed) or outcomes (such as convictions . . . )”); Wright & Miller,
supra note 441, at 1615, 1617 (“[Some] lead prosecutors now use case data to shape the
relationship between the office and the voters.”). See generally M. Elaine NugentBorakove, Performance Measures and Accountability, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR, supra note 12, at 91–106 (discussing benefits, objectives,
challenges, and guidance for the implementation of prosecutorial performance
measurement frameworks).
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